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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines how the major television networks, in conjunction with the Reagan 
administration, launched a lingering cloud of nuclear anxiety that helped to revive the Cold War 
during the 1980s. Placed within a larger political and cultural post-war context, this national 
preoccupation with a global show-down with the Soviet Union at times both hindered and 
bolstered Reagan‘s image as the archetypal conservative, cowboy President that could free 
America from its liberal adolescent past now caustically referred to as ―the sixties.‖ This stalwart 
image of Reagan, created and carefully managed by a number of highly-paid marketing 
executives, as one of the embodiment of peaceful deterrence, came under attack in the early 
1980s when the ―liberal‖ Nuclear Freeze movement showed signs of becoming politically 
threatening to the staunch conservative pledging to win the Cold War at any cost. And even if the 
nuclear freeze movement itself was not powerful enough to undergo the Herculean task of 
 
 
 
removing the President in 1984, the movement was compassionate enough to appeal to a mass 
audience, especially when framed in narrative form on network television. In the early 1980s, 
debates over the possibility of nuclear war and other pertinent Cold War related issues became 
much more democratized in their visibility on the network airwaves. However, the message 
disseminated from the networks was not placed in an educational framework, nor did these 
television productions clarify complicated nuclear issues such as nuclear winter theory and 
proliferation. I argue this renewed network attention on nuclear issues was not placed in an 
historical framework and likely confused American viewers because it routinely exposed 
audiences to both fact and fiction, undifferentiated at the level of the mass media. 
INDEX WORDS: Ronald Reagan, Cold War, Network television, Made-for-television movies, 
World War III, Special Bulletin, The Day After, Threads, Amerika, Nuclear freeze movement, 
Nuclear winter theory, Nuclear weapons, Strategic Defensive Initiative, ―Star Wars,‖, Great 
Nuclear Arms Debate, Infotainment, ―Morning in America campaign‖ 1984 US Presidential 
Campaign, Walter Mondale.  
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Introduction 
―If a scholar a thousand years from now had no evidence about what had happened in the United 
States between 1945 and 1985 except the books produced by the cultural and intellectual 
historians he or she would hardly guess that such a thing as nuclear weapons had existed.‖1 
 
In November of 1983, high above the panoptic eye of the international media, NATO 
engaged in a routine military exercise that was intended to assess the strength and speed of the 
U.S. nuclear arsenal. The ABLE/ARCHER exercises, as they came to be known, tested NATO‘s 
ability to mobilize from Norway to Turkey in the event of a nuclear strike. This nuclear exercise 
occurred at a time when the United States was engaged militarily around the world, fighting in 
Central America and Lebanon, as well as deploying state of the art nuclear hardware in Western 
Europe.  However, this large-scale exercise was interpreted by the Soviets as a potential first 
strike, and by some accounts the Soviets were prepared to launch their own nuclear weapons in 
retaliation.
2
 Although the ABLE/ARCHER scare did not lead to World War Three, the early 
1980s saw a rejuvenation of the Cold War that permeated every aspect of America life and 
helped to end the years of political and cultural détente. By late 1981 an NBC/Associated Press 
poll reported that over 75% of Americans expected a nuclear war to occur in their lifetime.    
 This pronounced cultural belief in the end of days reflected a dramatic shift in American 
Cold War culture. For the first time since 1973, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved the 
infamous ―Doomsday Clock‖ to four minutes to midnight, signaling to an uneasy public that 
nuclear annihilation was indeed a contemporary reality. While the Reagan administration 
focused national attention on the ―evil‖ machinations of the expansive Soviet empire, the 
                                                 
1
 Paul Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New 
York: Pantheon, 1985), xvii.  
2
 Richard Rhodes, Arsenal of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race, (New York: Knopf, 2007), 181.  
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American public became aware that the possibility of nuclear war might result from the 
geopolitical movements of the Soviet empire or the bellicose military build-up under Reagan‘s 
leadership. Even worse, World War Three might occur due to a technological mishap. 
 In the United States, the national media was focused on the premiere of a new primetime 
television movie special depicting the American landscape after a nuclear war. On Sunday, 
November 28, 1983, ABC aired the made for television film, The Day After, and an estimated 
100 million viewers tuned in to watch the complete annihilation of America in a cataclysmic 
nuclear war. Weeks prior to the premier of the film, ABC began an extensive promotional 
campaign that was matched by unflinching coverage in the popular press. While the national 
network news shows discussed the potential political impact of The Day After, NATO‘s 
ABLE/ARCHER incident went virtually unnoticed by American television viewers. Not only 
was the national media focused on nuclear culture, but the national discourse began to reflect the 
renewed visibility of Cold War imagery and fears.  
 During the years of détente in which Carter precipitously announced an end to the Cold 
War due to the SALT II agreement, the idea of ―winning‖ and surviving nuclear war with the 
Soviet Union was once again propagated by White House officials. During the 1980s, network 
television was peppered with docu-dramas, made for television movies that foretold the story of 
an impending nuclear war against Communists to a new generation of television viewers, 
generation X. The televised and dramatized depictions of the Cold War on network television 
during the Reagan administration represents a continuation of the symbiotic and intertwined 
relationship between the government and the networks to sell the Cold War project to the 
Americans, generate ratings for the major networks and also produce profits for corporate 
sponsors. However, in pursuit of viewers and a friendly relationship with the government, 
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network television intentionally avoided consistent interpretation of nuclear issues or critical 
analysis of the Reagan administration. This dissertation argues that the networks attempted to 
capitalize on escalating nuclear fears by producing ―made for television‖ movies that were meant 
to engage viewers on all sides of the political spectrum. As the political maneuverings of 
Reagan‘s Cold Warriors heightened national anxiety about nuclear war, network television 
brought the ―fictional‖ accounts of possible nuclear narratives to nervous Americans viewers, 
and their children. 
This dissertation examines how the major television networks, in conjunction with the 
Reagan administration, launched a lingering cloud of nuclear anxiety that helped to revive the 
Cold War during the 1980s. Placed within a larger political and cultural post-war context, this 
national preoccupation with a global show-down with the Soviet Union at times both hindered 
and bolstered Reagan‘s image as the archetypal conservative, cowboy President that could free 
America from its liberal adolescent past now caustically referred to as ―the sixties.‖ This stalwart 
image of Reagan, created and carefully managed by a number of highly-paid marketing 
executives, as one of the embodiment of peaceful deterrence, came under attack in the early 
1980s when the ―liberal‖ Nuclear Freeze movement showed signs of becoming politically 
threatening to the staunch conservative pledging to win the Cold War at any cost. And even if the 
nuclear freeze movement itself was not powerful enough to undergo the Herculean task of 
removing the President in 1984, the movement was compassionate enough to appeal to a mass 
audience, especially when framed in narrative form on network television. In the early 1980s, 
debates over the possibility of nuclear war and other pertinent Cold War related issues became 
much more democratized in their visibility on the network airwaves. However, the message 
disseminated from the networks was not placed in an educational framework, nor did these 
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television productions clarify complicated nuclear issues such as nuclear winter theory and 
proliferation. I argue this renewed network attention on nuclear issues was not placed in an 
historical framework and likely confused American viewers because it routinely exposed 
audiences to both fact and fiction, undifferentiated at the level of the mass media.
3
    
This dissertation has five chapters organized in chronological and thematic order from 
1977 through 1987. It explores how network television attempted to translate political discourse 
to a national audience through made for television docudramas that dealt with nuclear issues. 
Each chapter presents a specific made-for-television film as a case-study to examine how 
network television and the Reagan White House engaged nuclear debates and moreover how 
these films represent the larger historical significance of Reaganism. Television underwent a 
radical transformation in the 1980s with the inclusion of a number of technological changes 
including the remote control and cable television.
4
  Furthermore, television, as a medium charged 
with informing and entertaining the public, grew in tandem with the Cold War. By examining 
television movies, network television shows, and televised news specials, I argue that television 
helped to complicate Reagan‘s nuclear message throughout both terms of his presidency.  In 
addition, even though at times network nuclear programs generated a great deal of heightened 
controversy regarding the political  meaning of various nuclear programs, I argued the interplay 
between the White House, television networks and corporate advertisers proved profitable for all 
parties involved.  
The era of eighties television is complex in that the imaginary characters brought to life 
by the networks were not dissimilar from the fictionalized persona of President Reagan. During 
the decade, network television was still steeply invested in maintaining political orthodoxy 
                                                 
3
Ibid, 169. 
4
 Jane Feuer, Seeing through the Eighties: Television and Reaganism (Duke University Press, 1995), pp 2.  
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however the hegemonic power of the mass media became more complicated through the 
development of new technologies, cable television, and federal deregulation. Furthermore, the 
line between entertainment and network news programming became more obscured as network 
ratings began to wane in the midst of the availability of cable television. The verisimilitudes of 
the decade, especially in the context of the Cold War, complicate Alan Nadel‘s cultural analysis 
of network television acting as brainwashing agent to promote American Cold War orthodoxy 
during the post-war period. Rather, as this dissertation argues, network television was engaged in 
a more complicated relationship not only with the White House, but also with television viewers 
during this ten year period, approximately 1977-1987. Television technologies, from the 
introduction of cable stations, satellite television, the remote control, and the VCR challenged the 
control of the traditional three major network‘s command of the viewing audience. However 
complicated and enigmatic this relationship became, I argue the method of investigating this 
relationship through the television lens provides much needed analysis on how Americans 
continued to grapple with politics, the mass media, and contradictory Cold War messages 
delivered on network television during the late atomic period.  
Methodological approaches to the Cold War employed in this dissertation include but are 
not limited to John Fiske‘s work on popular culture and the ―subordinate‖ television viewer, 
Alan Nadel‘s cultural analysis of television working as a state and corporate sponsored 
apparatus, and also Jane Feuer‘s idea that network television underwent a transformation during 
the eighties because of new technologies and changing viewership
5
. Finally, guiding this method 
is the work of Paul Boyer and the assertion that the ―idea‖ of the bomb permeates every aspect of 
American culture, especially when it is dramatized and democratized on television. In an attempt 
to move ―beyond the cultural turn,‖ I interweave cultural analysis within the larger political 
                                                 
5
 John Fiske, Understanding Popular Culture (New York: Routledge, 1989), 23.  
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narrative.
6
 Other thematic issues discussed in this dissertation include Reagan and the media, 
docudramas and activism, suburbia and generation X, and finally the objectivity of network 
news. Archival sources procured at UCLA and Vanderbilt, such as Reagan‘s 1984 presidential 
television ad, ―Morning in America,‖ offers visual texts to decode how masculinity, militarism, 
and capitalism became synonymous with Reaganism.  
When Reagan first entered the White House in 1981, he brought to office a team of hard 
line anti-communists, as many as 50 drawn from the ranks of the neo-conservative group, the 
Committee on the Present Danger (CPD). 
7
Network made-for-television movies provide a visual 
and thematic trajectory of Reagan‘s political motives. For example, in the early 1980s NBC 
produced World War III and Special Bulletin, two films that presented a ―liberal‖ message of the 
dangers of nuclear proliferation. By 1983, as nuclear fears escalated around the globe, network 
programming reflected this climate of fear by producing the seemingly horrific and timely made-
for-television drama, The Day After. The White House was so concerned about the political 
fallout that the film might have on American voters that staffers distributed numerous internal 
memorandums that presented a specific media plan as to how to counter any negative press the 
film might bring for the President. Archival records from the Reagan Library suggest the White 
House was prepared to launch a three prong strategy to combat any negative press these made-
for-television films might produce amongst American voters. The first step was to reiterate the 
position that mutually assured destruction (MAD) was the most effective way to prevent global 
nuclear war. The next strategy was to present high-ranking White House officials, such as Casper 
Weinberger and George Schultz on television to reassure Americans that the Reagan 
                                                 
6
 Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds. Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and 
Culture. (Berkley: University of California Press, 1999).  
 
7
 Jules Tygiel, Ronald Reagan: The Triumph of American Conservatism (New York: Pearson, 2005), 120. 
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administration was confident it could successfully defend Americans from the Soviet menace. 
Finally, the White House was prepared to use aggressive Cold War red-baiting tactics to 
discredit any television program that questioned the tenets of peaceful nuclear proliferation.  
In addition, the official White House ―Day After‖ plan discusses how European 
audiences might react to the depiction of cataclysmic nuclear war on American television. As a 
growing wave of nuclear freeze activist galvanized in Europe, by 1984 the BBC produced its 
own made-for-television docudrama, Threads, which not only humanized nuclear war but also 
imagined how the effects of a nuclear war would shape the lives of the next two generations of 
European children. After a private viewing of the The Day After in October of 1983 Reagan 
reportedly became depressed about the possibility of nuclear war irrespective of his militaristic 
foreign policies.
8
 By Reagan‘s second term, television and the mass media were more optimistic 
about America‘s cultural and political supremacy and presenting imagery that suggested faith in 
Reagan could rebuild society, reassert masculinity, and solidify global supremacy.  
As the nuclear freeze movement became more detrimental to the Reagan administration 
both abroad and at home, Reagan sent visible, televised message of a mythical America, 
protected by the futuristic Strategic Defense Initiative, and unstoppable in its jingoistic 
religiosity through his televised appearances and national speeches. In turn, network television 
programming mirrored Reagan‘s new conciliatory tone. In 1987, ABC aired its epic docudrama, 
Amerika, a teleplay about American life under Soviet occupation. Although this film received 
respectable ratings for the network it created a torrent of controversy for both corporate 
advertisers and the White House. Network television‘s unskillful and cumbersome portrayal of 
Communism served to only .embolden the puzzling message of peaceful deterrence orchestrated 
by the White House.  
                                                 
8
 Rhodes, Arsenal of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race, 168-169.  
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Ronald Reagan is arguably the first television-created president. From his early days as a 
Hollywood agent and actor, to his ascension to national political prominence through his 
powerful televised speeches of the 1950s and 1960s, Reagan was remarkably astute at utilizing 
the media to further his political career. The image of Ronald Reagan, as the well-crafted 
legendary cowboy maintained by his handlers, offered to the people, just as Gary Willis asserted 
about John Wayne, a man that ―stood for an America people felt was disappearing or had 
disappeared.‖9   Reagan‘s popularity, particularly after the failed assassination attempt on his life 
by John Hinckley Jr., achieved an iconic level. Historian Philip Jenkins notes that the 
assassination attempt, which was widely televised, ―was chilling to a nation just recovering from 
the horrors of the 1970s and hoping desperately that Reagan‘s leadership would mark the start of 
better times.‖10 Reagan‘s stalwart image, coupled with his brilliant command of the camera lens, 
offered a layer of familial nostalgia that in many ways harkened back to the nascent post-war 
years, before New Left liberal politics.  
This work explores the methods that Reagan, along with the major television networks 
and the mass media, utilized to escalate the climate of nuclear fear that characterizes the late 
atomic period. Television has been inextricably linked with the Cold War since its inception and 
moreover has been a conduit for the West‘s position on combating the spread of Communism. 
Reagan came to political prominence through Hollywood, became an ardent Cold-Warrior and 
demonstrated a preternatural command of the camera, all integral skills for the post-war, atomic 
climate. Historical investigations on the 1950s established the symbiotic relationship between the 
                                                 
9
 Gary Willis, John Wayne’s America (Simon and Schuster: New York), 14. 
10
 Philip Jenkins, Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of Eighties America (Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2006), 239.   
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Cold War and television; however surprisingly little attention has been given to Reagan era.
11
 
Reagan brought to the camera what the American television audience valued most: a strong 
visual presence and a vaunted affability. Reagan also had the ability to simplify the most abstract 
national issues--deficits, territorial jurisdictions, and nuclear stalemates. By finding the essential 
narrative in these matters, and then by humanizing those narratives, Reagan produced his own 
unique style of conservative politics. Television favors that style since it is, after all, the most 
intimate of the mass media, with its ability to show emotion and to do so in tight focus.    
Network television emerged at the dawn of the Cold War and the two have shaped 
American political and cultural life since 1945. In the battle against Communism, television 
news became viewed by American politicians as a vital tool to spread American consumer and 
democratic ideas. Moreover, most Americans believed that ―the corporate owned and 
commercially sponsored television industry represented the freest, best and only alternative to 
state-controlled information.‖12 As early as 1951, advertisements warned parents that not buying 
television sets could prove detrimental to their children‘s well-being, particularly in light of a 
Cold War fears knowing specific civil defense measures. 
13
  Network television was given the 
specific task of using its powerful influence to propagate anti-communism to the growing 
American post-war audience and continued to do so until the collapse of the Berlin Wall.  
The emergence of network television is also indelibly linked to the growth of suburbia. 
During the 1960s when Vietnam and social movements occupied the government‘s attention, 
network television began to neglect Cold War inspired programming and instead focused on 
creating national television past-times such as weekly network sports, children shows, and 
                                                 
11
 Nancy Bernhard, U.S. Television News and Cold War Propaganda, 1947-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University press, 199). pp. 1-2 
12
 Ibid.  
13
 Thomas Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism and American Culture (Columbia 
University Press: New York, 2003), pp. 4-5.  
10 
 
 
variety programs intent on capturing the growing suburban audience. Television networks 
proved it was not only an economic threat to Hollywood films but also that it could retain more 
viewership thanks in part to the advent of suburbia. In the postwar era, television provided 
conventional mass entertainment in infinitely greater abundance, as well as far more cheaply, 
then Hollywood studios. 
14
 In the late 1960s television was able to garner huge audiences by 
broadcasting the First World Series, the Super Bowl as well as ―made for television‖ movies.  
During the 1970s, television entered into a new age of network film: the made for 
television movie.  The 1977 ―made for television‖ film Roots achieved incredible success, 
drawing the largest audience in television history with more than half the American population, 
over 130 million viewers, watching at least some part of the eight hour mini-series.
15
 By the late 
1970s, television executives such as ABC President Brandon Stoddard found that American 
audiences were once again interested in Cold War culture and in turn the three major networks 
played an active role in escalating nuclear anxieties for a new suburban generation by producing 
an onslaught of news specials, television narratives, and religious programming that created a 
national discourse and disquiet about the greatest of all fears in Cold War history: nuclear war 
with the Soviet Union. This television genre was also exposed to a new faction of American 
viewers: Generation X. After years of relative hibernation, the Cold War rebounded in the late 
atomic period with a renewed immediacy that became explicitly connected with the network 
television, the Reagan administration, and suburban conservative politics. 
Central to this dissertation is the ―Reagan Revolution,‖ which is more cultural than 
economic in scope. The year 1983 stands out as one of great contradictions. For a small 
                                                 
14
 Paul Monaco, The Sixties: 1960-1969, History of the American Cinema (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2001), 3.  
15
 Bruce Shulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in America Culture, Society and Politics (Da Capo Press; 
Cambridge, MA, 2001), 77.  
11 
 
 
percentage of privileged Americans, the Reagan economic reform reenergized a culture of 
capitalism and consumer abundance that became synonymous with individuality. As many 
political activists found identification with social movements of the 1960s, by the early 1980s 
Americans were identifying with commodities, especially technology. For most Americans, 
these new technological innovations were still restricted by either federal legislation or economic 
access. For the privileged white-collar yuppie class cultivated by Reagan‘s economic policy, the 
ideas of satellite or cable television, home video recording, and niche channels opened up this 
new world of television viewing. Similarly, Reagan‘s approach for peace through superior 
technological might, as outlined by the Strategic Defensive Initiative, promised a world free 
from nuclear war 
The renewed interest in nuclear war was also becoming a hotly contested political issue 
between the nuclear freeze activists associated with the New Left and the New Right Cold 
Warriors. Scientists, journalist and government officials published a number of reports that 
presented alternative nuclear scenarios. From the discussion of nuclear arms on television news 
shows to nuclear-themed television narratives, for a moment it looked like what Amy Carter told 
her father in 1980 was indeed true: Nuclear war was the most important issue of her generation.
16
 
This brief contest, played out in the media, between anti-freeze activist and the ambassadors of 
the Reagan Right, did little to educate the public since it was filled with nuclear jargon. 
Additionally, the New Right routinely red-baited those involved in the nuclear freeze movement, 
including prominent scientists such as Carl Sagan.   
  
 
                                                 
16
 Meyers, xiii.  
12 
 
 
Television and the Cold War: A Brief history 
Television has a long history of presenting the Cold War project to Americans in a 
number of forms. Television executives and Cold War political architects alike understood that 
the American public would never accept network news that overtly resembled state-sponsored 
propaganda.
17
  One way of avoiding this connection was through the legitimization of individual 
television reporters. By 1951,  Edward R. Murrow‘s show, See it Now, as well as NBC‘s highly 
successful, Meet the Press, offered examples of the ―objectivity‖ of individual network news 
reporters by permitting them to challenge the corporations that they ultimately answered to and 
the government officials presumably hostile to their reporting. Although network-scripted prime-
time programming grew disinterested in the political machinations of the Cold War, particularly 
after the reign of McCarthyism, network news portrayed itself as steadfast in the ―pursuit of 
truth‖ in the atomic age. 
The post-war period is filled with examples of the mass media‘s complicit cooperation in 
promoting the Cold War and investigating potential American communists, particularly during 
the Second Red Scare. Nancy Bernhard, in her work on the symbiotic relationship between 
network news and government officials during the early and high atomic periods, uses the 
framework of ―normative objectification,‖ a term coined by sociologist Alvin Gouldner to 
describe the process in which the practices and ideologies of objectivity incorporate prevailing 
social and political norms, but retain and even strengthen their claims to objectivity. Bernhard 
argues the networks claimed objectivity in terms of individual reporters and investigative 
journalism, while adhering to formal Cold War ideology. This was a dangerous precedent, as 
Bernhard suggests, since it involves cooperation between government officials, network 
executives, and the corporations that reign supreme in the capitalist structure. One example she 
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cites is the relationship between CBS and the CIA in the nascent years of the Cold War. 
Bernhard writes, ―CBS and the CIA was so friendly that Allen Dulles, CIA director from 1953 
until 1961, hosted annual New Year‘s parties for CBS News Staff at his home or at his private 
club, the Alibi, in Washington, D.C. …Clearly, at the time, no one who participated felt their 
gathering violated professional ethics…‖ even though this relationship between networks news 
and the government resulted in the firing of over 1400 government officials during the 
Eisenhower administration alone.
 18
 Bernhard underscores two important points: the 
interrelationship between the networks and the government during the post war period and the 
major three networks‘ collective commitment to advertise and sell the Cold War project to 
American consumers. 
 According to Bernhard and television historian Gary L. Edgerton, the ABC television 
network lagged behind NBC and CBS in the immediate postwar years and was also 
conspicuously immune to direct governmental confrontation. This is not to say the network was 
completely free from government pressure to help promote the commitment to contain 
communism in both its network programming as well as its news, however the network never 
received the ratings the other two major networks garnered. Bernhard provides an excellent 
example of this aforementioned stunted cooperation with her discussion on a State Department 
devised television program that sold the militarization of U.S. containment policy for ABC to 
broadcast during prime-time. The show entitled, The Marshall Plan in Action, aired on ABC 
from 1950 to 1953, and even though ABC aired the program for over three years, the network 
decided not only to change the name, (it became Strength for a New World in 1951), but also 
moved the show to a different night. The network found that even though it routinely 
broadcasted government constructed programs it could generate more advertising revenue by 
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tapping into the newly formed suburban market with family friendly programs such as Walt 
Disney Presents. 
19
 
  Building on this audience, ABC moved into more specific types of programming, such as 
development of its Tuesday night Movie of the Week, which became the most popular feature-
length series in television history, beginning in 1969.
20
 Quickly, the movie of the week started 
grappling with social issues such as race and disease (Brian’s Song, 1970), homosexuality (That 
Certain Summer, 1972), drugs (Go Ask Alice, 1973) to the horrors of America slavery (Root’s, 
1977). The success of ABC‘s docudramas reflected larger social and political changes occurring 
throughout the United States during the seventies. Although the concept of television movies had 
been evolving since the late 1950s, the style of the television movie, which relies heavily on 
social melodrama, became so popular and successful that no major network dare stray from the 
formula. Edgerton‘s work on the history of television argues, ―the inclination of NBC, ABC, and 
CBS to follow similar lines of program development is a long-established pattern that results 
from the high degree of insularity and interdependence within their oligophy.‖21 The American 
public wanted to participate in social discussions provoked by docu-dramas and receive the 
opportunity to discuss their opinions on social issues, without having to get off the couch. As 
Edgerton explains: 
Baby boomers were especially attracted to more contemporary and relevant specials and 
series of all kinds. ABC, in particular, had been appealing to the tastes of this 
demographic group since the mid 1950s, and it continued to do so by probing America‘s 
headlines and popular culture for TV movie topics that were both attention grabbing and 
up to the minute. The telefeature format was ideally geared to the immediacy of most 
docu-dramatic ideas by having a gestation period of only six months to a year; in this 
way, a television movie could be created and telecast while the newsworthiness of the 
subject was still fresh on the minds of most Americans.
22
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What Edgerton leaves out in this analysis on the success of the docudramas amongst the 
changing suburban demographic of the new target audience compromised of young, urban, 
professionals with a growing number of children raised watching television, was that this 
demographic also enjoyed the implicit resolution of complicated social issues in a feature-film 
prime-time format, punctuated with commercial reminders of the joys of consumption.  
 The docu-drama styles that many of the made for television films employed, including 
Special Bulletin and The Day After, further obfuscated the already blurred lines between network 
news, partisan politics, ideological foreign policy, and corporate capitalism. Furthermore, with 
prominent members of Reagan‘s administration prepared to launch a political counter-offensive 
on the effectiveness of mutually assured destruction and exclaiming how the purpose of an 
immense nuclear arsenal produces peaceful deterrence, not war, the critical message of the films 
was blunted.  American audiences were at best likely to be confused by the mixed messages 
emanating from television. Yet as television studies have demonstrated, the issue of reception is 
not only complicated but predicated on larger socio-economic and cultural issues.  
In the post-Watergate era, television became the primary medium in which many 
Americans interpreted the news. The advent of Nightline created a unique format for the 
American public to understand international events without interrupting network programming 
or barraging the American public with uncomfortable political situations. The news division of 
ABC created the still-running news program Nightline to cover the Iranian Hostage Crisis of 
1979. Originally titled, ―The Iran Crisis: America Held Hostage,‖ the format of the show was 
designed to provide a designated 48 minutes of news just pertaining to the hostages every night 
so to guarantee valuable news times for any other pressing items of the day during the primetime 
16 
 
 
news hour, while not appearing to be harping on the event as if it were a war. Thus, under these 
interesting conditions of incubation, Nightline was formed and the public had the option to watch 
further news on the hostage crisis in Iran or alternatively watch The Tonight Show with Johnny 
Carson. Through the influence of Nightline, ABC, regardless of the ―objectivity‖ consistently 
effused by ABC President Brandon Stoddard, was bonded to the current administration just as 
the other two networks were since 1948. When the same network, now appeared to use the mini-
series, specifically The Day After, as a way to secretly engage in alleged pro-nuclear freeze 
propaganda the administration was prepared to offer a rapacious and scripted response. The 
administration‘s choice of rebuttal was ABC‘s own Nightline. The same network, which had just 
aired the highly anticipated social melodrama, now had to calm the nation of any nuclear 
anxieties it just provoked.  
       A 1977 Congressional hearing investigating the relationship between the CIA and network 
news agencies concluded the 1950s was a time when government officials were most active in 
cooperating with significant media outlets such as the New York Times, Time, and CBS.
23
 In 
contrast, ABC intended Nightline to be cancelled once the Iranian Crisis hostage was over, 
fearing the accusation of the network working in conjunction with the federal government for 
political gain. However, the continued popularity of Nightline, as well as its format, allowed Ted 
Koppel to maintain his legitimacy as an objective reporter.  In a continued response to impending 
nuclear television mini-series, The Day After, an April 1983 episode of Nightline presented a 
special hour-long newscast entitled, ―The Crisis Game,‖ in which a war game was simulated for 
the American people. In typical eighties cinematic style, former Secretary of State Edmund 
Muskie appeared as the president. Time Magazine published a four-part segment on how the 
United States and the Soviet Union would respond to a ―superpower showdown.‖ This onslaught 
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of atomic discourse pouring out of television and print journalism served to only frighten the 
American public and more importantly is reminiscent of the earlier postwar cooperation between 
network news and Cold War propaganda. The immediacy within which television programming 
could bring to life important, relevant current events allowed for the exploration of numerous 
political issues in narrative form and contributed to growing nuclear anxieties. The Reagan 
administration kept a watchful eye on a number of high-profile network mini-series that depicted 
atomic issues making sure the administration was literally waiting in the wings for a rebuttal, 
especially ABC who, as argued in chapter five repented for the alleged inflammatory 1983 film 
The Day After, with the overtly patriotic docudrama, Amerika in 1987.   
Building on Bernhard‘s contention, which argues that network television news 
legitimized its own objectivity by clinging to anticommunism orthodoxy, even if the orthodoxy 
undermined the network‘s objectivity, this work examines how network television during 
Reagan‘s 80s, understood that television news and programming must adhere to political 
orthodoxy for fear of being labeled ―liberal‖ during the Reagan revolution. Although Berhard 
focuses primarily on network news as the site of this implicit cooperation between the networks 
and the government, this dissertation argues that other types of network programming, including 
the social melodramas, were also visual sites that reveal television‘s complicity in furthering late 
Cold War orthodoxy. Bernhard‘s contention, which argues that television became one of the 
largest corollaries for selling the Cold War project to the American people, influences this work.  
I argue that the network television mini-series, which relies on capitalist corporate sponsorship, 
grappled with contemporary political issues in order to provoke audiences and sell cars---in short 
to sell American ideology to its consumers. The American Broadcasting Company, with its 
commitment to presenting pressing political and social issues, through both its network news and 
18 
 
 
primetime programming, continued to struggle with the bipolar nature of the Cold War. ABC 
found itself accused of undermining anticommunism, and by extension this meant the network 
was accused of not supporting national security and foreign policy. White House documents 
indicate the Reagan administration urged corporate advertisers to avoid paying television time 
during the ―liberal‖ made-for-television films such as The Day After.24  This criticism, which 
helped to shape network news in the early post-war period, repackages Allan Nadel‘s assertion 
of American television working as a hypnotic influence, or brainwashing, over the masses all to 
serve a capitalist agenda.  
The End of Détente and the Rise of Reaganism 
Even in the midst of the era of Cold War détente, adamant Cold Warriors propelled by 
the ―Vietnam Syndrome‖ were strategically aligning their forces to reheat the military contest 
with the Soviets. In response to mounting pressure from groups such as the Committee on the 
Present Danger, a group founded in 1976 with the sole aim of drawing attention to the escalating 
Soviet menace, numerous U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that the U.S. had calamitously 
underestimated impending Soviet military plans. Even if the Apollo missions had designated a 
win for the U.S. in terms of the space race, U.S. intelligence agents warned that the United States 
was considerably losing the arms race. When Reagan assumed office in 1981, a litany of 
supporters calling for nuclear rearmament received appointments to Reagan‘s cabinet. Although 
many Americans strongly favored an arms control agreement with the Soviets, by 1980 the 
pendulum swung towards higher defense spending and the landslide election of not only 
President Reagan but also Congressional Republicans.  
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 The new team of Cold Warriors appointed by Reagan was charged with the task to 
―restore the shattered American prestige and position around the world.‖25 This new 
conglomeration of Republicans would take a draconian position towards the Soviet Union, 
Communist led governments in Central America, and launch a massive military build-up, all in 
the name of ―beating the Russians.‖ According to Republican rhetoric, the United States was 
emasculated during the Carter years by the President‘s humanitarian agenda, the opening of the 
SALT II agreements, and finally the Iranian Hostage Crisis. In order to restore geopolitical 
supremacy, the U.S. ordered the production of the B-1 bomber, the Pershing II missile, and even 
allowed American arms manufactures to sell weapons on an unprecedented scale during 
peacetime. Given this new attention to weapon production, the arms industry grew exponentially 
during the early 1980s, with worldwide military spending peaking at approximately $550 billion 
annually.  
 This dissertation argues that the early years of the Reagan administration are reminiscent 
of the nascent years of the Cold War under Truman. Furthermore, there is a congruent cultural 
and political pattern in the late atomic era that echoes many cultural fears present during the first 
atomic period, (1945-1950). Although cultural fears about nuclear war had been somewhat 
diminished by 1955, atomic energy was heralded in the same era by scientists as a possible 
formula for other scientific inquiries. This same idea that atomic energy could provide a 
permanent solution to our nation‘s energy crisis was recycled in the mid-1970s, in the wake of 
the 1973 energy crisis and the ascendance of OPEC. In addition, the preoccupation with atomic 
secrecy that permeated the country in the wake of the 1950s atomic explosions in the Pacific, 
were duplicated under Reagan with his commitment to Cold War ideologies. In this context, 
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Reagan era militarism and the construction of new technologies, such as Strategic Defense 
Initiative, not only rejuvenated the political climate of fear that surrounded nuclear proliferation 
but also widened the chasm between scientists and the military. Scientists had occupied a curious 
position for many Americans since detonation of the first atomic bomb. Boyer writes, ―The same 
scientific discovery that had apparently brought an end to one terrible war simultaneously raised 
the specter of future wars of inconceivable destructiveness. An almost schizophrenic view of the 
scientist as public benefactor and as sinister impresario of death pervaded American culture.‖ 26 
The Reagan administration employed a variety of propaganda schemes in order to erase the 
destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons and also emphasized what David E. Lilienthal, the 
first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, described as the ―bright promise of atomic 
energy.‖27 
 Cold War Historiography 
Since the detonation of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the idea of 
the ―bomb‖ and ―nuclear annihilation‖ has captured the imagination of people around the world. 
In the United States the advent of the ―Atomic Age‖ ushered in a new era in American life 
characterized by fear, paranoia and the apocalyptic imagination. 
28
 
―Nuclear culture‖ is an umbrella term that describes different cultural products ranging 
from film, to literature, to television, to the emergence of specific genres like science fiction and 
post-apocalyptic narratives. More importantly, nuclear culture can be understood as the ways in 
which popular culture responded to both the social and political factors that precipitated the use 
and proliferation of nuclear weapons, and secondly, how the American public came to 
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understand and comprehend the potential implications of the bomb through public discourse. 
Immediately following the first use of the atomic bomb, Hollywood began incorporating atomic 
weaponry into its scripts. Works of both fiction and non-fiction began to contemplate the horrors 
of atomic imagery, and science fiction emerged as a distinct genre with its basis located in the 
nucleus of science and technology. Since the late 1940s, roughly thousands of films have been 
released in the United States alone depicting images of nuclear warfare and/or Cold War 
paranoia. However, it was not until the 1980s that scholars began the difficult task of examining 
the cultural, political and religious implications of atomic cinema. Science fiction films, in 
particular, were predominately dismissed as sub-par B movies devoid of any serious political, 
cultural or social meanings. For the most part historians have dismissed atomic films as simply 
monster films, mad scientists films, or disaster films without addressing the crucial, inextricable 
link inherent between technology and science fiction. However, more than any other genre 
science fiction has been able to capture and represent the paranoia and fear that accompanied the 
atomic age. As Susan Sontag writes in her watershed essay on postwar science fiction, ―One gets 
the feeling…that a mass trauma exists over the use of nuclear weapons and the possibility of 
future nuclear wars. Most of the science fiction films bear witness to this trauma, and in a way, 
attempt to exorcise it.‖29  
During the 1980s scholars began to produce serious examinations of atomic culture. 
Originally published in 1985, Paul Boyer‘s work, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought 
and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age, was one of the first serious historical works that not 
only documented the cultural fears present within the nuclear age, but also exposed the 
complicated public anxiety and discourse disseminating from Washington, the popular press, the 
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media, and Hollywood. Boyer argues that post-war American life has been characterized by 
cultural waves of nuclear anxiety that span from 1945 to the collapse of the Soviet Union. He 
spends a considerable amount of time discussing the American reaction to the bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and asserts that one of the most important visual artifacts first to 
emerge was Life’s magazine atomic bomb issue released August 20, 1945. The visual imagery 
presented in the magazine became the dominant way that many Americans first encountered the 
bomb and perhaps more importantly became a cultural touchstone for U.S. scientific 
achievement.
30
 In addition, he argues that the American reaction to the atomic bombing of Japan 
was shaped by a pronounced fear that this might happen in the United States. But more 
importantly he argued that the media helped to generate and perpetuate the myth that the 
utilization of atomic weapons not only shortened the Second World War but also saved 
American and Japanese lives.
31
  
 Margot Heinriksen and Allan M. Winkler agree that the bomb revolutionized American 
society, but perhaps more importantly, they argue that scholars only came to understand the 
enormity of atomic culture due to the heightened Cold War tensions exhibited in the early 
1980s.
32
  Furthermore, it is only after social critics and cultural historians began writing in the 
late 1980s, in response to the ―wave of antinuclear protests that was aroused in the early1980s,‖ 
that a discourse on nuclear culture began to emerge out of the academic world.
33
 Boyer‘s 
subsequent work on the topic of atomic culture also echoes this assertion that the regeneration of 
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the Cold War under Reagan ignited a scholarly interest in our atomic past, present and future.
34
 
Out of this new discourse came the insight that not only was nuclear culture revolutionary, but 
also that scholars should examine a variety of cultural products if they wanted to gauge how 
American learned to live under the new threat of nuclear weapons. According to early 1981 poll 
over half of Americans believed that a nuclear war was possible with the Soviet Union.
35
 Atomic 
investigations of the Reagan years were also fueled out of the same nuclear fears engulfing 
American citizens. From this regenerated nuclear fear emerged a decisively different version of 
the ―end of the world.‖ 
 Beginning with Paul Boyer, historians over the last twenty-five years successfully 
demonstrated how the culture of the Cold War invaded every aspect of post-war life. From the 
political and cultural objectives of the CIA, as examined in Saunders work Culture of the CIA 
and the world of Letters, to Dudziack‘s work on the relationship between the Cold War and civil 
rights, to numerous works that link containment ideology to gender, sexuality, red-baiting and 
social movements, it becomes increasingly clear that the Cold War permeated every aspect of 
American culture. Although, most of these treatments offer brilliant analysis into the culture of 
the early atomic period; they rarely consider the link between the Cold War and the New Right 
or the conservative cultural turn during the late atomic period.
36
   
Historiography on the New Right and Reagan is increasing in scope and content, aiming 
to explain how America made the conservative ―Right‖ turn in American political culture. The 
overall consensus amongst political historians of the late twentieth-century asserts that Reagan 
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was able to tap into a type of archetypal character, the cowboy conservative, to reassert 
masculinity and jingoistic religiosity into the fabric of American political culture which had 
waned during the mid-1970s. Moreover, Reagan exuded a sense of paternalism which mitigated 
many of the nuclear fears percolating under the veneer of ―effeminate‖ New Left liberalism. 
Philip Jenkins, in his 2006 work Decade of Nightmares: The End of the Sixties and the Making of 
Eighties America, persuasively argues that when one investigates the political and cultural milieu 
of the first Reagan administration, including the colossal military-industrial complex, the CIA‘s 
involvement in Central America, and a strong emphasis on arms and space, it remarkably 
resembles the early 1950s more than the ―liberalism‖ present during the Johnson and Nixon 
administrations.  
A Contraction of Periodization: The Long 1970s  
One of the major problems present in the post-war historiography is tracing the trajectory 
from the era of 1960s and the beginning of the conservative turn in American politics and 
cultural attitudes. Historians consistently argue over issues of periodization in terms of defining 
the ―actual‖ beginnings and end of the postwar decades and the rise tide of conservatism. 
Scholarly works such as Bruce Schulman‘s The Seventies, as well as Peter N. Carroll‘s, It 
Seemed Like Nothing Happened and Stephanie A. Slocum-Schaffer‘s, America in the Seventies, 
all offer different cultural explanations of how the United States transformed from the decade of 
―radical‖ movements to the beginning of the Reagan years. However, whether or not one agrees 
with Schulman‘s assertion that the end of the Sixties is invariably marked by the cultural and 
political unrest indelibly linked with the events of 1968, or whether the long ―decade‖ continued 
into the 1970s with the continuation of the Vietnam war, anti-war dissent and the dissemination 
of counter-culture imagery, music, movies, clothing and attitudes into the heart of American 
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suburban teenagers, what is generally unanimous amongst postwar historians is the theory that 
the years ranging from 1968 to 1974 represented a decisive ―cooling‖ of Cold War anxieties.37 
Furthermore, in order to explain the transition from Sixties Liberalism to the triumph of the 
Reagan revolution, one must accept the premise that ―the Seventies transformed American 
economic and cultural life as much as, if not more than, the revolutions in manners and morals of 
the 1920s and 1960s. The decade reshaped the political landscape more dramatically than the 
1930s. In race relations, religion, family life, politics and popular culture, the 1970s marked the 
most significant watershed of modern U.S. history, the beginning of our time.‖38 
Another obstacle a historian confronts when examining the first Reagan administration 
was how the Reagan Revolution was able to become such a triumphant success when his first 
years were peppered with political problems. The popular press, including Time Magazine and 
The Washington Post to name a few, criticized Reagan‘s big business agenda at the expense of 
American union-affiliated workers and warned that the economic climate of 1982, defined by 
Reagan‘s assault on social programs, was too reminiscent of President Hoover and the Great 
Depression. 
39
  Furthermore, even if Reagan‘s first years as President did not establish him as the 
stalwart, quintessential American cowboy conservative that could save the American public from 
evil enemies, both external and internal alike, as early as 1984 White House insiders, such as 
Martin Anderson, proudly proclaimed that Reagan had ignited a ―revolution‖ that would ―shake 
the political establishment of the United States—and the world—for some time to come.‖40  
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 The latest publication of Reagan‘s memoirs also confounds the question of ideological 
adherence to the tenets of the ―early atomic periods‖ as numerated by Boyer. Mark Haas asserted 
in his 2005 book on international politics, it would be a mistake to interpret Reagan‘s decisions 
as strategically informed, but rather a renewed dedication to rigid ideology, which at times took 
on biblical proportions. In addition, new examinations by Dickson, Nadel, and Zeman, suggest 
that Reagan was not simply motivated by ideological methods but instead embraced a personal 
cocktail of religion and individualism, which guided his positions. Reagan had to traverse a 
slippery path as he used both Cold Warrior nuclear jargon to defend military spending and ―out 
weapon‖ the Soviet Union, while adhering to religious prophecy in order to appease his 
fundamental voter base. It is no coincidence that Reagan delivered his ―Evil Empire‖ Speech to 
the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida (a state growing increasingly 
―Right‖ in the late 20th century), for here he was able to not only reiterate the religious chasm 
that separated the United States from the atheistic, monolithic regime of the Soviet Union, but 
could also propose the increase military budget to design the SDI, in order to defend our 
―children‖ from the growing godless juggernaut that was the Soviet menace. The ―evil empire‖ 
speech, as it has come to be known, ended in a rousing standing ovation with over 3.5 million 
evangelicals in attendance. Only months later, Reagan would publicly disregard the TTAPS 
study (popularly known as nuclear winter theory) in lieu of more attention placed on military 
technology opposed to cynical, ―liberal, fearful‖ scientists. Perhaps caught in the middle of this 
epic battle for global supremacy was Great Britain, which not only staged serious protest against 
the installment of American weaponry in the country, but also produced films such as Threads, 
which demonstrated how Western Europe was in the crosshairs of nuclear destruction and even 
depicted the apocalyptic landscape for generations to come. 
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Methodology on Cultural History 
The methodology employed in this work derives from numerous cultural historians as 
well as popular culture scholars. It is also imperative to provide a concrete political narrative to 
examine these visual texts. One useful theory for understanding the symbiotic relationship 
between television and Cold War is offered by Alan Nadel. He writes,  
―Whatever methodologies of cultural history may help clarify aspects of television‘s 
appearance on the American scene, it is important to remember that the way it was 
organized and construed followed from specific industrial and legal outcomes produced 
in conflict, not consensus, and certainly not preordained. Equally we must recognize that 
these conflicts and their resolutions occurred under historically specific conditions, as did 
the televisual product produced by those resolutions. American television‘s impact thus 
necessarily would have been different, had it not entered the public imaginary at roughly 
the same time as the atomic bomb, the baby boom, McCarthyism, suburbia and the 
Korean War; had it not entered the lives of a nation fixated on politically mandated 
normality and obsessed with nonconformists; had it not become the unifying common 
experience of a nation constantly on the watch, lest it blink and its unprecedented 
prosperity be stolen, unobserved by subversives. 
41
  
 
Nadel goes on to assert that for Americans, television was the equivalent of Soviet 
brainwashing. Given Reagan‘s brilliant manipulation of the medium, it is logical to examine the 
regeneration of the Cold War three decades later through the television lens. Even though 
network television offered possible scenarios of nuclear war because of contemporary Cold War 
objectives, Reagan helped to mitigate those fears by presenting himself as the quintessential 
American hero. He routinely ―allowed‖ the media to capture images of himself holding the 
Olympic torch, honoring World War II veterans, and visiting farmers in the field, in sum perfect 
media opportunities that reflected a safe and conservative America. 
42
 
Cultural theorists continue to understand how popular culture works as a political 
barometer for understanding cultural anxieties. John Fiske argues political tensions are often 
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played out in popular culture and entertainment. Looking at this period, from approximately 
1976 to 1987, illustrates the connection between politics and mass culture and demonstrates how 
popular culture responded to escalating nuclear anxieties in the midst of growing anti-nuclear 
movement and culturally conservative politics. Television productions such as World War III, 
The Day After and especially Threads, questioned the doctrine of mutually assured destruction or 
alternatively preemptive strikes that would afford a qualitative, if pyrrhic, post nuclear victory.  
However pyrrhic the nuclear holocaust might be these aforementioned cultural representations 
still adhered to the official proclamations on the need for reselling the Cold War and escalating 
nuclear anxieties for political gain. 
The hegemonic framework for understanding how popular culture affects politics offered 
by Nadel and bolstered by other neo-Gramscian cultural studies scholars offered by the 
Birmingham School is complicated by the challenges network television faced during the 
eighties. Although John Fiske presents a persuasive argument that television viewers are 
subordinate and dominated under the superstructure of Western hegemonic capitalism, scholars 
such as Jane Feurer help to complicate this assertion by suggesting that the eighties presents a 
moment of rupture for network broadcasting brought about by technological changes.
43
 During 
these moments of crisis, the hegemonic process was resisted by viewers who desired to see even 
more self-reflectivity emanating from the small screen. The eighties represented one of these 
moments of network television rupture in which television became a vital part of individual 
identity and personal politics. Television technology ranging from the home video recording to 
the remote control, to much larger transformation of network television due to cable stations and 
satellite availability, all gesture toward an audience that is demonstrating more agency and self-
identification during the decade.  Stuart Hall offers an extensive framework for examining the 
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contradictory meanings that viewers make from visual text.
44
 Hall‘s ―Encoding, Decoding,‖ 
theoretical model suggest that alternative interpretations often derive from the same visual 
television source. An example of this complicated relationship was television advertisements for 
the nuclear freeze movement. The nuclear freeze movement challenged the hegemonic hold on 
American viewers by offering a peaceful, communal alterative to the conspicuous consumption, 
militaristic ideology promoted by the White House and network television shows. Hall, along 
with other cultural studies scholars like David Morley, reminds historians to that audience 
reception can be measured on a variety of levels. Interpration of television is not limited through 
the producers and profiteers of cultural products, but also by those cultural consumers who 
analyze how the reception of television messages through distinctions and identities such as race, 
class and gender. Central to this investigation is the idea that the television must also be 
examined as a Cold War device that at times offered a democratized space and also an 
instrument that American audience could manipulate to their liking.  
Sources: 
By analyzing and historicizing television commercials, network television news shows, 
and political discussions regarding made for television movies, nuclear winter theory, and the 
freeze movement, I am able to more clearly define the relationship between the networks and the 
White House and also consider the messages conveyed to television viewers. The Reagan 
Library has recently released a number of White House documents on popular media and the 
Cold War during his presidency. This collection includes specific White House documents on a 
number of made for television movies including The Day After, Threads and Amerika. The 
Reagan Library houses over 300 documents regarding the potential political threat The Day After 
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might generate. In response to escalating nuclear freeze pressure and an increased attention to 
selling the Cold War project of freedom and democracy around the world, the United States 
Information Agency (USIA) produced a film entitled, ―Soviet Military Power‖ designed to 
compliment the brochure of the same name and demonstrate how the Soviets continue to build 
up a menacing military power in violation of its agreement with NATO. According to the 
Director of the USIA, Charles Z. Wick in July 26, 1983 the film was intended to be viewed by 
virtually every top military leader in the country up to, and including, the President. In addition, 
the Reagan White House was prepared to spend up to 500 million dollars to launch a counter 
campaign that could combat the possible negative press generated by The Day After.  
 The archival holdings at Vanderbilt University‘s Television News Archive help to 
demonstrate the inexhaustible relationship between the White House and ABC throughout the 
Reagan era. The archive has an extensive collection of ABC‘s long-running Nightline, a news 
program that routinely engaged White House officials with topics ranging from nuclear arms, 
Communism, and most importantly the fear of nuclear war. One example of Nightline’s 
commitment to normative objectivity in journalism while adhering to anticommunism 
propaganda is the July 8, 1983 episode ―Wargames and Reality,‖ which discussed the popularity 
of the film Wargames and more importantly the possibility of an accidental first strike against 
the Soviet Union. Cold Warriors such as Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and NORAD 
spokesman General Thomas Brant defended Reagan‘s position of preventing nuclear war 
through peaceful deterrence and assured the American public that the fear of an accidental 
nuclear war was exaggerated by radical leftists clinging to ―sixties liberalism‖. In addition, the 
use of presidential campaign ads help to illustrate how the White House turned the national focus 
from nuclear issue towards a conservative future buttressed by peaceful deterrence. This is 
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evident in Reagan‘s 1984 campaign ad, ―Morning in America,‖ which illustrates the daily lives 
of white, suburban, god-fearing Americans that value freedom and democracy not global state-
sponsored malfencence.    
 The promotion of the Reagan Revolution and the great thaw is illustrated through White 
House memorandums that presented the 1987 teleplay Amerika as a necessary depiction of the 
evils of Soviet occupation. These documents not only demonstrate the White House‘s continuous 
monitoring of network programming but also show how official responses were formulated to 
manage the reception of these made for television nuclear movies. In addition, network reporters, 
such as Sam Donaldson interviewed key members of the Reagan administration to specifically 
discuss the Cold War. This gives further credence not only to the idea of normative objectivity in 
television journalism but also presents the larger issue of mutual cooperation between the 
networks, corporate sponsorship and the White House, a long standing post-war tradition 
according to Bernhard.  
Using these archival sources, as well as the televised archival holdings at the Museum of 
Television and Radio, UCLA‘s Film and Television Library, and The Museum of Broadcast 
Communication provide a more complete understanding of how the Reagan administration was 
responding to the creation of network miniseries that grappled with nuclear issues and the 
continuation of the Cold War. More specifically, television sources are used to demonstrate how 
the mass media presented the debate between nuclear freeze advocates from the Left and 
armament proponents from the Right. The archival holdings at the UCLA library provide an 
illuminating visual array of texts in which I can examine many of the assertions offered in this 
work. 
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The mass media offers a variety of sources from newspapers to televised Presidential 
speeches, which helps to explain how the public was interpreting the resuscitation of the Cold 
War. Print journalism is a vital source for this examination as well. Even though the popular 
press is clearly partisan, news magazines such as Time devoted a considerable amount of print to 
nuclear issues. In addition, the popular press provides more insight into the reaction of the global 
left to the geopolitical maneuvering of the United States and its perception of Ronald Reagan. 
The popular press, specifically print journalism such as The New York Times, also situates these 
case-studies within the larger framework of Cold War cultural history by reporting not only on 
network programming but politics, economics, and popular sentiment and dissent. Televised 
speeches are immediately followed by political pundits representative of both parties that then 
repackage Reagan‘s speeches and interrupt his words for the mass audience. This also 
demonstrates the media‘s continuous discussion of nuclear issues and Cold War fears. Placed in 
a larger context, this work continues to examine the transformative relationship between 
government, capitalism network television, and audiences during the eighties.    
Chapter outlines  
 Chapter One explores American network television depictions of World War III and 
U.S.-Soviet interactions. The chapter uses the1982 NBC made for television film, World War 
Three, as a case-study to examine the end of the age of détente and the reheating of the Cold War 
under Reagan. In addition, this chapter analyzed how the three major networks were presenting 
nuclear issues in terms of news programs as well as made for television productions. Chapter one 
places this film within the larger bipartisan debate between nuclear freeze activist and nuclear 
proliferation supporters. Thanks in part to celebrity endorsement for nuclear freeze, such as Paul 
Newman, and ―mainstream approach‖ employed by the leadership of nuclear freeze like Helen 
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Caldicott, the issue of nuclear freeze energized millions of Americans to demand an immediate 
halt in the production of nuclear weapons. The political Right also had celebrity participation, 
most notably, the actor Charlton Heston, who publicly debated Paul Newman on the issue of the 
nuclear freeze resolution in 1982.  With the fear of nuclear holocaust looming from all sides and 
potentially threatening American children, viewers began to experience the next wave of nuclear 
anxieties.  
  NBC‘s made for TV movie, World War III, was a modest commercial hit. Interestingly, 
this film is more inflammatory in its depiction of the superpowers‘ continued pursuit of nuclear 
annihilation. Robert Joseph, the screenwriter of World War III commented, ―We see them 
moving, moving, moving, towards a war they believe will never happen…two civilized countries 
going through this dance macabre, this jingoism, never wanting war, saying it can‘t 
happen…then provoking each other to greater and greater excesses.‖45. Chapter one provides the 
historic and political framework for understanding made for television films and uses this 
teleplay as case-study for arguing how television and Reagan officials intentionally misinformed 
the American public about the possibility of surviving a nuclear war because of confrontational 
Cold War objectives around the globe.  
Chapter two begins with the cultural and political expansion of television technology. 
With the expansion of satellite television and the opening of pay-for-television networks, the 
audience had more options and agency to create an individualistic television experience. 
Furthermore, the line between fact and fiction was further obfuscated by the development of a 
twenty-four hour news cycle and infotainment. The example used in this section examines how 
ABC‘s news division decided to demonstrate how the White House operated during a nuclear 
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crisis in a simulated special titled, ―The Crisis Game.‖ Shown during Nightline, the four hour 
special presented real political in fake political roles. Reviews of the special suggested that ABC 
news was offering a public forum to democratize the interworking of the White House. 
Arguably, however, this special highlights the conflation of news with entertainment, further 
blurring the line between fact and fiction on network television.  Chapter two also examines 
NBC‘s nuclear docudrama, Special Bulletin. In 1983 more films were produced about nuclear 
war than in any other year in cinematic history. As the first chapter explains, these films are 
emblematic of escalating partisan divisions between liberals and conservatives. In order to 
understand the cultural relevance of these films, it is important to note that these films garnered 
explicit political responses from the Reagan White House and moreover the producers of Special 
Bulletin used documentary-style formats to frame the narrative, thus further blurring the line 
between fact and fiction.   
The film centers on anti-nuclear terrorists who threaten to detonate a homemade nuclear 
devise off the coast of South Carolina. The story is conveyed entirely through the rubric of mock 
television news reporting. However the film appeared too realistic for American viewers and the 
network brass at NBC feared it might provoke a national panic. In order to prevent potential 
chaos, the network repeatedly informed the American audience that Special Bulletin was just a 
movie, not the actual prime-time news. Yet due to the film‘s plot, which portrays scientists and 
ex-Pentagon official as anti-nuclear war advocates who confront the US government by 
threatening war to promote peace appeared too confusing for American audiences and garnered 
limited ratings. More than any other made-for-television nuclear event, Special Bulletin offers an 
astute critique of how network television creates fictional news as spectacle. This commentary of 
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television working to create spectacles for profits is a remarkable moment of self-analysis for 
commercial television.  
 The second chapter also explores how television technology was changing cultural and 
political expectations. Reagan‘s inclusion of technology was a way to mitigigate Cold War fears 
is examined throughout this chapter. As his rhetoric explained, technology, specifically space-
based defensive missile systems, would serve to protect the U.S. from Soviet nuclear missiles. In 
turn, this chapter discusses how the Reagan administration used technology as a political and 
cultural trope to distract viewers from more substantial nuclear issues. Furthermore, by tracing 
the famous three speeches of 1983 (Eureka college speech, evil empire speech and the Star Wars 
speech), we can see the evolution of his political rhetoric. Through this lens, it becomes clear 
that Reagan‘s image was changing into a peaceful rather than hawkish president. 
   Chapter three investigates the Reagan White House‘s response to the most controversial 
American nuclear melodrama, The Day After. More than any other made for television film of 
the 1980s, the 1983 ABC film, The Day After, provoked the most direct response not only in 
terms of audiences‘ reaction but also by the White House. Aired the same month as the 
ABLE/ARCHER scare, The Day After became a cultural touchstone for the mounting nuclear 
anxieties of the early 1980s, especially for the increasingly television suave generation X kids 
whom had not yet had that visceral nuclear war experience. The Day After graphically depicted 
the aftermath of a nuclear attack on Lawrence, Kansas. Confronted by scenes of death, radiation 
burns and sickness, Americans watched the debilitating aftermath of nuclear war in the 
heartland. Unlike previous nuclear television dramas, The Day After was an enormous success 
due in no small part of the firestorm of publicity that surrounded the film. On November 20
th
, 
The Washington Post predicted more than 50 million American would watch the televised 
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nuclear war. The newspaper went on to report that churches, college-campuses, and many grass-
roots organizations were prepared to answer questions about the film. White House staffer Karna 
Small-Stinger received fifteen internal memos in the span of five hours after the airing of the 
television film. Perhaps even more revealing, the White House was so concerned about the 
possible political fallout of the film that it arranged for the Secretary of State George Schultz to 
appear in a special interview with Ted Koppel immediately following the broadcast. The post-
Day After roundtable discussion presented a cavalcade of political figureheads including Henry 
Kissinger, Robert McNamara, William F. Buckley, Jr. as well as social activists such as Carl 
Sagan and Eli Wiesel.   
The Day After is perhaps the most significant case-study for understanding the Reagan 
era Cold War images on network television because it ignited an unprecedented national debate 
on the subject of nuclear war. The Day After allowed all Americans to watch the unimaginable 
and to visually confront their own nuclear nightmares. The film attempted to tap into pre-existing 
nuclear war fears while also provoking wide-scale debates. The Day After brought to television 
the abstract political and scientific renderings of nuclear war and personalized them by providing 
human faces for the aftereffects of nuclear war. The film also provides a narrative framework for 
audiences to understand complicated political discourses. Instead of discussing nuclear weapons, 
disarmament or foreign policy in political jargon, the film democratized the issues of nuclear war 
by presenting them in a format most Americans could understand and more importantly discuss. 
One might not be able to describe NATO‘s first strike policy or the United State‘s Cold War 
history of deterrence, but anyone could discuss how The Day After made them ―feel‖ about 
nuclear war.  
37 
 
 
Chapter four explores how American television portrayed the global left‘s response to 
America‘s role in regenerating the Cold War. As an accelerated arms race appeared imminent, a 
number of European countries, potentially caught in the cross-hairs of global-thermo nuclear 
war, questioned these militaristic strategies thus sparking a growing political activism emerging 
out of the possibility of World War III.
46
 According to a 1984 report in Congressional Quarterly, 
the grassroots movement against nuclear weapons during the Reagan administration first 
emerged in Europe, with an estimated 100,000 activists marching through London‘s West End in 
1981 then slowly drifted across the Atlantic to the United States. In June of 1982, over 750,000 
demonstrators took to the streets of New York City to protest Reagan‘s nuclear policy. This 
event marked the largest protest in the city‘s history. Furthermore in December of 1982, over 
20,000 British women peacefully protested the instillation of U.S. Cruise missiles at the 
Greenham Common Air Force Base. While the 1982 protest is noted for its peaceful 
demonstration, when the first U.S. Cruise Missiles did arrive in October of 1983, the political 
activists led a more aggressive campaign. Only days later, the Soviet Union announced its 
intention to increase its nuclear forces. It appeared that if the Soviet Union and the United States 
were indeed engaged in a combative arms race then the rest of the world would suffer the 
potential consequences of nuclear war. 
This chapter examines the April 1983 CBS news special entitled, ―The Great Nuclear 
Arms Debate,‖ which presented an international panel of leaders discussing the deployment of 
nuclear hardware into Western Europe and the growing nuclear freeze movement in NATO 
countries. Hosted by retired CBS patriarch anchor Walter Cronkite, the special attempted to 
explain international nuclear policy in ordinary terminology. Opposed to other nuclear themed 
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Nightline episodes, CBS did not provide a live studio audience, nor did they directly engage the 
American public. The audience was introduced to Western European politicians from Britain to 
Western Germany however it was evident that the same debate regarding the effectiveness of 
nuclear deterrence theory versus the case for nuclear disarmament was just as problematic for 
international leaders. I argue that even though the CBS network intended to inform the American 
public on the growing anti-nuclear imagery emanating out of Western Europe it focused 
exclusively on the leadership, did little to inform the public or explain any real insight into 
NATO‘s position on the growing nuclear arsenal. Additionally, the network was criticized for 
not directly engaging the public compared to ABC news which often encouraged audience 
participation.   
The Western European nuclear freeze movement had deeper roots and at the time deeper 
immediacy due to the division of Europe by the United States and the Soviet Union after World 
War II. Western European anti-nuclear activism focused primarily on protesting the deployment 
of U.S. missiles into allied countries like England, West Germany and even Belgium. With 
Reagan‘s decision to deploy weapons to England, a new wave of political activism mushroomed 
throughout Western Europe. This chapter discusses European nuclear activism and how it was 
depicted on American television. In addition, this chapter discusses the release of nuclear freeze 
theory, otherwise known as the TTAPS study, and how the White House and the Press discussed 
this hotly contested scientific theory, which discredited the assumption behind mutually assured 
destruction. Situated within the larger scientific, global view of American nuclear proliferation is 
the release of the BBC made for television nuclear holocaust film, Threads. 
Like American television docu-dramas, Threads interweaves a conventional narrative 
with political voice-over narration by BBC journalist Paul Vaughan to add a layer of authenticity 
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to the movie. Unlike American network television‘s most controversial teleplay, The Day After, 
the BBC‘s nuclear television drama not only infused documentary style techniques but also 
detailed the geopolitical events leading up to World War III, including the United States‘ 
massive military build-up and its confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Middle East. The 
setting of the ultimate superpower showdown in the Middle East was not selected randomly but 
rather reminds viewers of how the United States and the Soviet Union have been embroiled in a 
bitter campaign to spread their respective influences into the region since 1945.
47
 Threads also 
incorporated the newly discovered nuclear winter theory into its narrative by depicting how two 
generations removed from World War III are struggling to survive in the post-apocalyptic 
landscape that was once England. Although Threads was by far the most incendiary of all the 
made for television nuclear dramas of the 1980s, the Reagan White House offered very little 
rebuttal to the teleplay. The New York Times review of the film, printed Saturday, January 12, 
1985, claimed that the telefeature was not a neutral discussion of nuclear disarmament, but a 
―candidly biased warning‖ about the effects of nuclear winter. Threads was shown for the first 
time in America on WTBS, the Turner Broadcasting Station, and the basic cable station at the 
time was only available in certain cable outlets around the country. Nonetheless, the film 
captures the anti-Reagan dissent projected by the global left and offers a political critique of 
Thatcherism in England. Placed within a larger context, it helps to explain how television was 
utilized by those on either divide of the political chasm to further politically driven Cold War 
agendas.  
    Chapter five begins with the landslide reelection of Ronald Reagan to the White House. 
Using the 1984 Presidential Campaign Commercials between Reagan and Democratic Nominee 
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Walter Mondale, I examine how Reagan presented his role as president as synonymous with 
American peace, prosperity, and optimism. Even as the Reagan Doctrine, a recapitulation of the 
Truman Doctrine, became the center-piece of America‘s foreign policy and the United States 
military became embroiled in civil wars from Angola to El Salvador, Reagan‘s language 
reflected a need to cooperate with the Soviet Union while fighting Communism around the globe 
and reclaim its masculinity at home. With the eclipse of the Late Atomic Period, the American 
public was challenged to conceive the Soviet Union in different ways. This chapter examines the 
1984 Presidential Campaign Commercials, the historical context of the mini-series Amerika and 
the expansion of cable. Although the Reagan administration grew increasingly scrutinized with 
the televised proceedings of the Iran-Contra Affair, network television continued to use the mini-
series as an avenue to explore political issues. The case-study investigated in the chapter is 
ABC‘s 1987 mini-series, Amerika. This heavy-handed, seven-part, fourteen-and-a half miniseries 
offers an unflinching portrayal of American life after a blood-less occupation by the Soviet 
Union. The argument proffered in the chapter suggests that ABC produced Amerika as a 
jingoistic political offering to the White House after the network was accused of promoting anti-
Reagan sentiment in its enormously successful 1983 miniseries, The Day After.  The network 
received an impressive amount of mail and phone calls about Amerika before it aired suggesting 
that the film would garner enormous ratings for the network. In addition, Amerika received more 
post-viewer reaction of any other ABC miniseries, including The Day After.
48
  Situated within a 
larger political context, the 1987 mini-series is emblematic of not only the ―liberal‖ backlash that 
denounced New Left politics, but also the triumphant of the Reagan conservative revolution.  
By 1986, Americans were fully engaged in the brave new world of satellite and cable 
television. Part of the Reagan legacy is the expansion of cable channels and the deregulation of 
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network television which led to the cable revolution. The cable revolution reconfigured the 
traditional network news cycle that ran like the Associated Press. With the arrival of Ted Turner, 
cable audiences now had other television news options such as CNN and Headline News. The 
growing cable audience found niche channels that catered to the individual. In a larger context, 
television not only framed the late atomic period but also transformed audience identification 
opening up a new world of cable services that catered to individualism: an idea aligned with the 
Reagan presidency.  
 Reagan, in his second term, had powerful political motives for solidifying his place in 
history and in turn, beginning in 1985, Reagan opened negotiations with the Soviets. In late 
1985, Reagan and Gorbachev met at a summit in Geneva and perplexed observers by their 
apparent willingness to engage in serious arms reduction discussions. 
49
 The next year, the two 
superpower leaders met again in Reykjavik and although the summit failed to resolve all looming 
nuclear issues it was a necessary step in the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which 
ordered the dismantling of long-and-short terms missiles in Europe. Ironically, as the United 
States was engaging in nuclear arms treaties for the first time since the SALT I treaty in 1972, 
the slogan, ―better dead than Red,‖ was still very much alive in American popular culture. 
Conclusion 
 Reagan, and other public figures in the mass media, presented the possibility of World 
War III in survival terminology and claimed it was necessary for maintaining geopolitical 
supremacy. Conservative politicians and pundits feared the antinuclear movement, in all of its 
cultural and political forms, as one that possessed the power to bring down the Reagan 
administration and with it reestablish a new political landscape of New Left liberalism. Although 
this fear proved unfounded, particularly with the landslide reelection of Ronald Reagan in 1984, 
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the cultural cacophony of discontent with the militaristic agenda of Reagan‘s first administration 
was heard around the world, particularly in Western Europe. Just as the CIA sponsored 
organization, The Committee on the Present Danger, quietly galvanized its forces to regenerate 
the Cold War and President-elect Reagan moved to release American hostages in Iran, the global 
Left responded to the potential NATO deployment of Pershing and cruise missiles without much 
media attention. 
 This dissertation argues that television brought renewed attention and immediacy to 
nuclear issues, which at first appeared detrimental to Reagan, but rather as evident in his second 
administration, had the opposite effect. I argue that television, with its made-for-television 
movies, roundtable discussions, and network news, confused the American public into a national 
belief that Reagan would restore freedom from fear and secure American ideology. By 1985 
Reagan had softened his rhetoric towards the Soviet Union and began advocating arms reduction. 
Perhaps the lingering effects of the Vietnam Syndrome was beginning to lift considering the 
considerable successes the United States was having in the clandestine installations of pro-U.S. 
regimes in Central America. Regardless of the Reagan administrations motives, the U.S. 
Congress began holding sessions regarding nuclear winter theory and by the end of 1985, nuclear 
winter was no longer viewed as a political threat. 
The cultural preoccupation with nuclear war was reinforced with a renewed political and 
religious imperative of ―beating‖ the Soviets, in every conceivable arena. Although American 
filmmakers were particularly astute in not asserting blame for the beginning of World War III, 
human hubris followed by human fallibility remained our collective Achilles heel. Even in the 
most horrific of American network television depictions of the post-apocalyptic landscape, 
particularly The Day After, human fallibility is as much to blame as presidential policy.  Placed 
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with a larger context, investigating this time period contributes to the growing historiography on 
the conservative turn in American culture, politics and the historical significance of Reaganism.   
 Given the level of attention nuclear war was receiving in both official discourses, among 
scientists, journalists, and government officials, coupled with the amount of attention the media, 
particularly television, gave the topic, it appeared as if the possibility of nuclear war was 
occupying the political consciousness. 
50
 This new generation of Cold War discourse invited 
public participation not only in terms of voting, but also because Americans articulated their 
concerns over nuclear issues through America media.  As writers like Jonathan Schell, along 
with nuclear scientists depicted the post-nuclear landscape as being much worse than the 
government had previously envisioned the Reagan administration rebounded by claiming to have 
the policy and technology to prevent such a catastrophe from ever happening. In addition, 
fictionalized accounts of nuclear war and its aftermath provided a multiplicity of ways of 
imagining the realities of nuclear war. The television films, such as The Day After, Special 
Bulletin, and Threads, were not only representative of the widespread nuclear fear, but also 
helped to bring the discourse on nuclear war from inside the situation room and into the public 
sphere. The nuclear debate was no longer confined to the Committee on the Clear and Present 
Danger, but was debated on television, and to some extent, democratized. Perhaps the cultural 
legacy of this time in Cold War history is that politics collided with the bomb on prime-time 
television. A nuclear apocalypse was indeed televised on all three major networks, multiple 
times, and through the medium‘s hallucitory powers of Technicolor persuasion a new generation 
of American became entranced by the bomb, but more importantly Americans awaited the arrival 
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of the cavalry of Cowboy conservatives who would champion the values of the Reagan 
Revolution and finally beat the Communist menace, all on television.  
Chapter One: “The Rejuvenation of Cold War Fears: Reagan, Nuclear Freeze, and the 
Made-for-Television film World War III” 
On January 31, 1982, NBC broadcasted its made-for-television movie, World War III, 
which examined the world on the precipice of a nuclear holocaust with the Soviet Union. Over 
the next two nights, viewers watched as Soviet troops infiltrated an Alaskan army installation in 
retaliation for an U.S. grain embargo against the USSR. The American president played by Rock 
Hudson, he is caught in a web of diabolical KGB plots, overzealous militarism, and inexperience 
in his position as leader of the free world.  Near the end of the narrative, after the president is 
told that opportunistic KGB comrades have killed the inept yet peaceful General Secretary 
Gorny, the president forecasts the nuclear apocalypse by stating, ―They have killed Gorny. They 
killed him because he stood for peace. I think they are going to come in, they are lying. We can‘t 
wait. Their backfire bombers will not be turned back. God forgive me.‖51 In the scenes that 
followed, a montage interweaves children from Moscow to Washington playing in the snow, 
parading in the streets, and attending schools. These everyday images of life are disrupted by the 
roar of aircraft in the background. As people from around the world look up to the sky, the sun 
erupts into a large mushroom cloud, and the screen turns to black. This bleak vision of the end of 
the world brought on by misinformation and hard-line commitment to Cold War orthodoxy 
ushered in a new era of nuclear anxiety brought on by the first Reagan administration, network 
television, and antinuclear activists.  
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In the early 1980s, Americans were inundated with nuclear imagery. In light of the 
renewed commitment to maintain the strongest nuclear arsenal on earth, President Reagan not 
only presented nuclear war as an unfortunate byproduct of Soviet aggression, but also 
promulgated the notion of ―winning‖ a limited nuclear war.  The visibility of nuclear imagery in 
popular culture was one of the most remarkable features of the early 1980s. In the mainstream 
media, key Reagan administration officials‘ cavalier and dismissive comments about nuclear war 
not only frightened Americans, but also democratized the issue by speaking of nuclear policies in 
the public sphere. The public discussion about nuclear war was inexorably linked to the early 
years of the Reagan administration. Television and the popular press provided a vehicle that 
invited Americans to participate in this open dialogue. The mass media produced a tidal wave of 
nuclear-themed articles, movies, and television programming that exposed this growing fear of a 
nuclear nightmare. The interplay between the media and the first Reagan administration created a 
culture of nuclear fears that engulfed Americans during the early 1980s. 
This chapter examines how the mass media in conjunction with the Reagan 
administration and nuclear freeze activists presented nuclear-themed television news specials, 
television movies, and print journalism, which collectively helped to reignite nuclear anxieties in 
America. This investigation begins with an examination on how network television news and 
print journalism helped to bring renewed themes of nuclear news to American viewers. After 
Reagan‘s election, the mass media pointed a sharp, critical lens on the newly elected president‘s 
proposed military buildup and openly interrogated Reagan‘s Cold War agenda. Additionally, as 
the nuclear freeze movement gained more support, it also garnered celebrity endorsements on 
both the left and the right. This section discusses how celebrities were used as mouthpieces to 
explain the issues of nuclear deterrence and nuclear proliferation.  Using the 1982 made-for-
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television film as a case-study, World War III, I argue that the film reflects the social and cultural 
fears generated by Reagan‘s commitment to militarism. This section examines how the movie 
interweaves a critique of inept government officials, while adhering to the thematic conventions 
of the made-for-television social melodrama. The narrative focuses not on the minutiae of 
everyday life, but on the private machinations of both the American political machine as well as 
the secret Soviet apparatus. The message of the film was more aligned with the post-Watergate 
cynicism regarding distrust of officials. Although the film was not interpreted as an overt critique 
of Reagan, it did remind audiences that miscommunication between the superpowers could lead 
to unintentional nuclear war.  The nuclear freeze movement is examined to provide the counter-
narrative to Reagan‘s call for an immediate military buildup.  In addition, the nuclear freeze 
movement, a social activist-based organization that worked to end the production of nuclear 
weapons, became a viable political threat for President Reagan, as it gained popularity amongst 
middle-class white women, suburban voters, and liberal celebrities. Its message of protecting 
children and providing a safe world for the future increasingly became hard to combat by 
Republicans in 1982. As the nuclear freeze movement gained political support, the White House 
launched a two-prong approach that linked antinuclear supporters as far-leftist Communist and 
reestablished the historically proved record of deterrence policy. In addition, this section 
analyzes how the Reagan White House equated the growth of antinuclear activism in the United 
States with the expansion of the Soviet Union. Framed within this larger context, World War III 
mirrored the frustrations many Americans had about the government and provided the catalyst 
for those Americans who joined the cause for nuclear freeze. This chapter argues that the Reagan 
White House was locked in a symbiotic relationship with the nuclear freeze movement and that 
television networks played a crucial role in disseminating this message through both its news 
47 
 
 
divisions and original programming and helped to bring the nuclear debate into mainstream 
America.   
The Rising Tide of Nuclear Fears: How Network Television, the Mass Media, Activists, and 
the Reagan White House Created the Late Atomic Period 
The late atomic period, approximately1976 to 1989, was an inimitable fusion of political, 
social, and cultural Cold War contradictions. Characterized in part by the colossal military 
buildup under Reagan, and by the groundswell of antinuclear activism growing in tandem with 
Reagan‘s nuclear policies, the late atomic period saw a renewed interest in nuclear-related issues. 
This heightened curiosity regarding the state of the nuclear world was evident in all aspects of 
the mass media. More specifically, network television productions routinely employed the 
doctrine of mutually assured destruction (MAD) while questioning the policy of deterrence to 
maintain peace between superpowers.
52
 These two U.S. nuclear policies were critiqued on 
network news shows and in the popular press, and also fictionalized in made-for-television 
movies and miniseries. Additionally, the late atomic period is also noted for the growth of the 
nuclear freeze movement, a grassroots interest group against nuclear proliferation, which 
attracted millions of people around the world under the banner of ―peace‖ for future generations.   
On June 12, 1982, approximately one million people gathered in Central Park and 
overflowed the streets of New York City to protest President Reagan‘s proposed military 
buildup. This demonstration marked the largest protest in U.S. history. The diverse coalition of 
activists and individuals rallied behind slogans calling for a ―freeze‖ on the existing nuclear 
arsenal, a reversal of U.S.-Soviet arms policies, and the redirection of federal funds from the 
military to social programs. In the months before the protest, the nuclear freeze movement, an 
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umbrella coalition of doctors, antinuclear activists, and social crusaders, was increasing in its 
number and its visibility in the mass media. The March 29, 1982, cover of Time magazine 
prominently featured a large mushroom cloud with the caption reading, ―Thinking the 
Unthinkable: Rising Fear about Nuclear War.‖ The issue was filled with articles regarding 
nuclear disarmament, proliferation, and the rising climate of nuclear fear. The cover illustrated 
that out of the smoldering ashes of the once-bountiful planet, an ominous, demonic face appeared 
through the cloud of nuclear fallout, a face that personified humanity‘s capacity to destroy itself.  
Like many other periodicals and network news outlets during the first years of the Reagan 
administration, the mass media extensively captured this nuclear debate with a renewed sense of 
urgency. 
The Reagan administration‘s use of television as the primary vehicle to engage the 
American public transcended the boundaries of previous Cold War administrations‘ policies of 
nuclear silence. In the nascent years of the Cold War, even though nuclear imagery was 
prevalent in popular culture Americans were not as aware of classified nuclear war foreign 
policy decisions. For example, Robert McNamara, who served as secretary of defense under 
Kennedy and Johnson and also was the architect of mutually assured destruction, did not speak 
directly to the American people through the medium of television. In contrast, the Reagan White 
House staff routinely made the rounds on network news shows to explain the growing unrest 
about nuclear weapons, social activism, and Cold War saber rattling. Reagan‘s first secretary of 
state, Caspar Weinberger, was a common fixture on network television shows, yet provided 
limited access to print journalists. During the 1960s, nuclear policy was not as present in the 
public discourse but rather tightly secluded within political or scientific circles. Ironically, 
throughout the Reagan years, McNamara was routinely asked to speak about the topic as an 
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advocate for maintaining a superior nuclear arsenal because of the effectiveness of MAD. The 
Reagan White House was deemed unapologetically hawkish in its plans to restore nuclear 
supremacy over the Soviet Union, even if that translated into White House officials having to 
restate nuclear policy on television for voters.   
In addition, the Reagan administration‘s proposed military buildup proved to draw mass 
attention in the media and the public. The first television special on Reagan‘s newly constructed 
nuclear proliferation plan was a five-part CBS documentary on U.S. military policy, The Defense 
of the United States. Aired in June 1981, the program presented a bleak vision of the United 
States in the event of a nuclear war.
53
 Hosted by Dan Rather, it ran on five consecutive evenings 
during prime-time hours, competing with ABC‘s highest-rated show, Joanie Loves Chachi.54 In 
short, it was designed to attract a large audience. The documentary news special openly 
questioned Reagan‘s military proposals as well as the White House‘s cavalier rhetoric about 
winning a nuclear war. Statements made by government officials such as Charles Kupperman, 
executive director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and a member of the 
Committee on the Clear and Present Danger (CPD), who described nuclear war as a ―physics 
problem‖ that the United States could resolve and win, were openly challenged by Dan Rather.55 
Furthermore, Rather concluded the series by stating: ―The nation is about to commit itself to the 
biggest defense spending buildup in our history…Yet, for a commitment of this magnitude, we 
have learned little debate about alternatives.‖56 
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This overt political criticism from network news television was unprecedented in Cold 
War and television history. Thomas Powers, writing for the Nation, described it this way: ―CBS 
made two essentially political decisions before commencing ‗The Defense of the United States,‘ 
neither of them a big deal for a writer speaking to a small audience, but acts of independence for 
a broadcasting network. The first was to dwell on the consequences of nuclear war, the cost in 
human terms—not to touch on it in passing but to make it the point … The second decision was 
to treat the Soviet Union as a great power like any other, not the source, but the other half of this      
great conflict.‖57  In the wake of CBS‘s open criticism of the Reagan administration, other 
networks followed suit. On October 20, 1981, NBC‘s primetime news featured the growing 
antinuclear movement in Western Europe and added that the protestors were responding in part 
because of the caustic remarks made by the Reagan administration. As a gesture of peace, 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was sent to Scotland to ease the growing tensions. 
Large demonstrations rejecting military buildup were staged in many European cities throughout 
late 1981 and 1982, galvanizing approximately 250,000 in Paris, 200,000 in Rome, and more 
than 400,000 quiescent protestors in Amsterdam. 
58
 In a larger context, the networks‘ 
commitment to covering these nuclear-centered events at home and around the globe with such 
immediacy reflects both the growth and mobilization of antinuclear activists as well as Reagan‘s 
commitment to combat Communism. This symbiotic relationship would become part of the 
contradictory public discourse through Reagan‘s first term.   
Reagan‘s staunch rhetoric was criticized not only by network news outlets, but also in the 
popular press. Time magazine ran a series of articles that openly challenged Reagan on his 
economic recovery plan in the midst of the 1982 recession and examined how the growing 
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political influence of the nuclear freeze movement was associated with the military buildup. 
Attempting to explain the rise in antinuclear activism, Time described how the movement was 
propelled by Americans from different ideological and geographic places. The March 29 issue 
contained a quotation from Rabbi Alexander Schindler prophesying that, ―nuclear disarmament 
is going to be the central moral issue of the ‘80s, just as Vietnam was in the ‘60s.‖59 The article 
goes on to proclaim that from the liberal halls of Chicago universities to the conservative South, 
Americans were agreeing on a need to halt the production of nuclear weapons. Although the 
article appeared partisan in its flowery depiction of the liberal movement, the final statement 
celebrated Reagan as the only president since Nixon who was strong enough on defense to 
negotiate with the Soviets.
60
 The New York Times offered similar examinations of Reagan‘s 
agenda both domestically and internationally and repeatedly framed these issues in an 
educational and historical context. Moreover, the Times openly critiqued Reagan‘s policy on the 
economy and its inextricable link to the proposed military arsenal. A March 7, 1982, Gallup poll 
indicated that 41 percent of Americans believed that the Democrats were more likely to keep the 
United States out of World War III.
61
 Similar to what Time magazine revealed about the eclectic 
hodge-podge of Americans openly aligned with the movement, the New York Times stressed the 
South‘s participation in orchestrating local chapters for nuclear freeze activities. The April 23, 
1982, article featured in Time, titled ―Nuclear Arms Protest Growing in Pro-Military South,‖ 
explained that the freeze movement had galvanized activists in Orlando, Florida; Atlanta, 
Georgia; and Austin, Texas.
62
  Over 600 members of local southern chapters even made the 
pilgrimage to march in Washington to participate in the Citizens‘ Lobby for a U.S-Soviet Freeze. 
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Writing about the southern activism in Southern Changes, Margaret Roach captured the 
sentiment that many other southerners had about the government. Bob Bland of the Little Rock‘s 
chapter of SANE was quoted as stating, ―We‘ve been dumped on by the Pentagon. Arkansas is 
completely expendable.‖63 In response to Reagan‘s nuclear and military proposals, Bland offered 
the Titan missile field incident, where an explosion killed one airman and injured twenty-one 
others in 1980, and the use of Arkansas as storage space for nuclear waste as examples of a 
dismissive U.S. government. The articles ends with Bland‘s political agenda stating , ―We‘ll 
remove the arch-hawks in 1984.‖ 
Throughout 1982, top White House officials made television appearances on the three 
major networks to explain the need to build and maintain a superior American/NATO nuclear 
arsenal. On April 22, 1982, Nightline invited White House officials, politicians from West 
Germany and the Soviet Union, and activists from the nuclear freeze movement to engage in a 
live televised debate broadcasting out of Harvard University. The audiences consisted of 
concerned citizens, faculty, viewers, and noted live guests such as Henry Kissinger. Executives 
at ABC‘s news division selected that week for the live nuclear debate as it was claimed by 
nuclear freeze advocates as ―Ground Zero Week‖ and commemorated the week with events 
across the country to demonstrate the American people‘s unflinching commitment to peace. 
Moderator Ted Koppel attempted to explain how nuclear freeze had grown in tandem with the 
postwar years; yet a visual montage of events, starting with World War II, the postwar boom, 
Watergate, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, was not placed in chronological order by the 
editors of Nightline. What was most striking about the nuclear debate was Koppel‘s repeated 
request for politicians to employ simple language (thus avoiding nuclear jargon) so the live 
audience, as well as television viewers, could clearly understand the difference between the call 
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for a nuclear freeze and Reagan‘s plan for nuclear proliferation. Yet no guest was able to do so. 
When a member of the live audience asked Henry Kissinger if Reagan was responsible for the 
growing number of people around the world gravitating to the freeze, Kissinger, with an 
unfortunate accent reminiscent of the 1964 character ―Dr. Strangelove,‖ provided this response: 
―If we announce we will not use nuclear weapons, that in a sense is committing suicide or 
arsenal blackmail. If we say we will not use them first, we may be tempting a conventional 
defeat rather than use of weapons are not yet available.‖64 After his remarks, Koppel and the 
audience appeared more confused. Koppel ended the debate with this editorial: 
What is important is to begin thinking about the unthinkable. And talking about it in a 
manner that prizes the rational over the dogmatic. It is all too easy to characterize those 
who we do not agree with as warmongers, or Communist dupes. On the other hand, it is 
easy to reduce nuclear war to an absurdity…In the coming months, there will be a high 
number of marches and demonstrations…we on television will cover them. They are 
largely designed to be covered by television to register the highest emotional impact on 
the largest possible audience. It will be difficult to remember at times that the issue 
transcends opposition to nuclear war. Nuclear war has very few advocates…As Jonathan 
Schell recently pointed out, our dilemma, is that we can never eliminate the knowledge of 
how to build nuclear weapons. That will be with us for as long as we survive. Learning to 
live with that knowledge is our problem.
65
 
Koppel enumerated many important points in his concluding remarks. He reminded the 
audiences that television relies on the dramatics of politicians, activists, and celebrities to stay 
commercially bankrolled. Additionally, he aligned the network with a critique of Reagan‘s 
policies and clearly stated that the network would cover antinuclear events. Similar to CBS and 
other news outlets of 1982, the popular press was momentarily supportive of the freeze. Articles 
in the New York Times continued to place the freeze within a larger framework. Hedrick Smith‘s 
article, ―The Nuclear Freeze; New Analysis,‖ suggested that ―on both right and left, the Reagan 
administration finds its strategic arms policies under challenge and feels compelled to mount a 
vigorous counterattack to try to hold together the consensus in favor of an arms buildup that was 
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strong a year ago but now has began to unravel.‖66 Similarly, Newsweek’s first story on the 
freeze led with the drama of a disabled Vietnam veteran collecting signatures for the antinuclear 
movement despite his severe physical pain.
67
 In turn, the Reagan administration was indeed 
countering a maneuver to ―out-peace‖ the antinuclear movement, which became easier to 
criticize as the months went on, especially when celebrities began discussing the possible nuclear 
freeze amendment.  
Celebrities were also publicly taking political stands on the Reagan military agenda. One 
example of celebrity endorsement of the diametrically opposed issue of Reagan militarism was 
an episode of The Last Word. Originally aired October 28, 1982, celebrities Charlton Heston and 
Paul Newman argued about Reagan‘s military budget and nuclear freeze, as well as the subject 
of celebrities lending their cultural capital for politically partisan purposes. In the first debate, 
The Last Word, hosted by Phil Donohue live from Chicago and Greg Jackson broadcasting from 
California, the two Hollywood actors squared off via satellite on the topics of nuclear weapons 
and the upcoming national referendum on nuclear freeze. They each represented iconic 
Hollywood actors speaking for and to the generationally divided American audience. Paul 
Newman, who was also an iconic Hollywood symbol, rose to fame during the 1960s, and his 
famous portrayals of rugged, individual antiheroes resonated with baby boomers.   Heston, like 
Reagan, spoke in a paternalistic, masculine, and authoritative manner, while adhering closely to 
the official GOP party line regarding nuclear freeze and antinuclear supporters. Heston asserted: 
Next week Americans will vote on nuclear freeze amendment, a lot of voters feel that 
nuclear freeze will bring to the world the peace we all seek. This is too important for 
passion, I heard an actor, not Paul, supporting the freeze by saying no I haven‘t read 
anything about it, I don‘t need to, this is a gut issue. Yeah, indeed it is. But you can‘t 
think with your guts.  A nuclear freeze will not serve the cause of peace because it is un-
negotiable, unequal and unverifiable. It would divert the energies of the American 
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negotiations now in progress in Geneva where we are trying not just to freeze nuclear 
arms but to reduce them. A nuclear freeze initiative if passed would send a false message 
of weakness to the Soviet Union and will on the part of the American people. It would 
lock us into a position of strategic inferiority, which in fact hurts deterrence, which as 
Paul said has kept us safe for the last 37 years. This would increase the danger of the war 
we all fear.
68
  
In this impassioned plea to the American people, Heston ends with a quotation on fear made by 
Confederate general Stonewall Jackson. Though only two years older than Newman, in the 
public imagination, Heston was an icon of ―the Golden Age of Hollywood‖ and reinforced the 
paternalism emitted by Reagan. Heston reminded the viewers of the dangers of the Soviet Union, 
the lessons the United States learned from World War II, and that the United States could not sit 
back and watch an expansionist Soviet Union with positioned nuclear weapons threatening any 
NATO ally or the United States. It was a matter of strategic importance to maintain the superior 
nuclear arsenal for it is the most proven method for peace. Most importantly, Heston framed the 
nuclear proliferation position more effectively than the people working inside the White House. 
Heston responded to Newman‘s explanations and goals of the freeze as if Newman was a radical, 
new-left, fear-monger.  
This debate continued the next night on Nightline. Koppel, with co-host Greg Jackson 
from The Last Word, invited the guests to once again engage the topic of the nuclear freeze 
referendum. In the opening of the debate, Jackson explained that Americans were engaging, 
participating, and responding to the national dialogue on nuclear arms. Jackson went on to reveal 
that over 184,000 American viewers called the previous night to register their opinion on the 
question of favoring a bilateral U.S.-Soviet freeze on nuclear weapons. According to Jackson‘s 
estimates, over 100,000 viewers voted no with the ―yes‖ vote calling for a freeze at 
approximately 79,000 calls. He reminded the Nightline audience that they were encouraged to 
participate in open forum with the two celebrities, who once again presented the opposing 
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political positions on nuclear weapons. In this installment of the debate, Newman stuck to the 
message of the nuclear freeze movement, a position that stressed the importance of keeping the 
world safe for future generations. Newman contended, ―I am concerned because the United 
States and the Soviet Union are at the equivalent to one million Hiroshima bombs, 4 tons for 
every man/woman/child on the planet. I am concerned because our nuclear weapons policy is 
moving away from deterrence and moving toward the incredible proposition that we can fight 
and win a nuclear war. That is why I support a verifiable freeze on the production, testing, and 
deployment of arms on both sides…This vote is not a vote on an arms agreement, this is a 
message that Americans have not abdicated our democratic right to advise the President on 
matters of great importance.‖69 
Although the topic of the conflation of celebrity news and infotainment is discussed more 
thoroughly in Chapter Two, these televised nuclear debates illustrate television‘s ability to blur 
the line between fact and fiction. By broadcasting news programs and narrative nuclear 
programming interchangeably, American audiences were confronted with a visual array of 
information and a cacophony of pundits debating deterrence, the use of nuclear weapons, and a 
post-apocalyptic world. Through most scholarly accounts, these televised images did not alter the 
popularity of President Reagan yet they left an indelible mark on American popular culture and 
television became the educational framework for most viewers to understand the politics of the 
Cold War during the eighties. 
World War III: Presenting the Nuclear Nightmare   
As the movie opens, the caption read, ―The Place: Alaska, The Time: In the Future.‖ The 
audience is introduced to bored soldiers in a military installation in the frozen state celebrating 
Christmas without their families this year. The dialogue opens with the soldiers discussing their 
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confined space. One soldier is about to end his tour of duty as another remarks, ―I am hopelessly 
passive.‖70 As the radar signals, the mood suddenly changes, as the mildly passive, bored 
soldiers are called to respond to a potential military situation. The ―hopelessly passive‖ soldier 
shoots the other American military personnel throughout the installation. As he lights a cigarette 
and surveys the collateral damage, he starts to type that the generator has malfunctioned but 
assures that the Alaska bunker is secure.  
Just like Ronald Reagan, Rock Hudson portrayed the American president as patriarchal, 
masculine, and rugged. In a verbal exchange with an attractive female reporter, the president is 
asked about the problematic grain embargo against the Soviet Union. The former vice president 
discusses how he has assumed the presidency, comments on the fact that he was not 
democratically elected, and explains his position regarding the embargo. The president contends 
that he wants to lift the grain embargo against the Soviet Union to help American farmers, for the 
best defense against the Soviets was the strength of the American farmer. His rhetoric is quite 
Jeffersonian in content and mirrors the rugged individualistic leanings emblematic of Reagan. 
The attractive journalist then turns to what the president intends to do in response to the Middle 
East‘s proposed oil embargo against the United States. She asks, ―Could the Alaskan pipeline be 
the solution?‖71The movie borrowed from headline political subject matter, and American 
audiences recalled all too clearly the oil crisis from the previous decade. Placed in a larger 
geopolitical framework, the movie gestured toward the combustible temperament of U.S. foreign 
policy during the Reagan years. Since the Nixon administration, the United States had found 
itself caught in the quagmire of Vietnam, isolated in the Middle East since the Iranian 
Revolution, and fearful of Soviet expansion. Americans had learned of the growing anti-U.S. 
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sentiment through network television. The made-for-television movie echoed many of these all-
too-real political scenarios.  
This narrative captured the anxiety over miscommunication, misinformation, and rigid 
adherence to Cold War orthodoxy. The president‘s inexperience was countered by his undaunted 
commitment to the American people. Additionally, Brian Keith‘s depiction of the inept Secretary 
General Gorny mirrored the right-wing notion that regardless of the innocuous figurehead, the 
larger threat was the Soviet apparatus orchestrated by fanatical revolutionaries. Although set in 
the near ―future,‖ the narrative borrows heavily from news making headlines such as the 1980 
grain embargo, which was the motivation for internal strife occurring in the Soviet Union, as 
well as the KGB‘s decision to invade Alaska in order to control the flow of oil coming down into 
the United States. The movie depicted the Soviet Union as a place rife with social and political 
disorder, surrounded by chaos, and managed by hawkish Soviet aggressors. In comparison, it 
painted the United States as family-oriented, God-fearing, rational Americans attempting to do 
the ―right‖ thing in the midst of political uncertainty. Embedded within the dialogue was a 
modest critique of the Reagan administration. Hudson skillfully portrayed President Thomas 
McKenna as peaceful, but one who found that geopolitical events were unfolding too rapidly for 
an informed response. Neither diplomacy nor mutually assured destruction could match the 
chicanery of the old-guard KGB. The Soviets had diverted the president‘s attention on the 
prospect of peace, as they assassinated their own premier. In the end, the United States was 
fooled one last time by the Soviets, who launched a first nuclear strike. 
72
 
The most interesting thematic undercurrent of the film, and also the most widely 
incorporated in other made-for-television films of the time, was the emphasis on children. 
Stationed thousands of miles away from his family, Colonel Caffey often speaks about how 
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heartbreaking it was to spend Christmas in Alaska, with other lonely military personnel. This 
theme also spoke to the growing message espoused by the nuclear freeze movement, most 
specifically by the Physicians for Social Responsibility: protecting the world for future 
generations. Implicit in that message was a narrative mixture of distrust in incompetent or 
unsuccessful diplomats with the complete annihilation of the world‘s future generations.   
The narrative held tightly to the normative conventional themes that were formulaic of 
made-for-television social melodramas. One example was the heterosexual coupling of the quasi-
famous television stars, David Soul and Cathy Lee Crosby. The sexual tension between Crosby, 
oddly miscast as high-ranking Major Kate Breckinridge, and Soul as Colonel Jake Coffey, 
reminded viewers that even in the frozen wilderness during a Soviet invasion, there was still time 
for Americans to find romance. This minor subplot flirts with another common theme of social 
melodramas: infidelity. Another staple conventional trope found in the film was the inclusionary 
and egalitarian image of the American landscape. The military was visibly integrated in terms of 
both African Americans and women employed by the U.S government, suggesting that the 
decades of movements had achieved some racial and gender parity. Director David Greene even 
paid homage to the iconic Cold War film, Fail-Safe (1964). Like the aforementioned Hollywood 
film, World War III ends with a montage of people from all ethnicities from all around the world 
looking at the missiles in the beautiful blue skies and hearing the sounds of military hardware 
pouring down from above, concluding with a last glance at the sun and then a fade to black. Just 
as Fail-Safe frightened Americans in the months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, World War III 
reminded audiences of the unthinkable consequences of miscommunication between the 
superpowers in 1982. 
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A surface reading of the film suggests that the film is apolitical in scope and context. 
Although the film ends in cataclysmic annihilation of the Earth, the powder-keg resulted from a 
mutual misunderstanding of events caused by bureaucratic interference. This interpretation, 
although valid, does not acknowledge the moments of political criticism offered by the hero, 
played by David Soul. In a verbal exchange with Soviet paratroopers, these two soldiers engage 
in a dialogue about how neither wants to be responsible for starting nuclear war. In turn, the 
American hero states that the two soldiers are just following orders from governments far away 
and with no real knowledge of the events that have unfolded in Alaska. The dialogue 
interrogated the difference between ―people‖ and ―politicians.‖ The narrative allows for 
moments of criticisms by showing two ordinary men, one American and one Russian, willing to 
negotiate, as opposed to the miscommunication between politicians with nefarious agendas. The 
citizenry was not to blame for this nuclear standoff; the viewers were innocent bystanders held 
hostage by rigid political orthodoxy. This criticism of militarism, Reagan, and political 
bureaucrats from both ideologies resonated with American audiences that had yet to recover 
from the political double shot of Watergate and Vietnam.  
Given its production problems, convoluted story, and melodramatic acting, it is not 
surprising that World War III did not achieve the popular success NBC anticipated. However, 
what was more significant was that the movie captured the climate of nuclear fear engulfing the 
nation and that other networks wanted to emulate the nuclear made-for-television melodrama. 
Even as World War III was still in production, ABC announced its commitment to make a 
nuclear drama that explored the effects of a Soviet H-bomb on Kansas City (a concept that was 
dramatized in the 1983 miniseries The Day After).  Overall, NBC‘s narrative suggested that 
misinformation and miscommunication between superpower governmental agents could create 
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World War III. This sentiment that politicians were speaking in a threatening or misleading 
manner was a common critique of the Reagan administration in the early 1980s. Regardless of 
the movie‘s obvious shortcomings, it attempted to force viewers to face up to the potential 
implications of nuclear war. Furthermore, networks learned that if they linked their nuclear 
melodramas to network news broadcasts, they could generate enormous commercial profits. 
Moreover, the networked played host to the democratized and mainstream debate on nuclear 
war.  
NBC‘s made-for-TV movie, World War III, was a modest commercial hit. The second 
part of the miniseries placed eighth in the Nielsen ratings, right behind ABC‘s Three’s Company 
and CBS‘s successful spinoff dramedy, Trapper John, M.D.73 A January 29, 1982 article in the 
New York Times reminded potential viewers of NBC‘s contention that the film ―makes such a 
powerful antiwar statement we request you not to reveal the ending to your readers.‖74 
Interestingly, this film is more inflammatory in its depiction of the superpowers‘ continued 
pursuit of nuclear annihilation. Robert Joseph, the screenwriter of World War III, commented, 
―We see them moving, moving, moving, towards a war they believe will never happen…two 
civilized countries going through this dance macabre, this jingoism, never wanting war, saying it 
can‘t happen…then provoking each other to greater and greater excesses.‖75. The New York 
Times was less forgiving in its review of the film asserting that ―World War III is precisely the 
kind of entertainment that would generate a warm glow among the Right.‖76 The movie gained a 
large market share and over the course of two nights viewers were switching over to World War 
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III from the competition.
77
Even though the Reagan White House did not issue an official 
denouncement of the film, executives changed the original future date of 1983 to 1987, due in 
part to the upcoming 1984 presidential election.
78
 What remained evident was the 
administration‘s determination to counter the growing antinuclear sentiment and anxiety 
engulfing the United States and Western Europe.  
Although it is difficult to gauge viewers reaction to the made-for-television nuclear 
holocaust, research into the relationship between television and public opinion had continuously 
suggested that media influence is not a matter of overt forms of persuasion, but a question of 
providing a context or working framework in which opinions are formed. Television had the 
capacity to provide viewers a rich informational climate, regardless of other information 
sources.
79
  Conversely, the volume of coverage also makes a difference in framing complicated 
political debates for viewers. Throughout 1982, the popular press presented the freeze movement 
as a byproduct of Reagan‘s militarism. The number of magazine and newspaper articles 
increased dramatically. On its nightly news broadcast in March and April 1982, CBS ran over 28 
stories on nuclear weapons protest in the United States. Additionally, television, attempting to 
capture the anxious nuclear mood of American viewers, presented nuclear scenarios without any 
larger historical context. Without much awareness, the networks discovered they could capture 
viewership by uniting the audience in fascination with pessimistic, trans-historical, external 
threats.
80
 This inclusion of the social melodramas with apocalyptic disasters reflected a divisive 
shift in the made-for-television movie as well as in the mainstream dissatisfaction with the 
Reagan military program. Furthermore, the last images of the Earth before a cataclysmic nuclear 
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war scared viewers and reminded Americans that nuclear war could possibly occur for a number 
of political, ideological or even technological reasons. This haunting visual continued throughout 
the early years of the Reagan administration and galvanized activists on both sides of the 
political spectrum.  
The Nuclear Freeze Movement 
The nuclear freeze movement of the 1980s has its genesis in a number of social and 
political organizations that grew in tandem with the atomic age. According to David S. Meyers, 
the advent of the nuclear age drastically changed the context and scope of organizations that 
feared another world war, particularly a nuclear world war. He adds that peace movements 
maintained the same type of supporters and activists, mostly middle-class sympathizers, peace-
church organizations, and the political left.
81
 Moreover, as concerns about nuclear war escalated 
with the Cold War itself, organizations such as the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) 
and the Women‘s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) called for unilateral 
disarmament and linked their antinuclear message to other foreign policy issues of the 1950s.
82
 
One of the more popular peace movements, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), 
emerged as a vehicle to broaden the basis for antinuclear activism. Created in part by Norman 
Cousins, the editor of the Saturday Review, SANE advocated a worldwide inclusive nuclear test-
ban.
83
 However, the group most responsible for the growth of the freeze movement was the 
Physicians for Social Responsibility. The ―call‖ for nuclear freeze galvanized peace activists 
from a number of different organizations. 
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In addition, Randall Forsberg, the chief strategist of the freeze, was convinced that the 
American middle class had to be mobilized in order to sell the message on nuclear freeze. The 
key to disarmament, according to Forsberg, was to articulate a clear, collective message of 
halting the manufacturing on nuclear war around which all spectrums of the peace movements 
could mobilize.
84
Speaking at rallies, teach-ins, and arms control symposia around the country, 
Forsberg argued for a mutual and comprehensive U.S-Soviet freeze. Having co authored the 
1979 work, Price of Defense, Forsberg argued that the United States could retain a strictly 
defensive nuclear posturing with half of the current number of nuclear weapons. By April 1980, 
Forsberg had drafted the official position of the nuclear freeze movement in the four-page 
document, Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race. The ―call‖ for nuclear freeze marked a 
monumental transition in the antinuclear movement in that it demanded a halt to production, as 
well as testing and deployment, of all newly constructed nuclear weapons.  
The freeze, under the leadership of Forsberg, maintained its ―heartland image‖ by 
incorporating and accepting endorsements from Christian organizations, such as William Sloane 
Coffin‘s Riverside Church, the Pax Christi USA, and the National Council of Churches.85 
However, the movement also became punctuated with problems-- the fear of centralization by an 
elite group, which was a lingering concern from participants of the New Left, to the claim that 
the message of the freeze was too narrow. Concerned that the freeze excluded minority social 
issues, the message was again debated in acrimonious floor debates. Carrie Burris of CALC 
(Clergy And Laity Concerned) stated, ―A lot of us…felt that diluting the Call that way [to stress 
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economic conversion to counter unemployment] would ruin the potential for outreach to a 
broader segment of the U.S. public and it might look like just another left wing radical group.‖86 
In order to rebuke right-wing assaults, Forsberg insisted that the National Freeze locate its 
headquarters in St. Louis, Missouri and adopt the guiding principle of ―national coordination‖ 
with ―local self-determination.‖87 
The wholesome image Forsberg attempted to create was further legitimized by the 
endorsement from the group Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR). Like the National 
Freeze Campaign, the PSR was headed by a woman president, Helen Caldicott. As an 
internationally recognized leader of the antinuclear movement, she mirrored the image Forsberg 
outlined. Unaligned with any leftist group, Caldicott‘s résumé read as the consummate 
professional. A renowned pediatrician and a professor at the Harvard University Medical School, 
she had left both positions to devote her time to the cause for nuclear freeze. The PSR organized 
thousands of sit-ins at American colleges and universities in the fall of 1981. Caldicott was also 
featured in the 1981 film, The Last Epidemic, which showed the consequences of a nuclear bomb 
dropped on San Francisco. The film was widely shown amongst the antinuclear movement and 
was also utilized as a mechanism for mass mobilizations. This domestic, female-led group of 
organizers, coupled with Reagan‘s own statements regarding ―winning‖ a limited nuclear 
engagement, frightened and mobilized not just the intellectual elite or concerned moms, but 
citizens across a wide social spectrum. In 1982, Newsweek reported, ―The saber-rattling rhetoric 
of the President has prompted vast and growing numbers of mainstream Americans to look past 
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the technicalities of arms-control procedures to a simple, symbolic first step such as the 
freeze.‖88  
An important strategy of the National Freeze Campaign was to flood the White House 
with letters that indicated the organization wanted to speak to the president directly. In the 
months leading up to the June 12, 1982 proposed march in New York City, Helen Caldicott sent 
numerous invitations to the White House for staffers to engage directly with groups, such as 
Physicians for Social Responsibility, who spoke of the medical consequences of nuclear 
weapons and war. As part of their non-biased political platform, Caldicott reiterated that their 
group was a ―national, non-profit organization of more than 20,000 doctors, dentists, and 
members of the public, in every state of the Union, dedicated to professional and public 
education on the medical implications of nuclear weapons and their use.‖89 After repeated 
denials from the White House staff, the National Freeze Campaign distributed literature that 
explicitly countered Reagan‘s assertion of surviving a nuclear attack. In a pamphlet entitled, 
―The Freeze is Not Enough,‖ the campaign explained how even when Reagan claimed he did not 
want nuclear war, his aggressive military build-up clearly demonstrated his plans for nuclear 
proliferation and not nuclear cooperation with the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the pamphlet 
enumerated the many times in our atomic history, such as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty that 
banned only atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, in which the government did ―nothing to 
prevent the continuing arms race.‖90Groups such as the Union of Concerned Scientists, Lawyers 
Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and United Campuses 
to Prevent Nuclear War also constructed lists of nuclear accidents in the United States from 1950 
to 1976, which showed the presence of nuclear exposure in every geographic region of America, 
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including Hawaii and Alaska. Furthermore, the National Action/Research on the Military-
Industrial Complex (NARMIC) map series compiled data that demonstrated that every state in 
the Union was owned in part by the Pentagon, with Arizona leading as the nation‘s largest 
Pentagon-controlled state, with over 5 percent belonging to the Department of Defense (DOD).
91
 
This generational extension of the ―military-industrial‖ atlas of the United States included the 
states with the most companies doing nuclear research as well as the colleges and universities 
with military contracts around the country. All of this data suggested that an overwhelming 
military presence existed in every state of the country, and with this inexorable nexus between 
the military and private nuclear weapons manufacturers, all Americans needed was to ban 
together and their numbers could promote and demand peace.  
Unfortunately in the early 1980s, media coverage on the nuclear freeze movement often 
did not clearly differentiate between the message of the movement and public displays of 
individuals championing the cause of nuclear disarmament. For example, the New York Times 
began its coverage in early September 1981 with a front-page story on Bishop Leroy 
Matthiesen‘s attempt to shut down a nuclear bomb facility in Texas. Bishop Matthiesen 
legitimized the movement, and the Times noted, ―Some members of the movement are pacifists 
but many are not.‖92 Furthermore, like the Times, network television exposure of the movement 
legitimized the movement by focusing on its grassroots appeal.
93
 The media covered this 
renewed fear of nuclear war with lively dramatic flair. The New York Times devoted more 
extensive coverage to an individual antinuclear protestor‘s 39-day fast as well as shadows 
painted on Wall Street to simulate the results of millions of victims of nuclear vaporization. 
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Television news injected more theatrics and reported on a man climbing 26 stories of a 45-story 
building to hang a nuclear freeze poster. Network cameras also captured the arrest of a civil 
disobedient female protestor married to the Minneapolis chief of police.
94
 The dramatics of the 
issue often obscured the political message of the freeze movement. Adding to the public debate 
on nuclear weapons and the implications of nuclear war was the release of Jonathan Schell‘s 
1982 essay, ―The Fate of the Earth.‖ Originally published as a series in the New York Times 
Magazine, the popularity of the message, which urged the moral necessity of preventing nuclear 
annihilation, resonated with American readers.
95
 Despite Schell‘s call to ―reinvent politics,‖ little 
political analysis appeared in the book. Ironically, as the peace movement became more visual, 
gained greater membership, and involved a mainstream dialogue, it was left open to overt right-
wing criticism.  
Beginning in 1981, the freeze campaign grew rapidly. As Reagan‘s rhetoric became more 
ominous, the movement became stronger. Unlike the atomic presidents who preceded him, the 
Reagan nuclear doctrine employed blunt language, stripped of ambiguity, and rooted in clinical 
optimism. What previous defense secretaries had purposely called ―options,‖ Caspar Weinberger 
said, ―nuclear war fighting.‖ Additionally, Secretary of State Alexander Haig openly spoke of 
firing a ―warning shot over Europe‖ to deter possible Soviet expansion. This statement was an 
open invitation to freeze activists all over Europe to unite around disarmament.
96
 Without any 
sense of irony, Weinberger selected August 9, 1981, the anniversary of the bombing of Nagasaki, 
to announce the manufacturing of the controversial neutron bomb. Even conservatives became 
concerned, especially in the midst of the comment made by Under-secretary of Defense T. K. 
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Jones, who said that surviving a nuclear attack included using a shovel and a hole in the 
ground.
97
 
The emphasis on what would happen to children if a nuclear holocaust occurred was one 
of the many national dialogues engaging Americans and network political pundits in 1982. The 
popular press focused on Helen Caldicott for a number of reasons, but mostly because she 
successfully spoke directly to middle-class women and appealed to their materialism and 
domesticity. This message that nuclear freeze was inextricably connected to the family attracted 
a number of different groups and fostered growing visibility in the popular press. The massive 
number of demonstrators and growing public support for a nuclear freeze amendment prompted 
a counterattack by the White House. Reagan agreed with the activists that nuclear war was 
―bad.‖ However, like others on the Right, he asserted that Americans involved in the campaign 
for nuclear disarmament were being manipulated by those who purported peace, but whose main 
objective was to cripple America.
98
  
The Reagan Response to Nuclear Freeze 
Throughout early 1982, the Reagan White House spent considerable time orchestrating a 
formal response to the nuclear freeze movement. As stated earlier, the official party line from the 
White House was that peace activists threatened the U.S. by decreasing arms while opening up 
spaces of organization that Communists could infiltrate and exploit. This classic red-baiting 
echoed Reagan‘s public anti-Communist stance cultivated since the fifties.  As the Physicians for 
Social Responsibility, from its St. Louis main office, sent numerous letters to the White House 
attempting to gain face-time with the president, the White House media office provided a swift 
response to a growing antinuclear movement. Immediately following the announcements of the 
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Kennedy-Bingham bills, nuclear freeze resolutions that were intended to be introduced to 
Congress before the 1982 mid-term elections, Secretary of State Alexander Haig called a news 
conference to repudiate the freeze. In April of 1982, the State Department issued two reports on 
the peace movement. One report suggested that the World Peace Council (WPC) was instigating 
and supporting Communism and oppositional groups throughout the West. The second report 
held tight to belief that the Soviet Union was controlling antinuclear groups in Western Europe 
and other former war-torn NATO regions. The State Department reiterated that NATO could not 
be swayed by dissent.
99
 In a memo to William P. Clark, June 22, 1982, the National Security 
Council summarized the administration‘s rejection of the ―no-first-use‖ nuclear option in 
Western Europe out of the proven method of deterrence.
100
 This declaration of ―no-first use‖ 
jargon did not specify that the administration would not provoke and/or start a nuclear war, but it 
did not mean the superpowers had reached nuclear parity, nor would arms talks reassume if the 
Soviet Union did not reveal its actual nuclear capability. The message from the Reagan White 
House reinforced the efficacy of deterrence policy and openly slandered antinuclear groups as 
hand-maidens to larger leftist conspirators directed by the Kremlin.  
Nuclear arms supporters, generally from the Right, often dismissed nuclear freeze 
activists as childish, naïve, and at worst, lingering marauders from the sixties. The political Right 
attempted to characterize the protests, along with members of the nuclear freeze movement, as 
hung-over radicals who openly congregated with Communists. Following in the tradition of 
right-wing red-baiting, Republicans repeatedly equated dissent and antinuclear activities with 
communism. The Right offered ―proof‖ of this collaboration between freeze activists and 
Communists in an essay by Rael Jean Isaac and Ehrich Issac that asserted Soviet spies had not 
                                                 
99
 Meyers, A Winter of Discontent, 213.  
100
 Memo, Sven Kraemer to William P. Clark, June 22, 1982, folder ―Nuclear Freeze‖ box OA, Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library 
71 
 
 
only infiltrated the freeze movement, but they had surreptitiously exploited the freeze to gain 
military dominance over the United States.
101
 This argument was ―validated‖ in an essay written 
by Vladimir Bukovsky, a Russian writer living in exile, who substantiated the claims that the 
Soviets were aggressively dominating the Western peace movements. He warned that if the West 
continued its commitment to peace, it would ―willingly or unwillingly‖ align itself with the 
rulers of the East. 
102
 From the editor of the Wall Street Journal to Caspar Weinberger, to over 
thirty members of the Committee on the President Danger (CPD) now holding positions in the 
Reagan administration, the Right suggested that a freeze on nuclear weapons or any type of 
disarmament did not work under the current geopolitical climate, especially Soviet 
expansionists‘ policies. Framed in this argument, the Right presented nuclear freeze movement 
as the possible catalyst for a Soviet invasion. The official GOP stance on disarmament was if the 
government was to disarmed unilaterally, the U.S. would become vulnerable not only to a 
potential nuclear attack but also to Soviet occupation. 
Despite these right-wing descriptions, the public image of the antinuclear movement 
consisted not of left-wing radicals, but rather of mothers begging aloof politicians to save the 
world for their children. This gendered message of the nuclear freeze was repudiated by the 
Right, suggesting that peace activists did not understand the implications of nuclear foreign 
policy and military maneuvers. The peace movement was a hodge-podge of celebrities, 
musicians, mothers, and scientists demanding a unilateral nuclear freeze. What was most 
problematic for the Reagan administration was engaging in the gendered debate regarding 
traditional American values and preserving the world for children. Thus, the dialogue became 
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stunted. Republican pundits spoke in military jargon, while peace advocates spoke of the rights 
of children to grow in a nuclear-free environment. Placed within a larger context, as nuclear 
issues became more visible in the mass media, the national dialogue on nuclear issues became 
overtly partisan, contradictory, and sensational. 
Nuclear Freeze and the Threat of Soviet Aggression 
It was a matter of strategic geopolitical importance that the U.S. government conveyed 
the Soviet Union as an expanding and struggling power, especially since the U.S. planned to 
deploy new nuclear hardware into Western Europe. The Soviets‘ replacement of its first-
generation missiles in Europe in the mid-seventies strained détente and suggested that the 
Soviet‘s might launch a first strike. Conversely, the 1980 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its 
support of Marxist regimes in Angola and Central America demonstrated their commitment to 
worldwide Communist revolution, according to conservatives. However, the Soviets shared a 
similar fear of the rhetoric and military reorganization occurring under Reagan. Even before the 
1980 presidential election, the United States was mobilizing its military strength. On July 25, 
1980, President Carter added to Soviet fears by proposing a new presidential directive, PD-59, 
which included an argument for fighting an extended nuclear war rather than attacking through 
use of the entire arsenal. 
103
 This position was popular amongst Republicans. During the 1980 
presidential race, the Republican National Convention co-opted this nuclear platform and Reagan 
delivered the message of the pronounced Soviet threat.  
The conservative call to rebuild the U.S. military arsenal began in the midst of the era of 
Cold War détente. Adamant Cold Warriors propelled by the ―Vietnam Syndrome‖ were 
strategically aligning their forces to reheat the military contest with the Soviets. In response to 
mounting pressure from groups such as the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), a group 
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founded in 1976 with the sole aim of drawing attention to the escalating Soviet menace, 
numerous U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that the United States had calamitously 
underestimated impending Soviet military plans. Even if the Apollo missions had designated a 
win for the U.S. in terms of the space race, U.S. intelligence agents warned that the United States 
was losing the arms race. When Reagan assumed office in 1981, a litany of supporters calling for 
nuclear rearmament received appointments to Reagan‘s cabinet. Although many Americans 
strongly favored an arms control agreement with the Soviets, by 1980, the pendulum swung 
―right‖ toward higher defense spending evident through not only the landslide election of 
President Reagan but also Congressional Republicans.  Neoconservative arguments about a 
frightening Soviet nuclear arsenal in the face of ―American appeasement policy‖ effectively 
equated the Soviet regime to the rise of Nazism in Germany. This militaristic theory was 
propagated during the years of supposed détente, and a USIA (United States Information 
Agency) film, ―Soviet Military Power,‖ was produced and shown to NATO allies in order to 
demonstrate how successful the Soviet military apparatus had become during the seventies. 
USIA director Charles Z. Wick wrote, ―the USIA produced videotape, ‗Soviet Military Power,‘ 
designed to complement the brochure on the same theme and to demonstrate how the Soviets 
continue to build up a menacing military power has now been viewed by virtually every top 
military leader in the country up to, and including, the President.‖104 As for the Soviets, their 
interpretation was that the U.S. was gearing for World War III.
105
 According to the Soviets, 
President Carter had ended détente with his proposal of protecting the Persian Gulf and the larger 
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American commitment of building more efficient nuclear hardware. Nuclear weapons scholar 
Richard Rhodes argues: 
By the 1980 presidential election…the choice in foreign policy was that of the 
Carter administration, which favored the [MIRVed, ten war-hear], MX missiles, 
the Trident submarine, a Rapid Deployment Force, a ―stealth bomber,‖ cruise 
missiles, counterforce targeting leading to a first-strike capability, and a 5 percent 
increase in defense spending, and that of the Republicans under Ronald Reagan, 
who favored all of these plus the neutron bomb, antiballistic missiles, the B-1 
Bomber, civil defense and a 8 percent increase in defense spending. 
For the American voter, although perhaps unclear on the larger implications of this story 
line in the miniseries World War III, he/she understood that the U.S. and Soviet Union had 
already traversed numerous nuclear landmines by the end of the 1970s. The question remained as 
to what political party was willing to bring peace and prosperity since both Democrats and 
Republicans agreed over the need for massive rearmament.  
With his landslide election in 1980, Reagan appointed this team of Cold Warriors with 
the task of ―restoring the shattered American prestige and position around the world.‖106 This 
well-oiled conglomeration of Republicans would take a draconian position toward the Soviet 
Union and Communist-led governments in Central America, and launch a massive military 
expansion, all in the name of ―beating the Russians.‖ After nearly two decades of arms talks 
under Presidents Nixon and Carter, the Cold War pendulum swung back to an era before détente. 
In subsequent campaign speeches, Reagan warned of the possible Soviet annexation of the 
Middle East, Latin America, and even spread into neighboring Mexico. Mirroring this position in 
1980, Reagan ominously warned, ―We now enter one of the most dangerous decades of Western 
civilization.‖107 Compared to the incumbent Democrat, President Carter, Reagan promised to 
secure nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union and restore the country to its providence. 
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Reagan stated that the United States had been through an era of ―vallication, appeasement and 
aimlessness,‖ throughout the Carter years and as a result, ―the Soviets had pulled way ahead.‖108 
According to Reagan‘s estimates, the Soviets had spent over $240 billion more on defense than 
the United States, and in so doing it was no longer an arms race, but a potential win for the 
Soviet Union. For Reagan, his rhetoric suggested that the American voter had to decide the fate 
of the United States as a superpower or suffer the fate of the British Chamberlain policy which 
led to Nazi expansion before 1941. This specter of the horrors of World War II would prove a 
useful trope in the endorsement of Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential election. 
Reagan advisors continually reiterated that the United States had the capacity to wage a 
protracted nuclear war against specific Soviet targets. In order to do this successfully, the White 
House promulgated the need for an extensive modernization of nuclear hardware, which would 
also double the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This unprecedented nuclear buildup, coupled 
with Reagan‘s rhetoric and his unwillingness to engage in arms talks, did much to heighten the 
fear of a nuclear holocaust. An NBC/Associated Press poll in December 1981 revealed that 76 
percent of Americans believed that nuclear war was likely to occur within a few years. 
109
 Some 
even believed that nuclear war was inevitable. A 1982 poll showed that for the first time in Cold 
War history, a large proportion of Americans, 41 percent, believed that the Russians possessed a 
larger nuclear arsenal, while only 7 percent agreed that the U.S. has a superior force.
110
 
In this midst of the discussion on the accuracy of nuclear weapons, the role of human fallibility 
has always served as a signpost of how vulnerable nuclear weapons were to mistakes. In the 
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early summer of 1980, on two separate occasions, the North American Defense Command 
Center indicated that the Soviets had launched a missile attack against the United State. 
Additionally, Soviet premier Yuri Andropov made a public announcement that the Reagan 
administration was preparing for a surprise first strike against the Soviet Union.
111
 In traditional 
Cold War fashion, the KGB and its military counterpart, the GRU, would combine for the first 
time in Soviet history to become the largest intelligence-gathering program during peacetime. In 
response to Reagan‘s pointed words, Yuri Andropov would also test the Soviets‘ ability to 
mobilize under the code-named Project RYAN, an acronym derived from the Russian words for 
a surprise missile attack.
112
 On separate occasions, radars belonging both to the North American 
Defense Command Center and to Soviet satellites, erroneously indicated that the other side had 
already launched a first strike against the other. Although all were mistakes, the fear that World 
War III could result from a technological mishap or failed computer equipment added more 
immediacy to the fear of a nuclear nightmare. Furthermore, these accidental blunders 
underscored how serious the situation had become between the superpowers. The public fear of 
nuclear war helped to propel the nuclear freeze movement and nuclear imagery on network 
television.  
The nuclear freeze movement became a political fixture in the 1982 midterm election. In 
the fall of 1982, the nuclear freeze movement mobilized the largest referendum campaign in U.S. 
history. Over eleven million Americans voted for the freeze and won in nine of the ten states that 
placed the referendum on the ballots.
113
  Meyers also adds that support for a nuclear freeze was 
aided in part by the recession of 1982. In the midst of an economic recession, the Reagan 
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rearmament program included more than $20 billion to improve and protect the vulnerable 
aspects of the U.S. nuclear communication apparatus. For many Americans, this rearmament 
project seemed suspect in the midst of the economic recession. By most accounts, the economy 
worsened during the first two years of Reagan‘s presidency. Reagan‘s rearmament blueprint 
budget was funded by a $35 billion cut for domestic programs. When asked about the cost of the 
project military arsenal at the expense of domestic programs, Reagan famously said, ―The 
military is not a budget issue.‖ Unemployment increased from an average around 7 percent under 
Carter to 10.7 percent in early 1982, and substantially got worse for women and minorities. 
114
 
Furthermore, organizations such as the United Auto Workers (UAW) and other Old Left unions 
shared the anti-Reagan sentiment espoused by the New Left or antinuclear activists. Economics 
and television brought immediacy to the problems facing increasing hostile anti-American 
sentiment. This emphasis on the failing economy, framed in the larger context of Reagan‘s 
bellicose rhetoric toward the Soviet Union and the use of federal funds to increase the nuclear 
arsenal, galvanized the nuclear freeze movement. Moreover, the central message of the freeze 
championed peace and the right to a nuclear-free future for children. 
As for the White House, it would continue to recycle the same ten talking points, which 
ranged from the obvious, such as nuclear weapons are a concern and need to be discussed, to the 
tradition of deterrence through proliferation. Not until the famous March 1983 ―Star Wars‖ 
speech did the administration finally out-peace the peace movement, which will be discussed in 
the next chapter.   
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Conclusion 
As the nuclear freeze movement gained political and popular support among voters, the 
Reagan White House worked furiously to construct a counter-narrative to mitigate collective 
fears of nuclear war. The strategy for winning public support was massive exposure on television 
to promote deterrence and nuclear armament. As Robert E. Denton Jr. writes, ―the daily priorities 
were: network evening news, morning shows, Cable News Network, and local regional news 
programs. Details of the daily nature of government policy and foreign affairs were avoided. 
Photo opportunities were granted, but questions for the President were not allowed. Press 
briefings were held late in the day, reducing the time for network editing. By 1983 Reagan gave 
the press 194 interviews and 150 White House briefings from outside the White House.‖115 
Furthermore, by Reagan‘s third year, the White House media staff constructed a new relationship 
with network news in which the executive branch wielded immense power. By 1983, Reagan‘s 
television exposure was recreating the American television political experience. His presidential 
style expressed how people feel, not what they think. Like the medium of television, Reagan‘s 
delivery and tone resonated with the television audience and created an intimate relationship 
between the president and the viewer.  
Network television movies were a viable commodity in the early 1980s as the format of 
these narrative films explored social, cultural, and political issues. The narrative of World War 
III borrowed heavily from Cold War headlines and more specifically about U.S.-Soviet nuclear 
issues. Although the grain embargo was discussed in the national media, the divisiveness of this 
issue was one of great importance to both superpowers. As early as 1974, the Soviet Union 
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admitted that its economic collapse would be inextricably linked to the grain embargo.
116
 
Furthermore, Nobel Prize–winning physicist Andrei Sakharov, in a series of memoranda 
published in the New York Times in 1968 under the title ―Reflections on Progress, Peaceful 
Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom,‖ admitted a number of ways in which the Soviet Union 
lagged behind in the production of essential materials, including access to foodstuffs. Most 
specifically, the Soviets lagged in terms of computer technology that had the capacity to benefit 
the national economy and demonstrate technological prowess.
117
 In the television movie World 
War III, the audience bears witness to the private conversations of the men who control the 
nuclear arsenal, gesturing toward the ability of television to engage the public in global issues. 
Although the average viewer may not have known of the connection between the Soviet grain 
embargo and the U.S. military expansion, collectively, the major three television networks 
utilized these programs as ways of inviting audience participation and generating revenue. 
Additionally, the film‘s use of the 1980 U.S. grain embargo adds to the miniseries commitment 
to illustrate social problems while also dramatize their political value. As the U.S. attempted to 
use its resource capabilities to withhold grain from the Soviets, as Carter stipulated in a speech in 
January 1980, as a way to discipline the Soviets for their 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the 
Soviet people were suffering. Historically, this became the basis of not only the end of détente, 
but also the fictional narrative device to explain the riotous Soviet people as well as the blunder 
of the Soviet leadership. Although the initial political impact of the embargo embarrassed the 
Carter administration, it also helped to generate Cold War anxieties in that it strained delicate 
U.S.-Soviet relations. Escalating tensions with the Soviet Union, in addition to the environmental 
nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, helped to unite members of the nuclear freeze movement 
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and mobilize the ―liberal‖ cause for peace. Again it is important to remember that the film World 
War III concludes with a nuclear holocaust, a montage sequence that begins with faces of 
children from around the world and ends with global thermal mushroom clouds, an ending that 
demonstrated little faith in government institutions. 
World War III reflected an increased awareness of Cold War maneuverings as well as a 
distrust of government and corrupt political officials. The conservative Right repeatedly evoked 
imagery from World War II as an ominous portent of what might happen if the Soviets continued 
to expand their territory. During the 1980 presidential campaign, Reagan compared President 
Jimmy Carter to Neville Chamberlin and the policy of appeasement in regard to the arms race 
with the Soviets. What the antinuclear movements shared with the Committee on Clear and 
Present Danger (CPD), the covert and surreptitious right-wing group wanting to increase the U.S. 
nuclear arsenal, was the desire to bring awareness to the issues surrounding nuclear arms. 
Ironically, these opposition organizers would find Reagan and his advisors the perfect 
figureheads to politicize and discuss nuclear issues through the media.  Ironically, both sides 
depended on Reagan and the mass media to bring these complicated issues into the mainstream. 
Ronald Reagan was the perfect advocate for the new conservative power bloc, and as he rode 
into Washington for his inauguration in 1981, he brought with him a cavalry of approximately 
thirty-one members of the Committee on the Present Danger, including the national security 
advisor, Richard Allen; the CIA director, William Casey; and the assistant security of defense, 
Richard Perle. For these major figures of the Reagan White House, their task was to make the 
rounds on network television news shows to reaffirm deterrence and the pernicious threat of the 
USSR. This national suspicion of the motives of the Reagan administration is captured in the 
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narrative and is also visible in print journalism, network news, and especially in the grassroots 
activism of the nuclear freeze movement.  
World War III remained politically threatening to the White House, for it had the pathos 
to appeal to the postwar middle class. In the midst of callous remarks coming out of the White 
House, coupled with the growing membership, visibility, and liberal political association of the 
nuclear freeze movement, the film reminded viewers that average Americans had little control 
over nuclear annihilation. This televised reminder of the dangers of the contemporary nuclear 
reality helped to galvanize supporters of the nuclear freeze, and it also reshaped the White 
House‘s bellicose ideology. The president wanted peaceful deterrence, and he would learn, in the 
next year of his presidency, to out-peace the peace movement with televised rhetoric on the 
importance of protecting the world for children and preventing a nuclear holocaust.   
The nuclear freeze movement would suffer a painful demise throughout the Reagan era. 
Even though public support of a nuclear peace remained high, public and political support began 
to wane for the movement in late 1983. Furthermore, with the 1984 campaign slogan ―Morning 
in America,‖ which depicted all-white, middle-class suburban, peaceful, consumer-oriented 
American voters safe from Communists, the dialogue on nuclear freeze began to change.
118
 The 
Reagan administration transformed its platform into a message that stated strong defense was 
synonymous with peace and prosperity. In short, the administration learned how to effectively 
out-peace the antinuclear movement by demonstrating the conservative commitment to 
protecting American children by invoking the fear of Communism and the effectiveness of 
deterrence. Even though historically mutually assured destruction (MAD) had arguably 
stabilized nuclear peace, it was a delicate balance that Cold War hardliners and overzealous 
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militarism could disrupt—a visual message reiterated in the concluding scenes of NBC‘s World 
War III. Although, the media helped to bring attention to the wellspring of antinuclear activists, 
ultimately, the networks did not offer any real framework for understanding complicated issues. 
Policy issues such as nuclear proliferation were being openly discussed, not only by President 
Reagan, but also by celebrities such as Charlton Heston and Paul Newman. This type of network 
and media coverage, as this chapter argues, did little to educate the public on nuclear/Cold War–
related topics but rather frightened or entertained American viewers with the terrifying fear of 
nuclear war. One cannot ignore, however, how the nuclear freeze movement did challenge 
Reagan‘s public policies and brought renewed attention to antinuclear activism. Furthermore, by 
looking at early explorations of network news on Reagan‘s military agenda and the nuclear 
freeze movements, it is evident that many Americans became willing participants who engaged 
television to become part of the debate. Not only were Americans watching nuclear themed 
programming, they were responding and actively articulating individual positions on these 
complicated nuclear issues.   
Indeed, when one million Americans marched in protest of Reagan‘s nuclear policy on 
June 12, 1982, the Reagan administration, as well as the media, took notice. Although not as 
popular as other nuclear made-for-television films of the decade, such as The Day After or 
Special Bulletin, World War III remains an important teleplay because it marked the resurgence 
of made-for-television social nuclear melodramas. Additionally, the film still has cultural 
relevance, sparking American viewers to write reviews on the Internet Movie Database (IMDB). 
Most of these audience reviews reveal how personally affected these Americans were after they 
watched World War III. The complexity of the Cold War, with all of its many verisimilitudes, is 
perhaps too intricate for network television prime-time viewing, for it does not allow for a 
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thorough explanation of the implications of intercontinental missiles, or the American nuclear 
triad, or megatons. Even within the hours of prime time and news broadcasting, the geopolitical 
maneuverings of the superpowers, the complex message of nuclear deterrence, or even the 
distinction between nuclear freeze and nuclear disarmament became increasingly contradictory 
and unapologetically unclear. What television produced in the early 1980s were selected sound 
bites on nuclear weapons, offered by the antinuclear activists and Reagan officials, as well as 
celebrity activists who chimed in on political issues. Left out of the televised public dialogue was 
the real parity in the nuclear arsenals of both the Soviet Union and the United States. In addition, 
as network programming continued throughout 1982, the line between fact and fiction would 
become even more obscured.  In January 1983, polls showed that Reagan‘s popularity rating had 
plummeted to 35 percent, the lowest midterm assessment of a president in forty years. Fewer 
than one in five Americans expressed confidence that the economy was improving. Yet Reagan, 
ever the optimist, retained faith that if America ―stayed the course,‖ it would prove its superiority 
to the world and regain its morality.
119
 
As the decade proceeded, the three major networks would continue to employ the 
structure of the made-for-television format to examine complicated nuclear issues. In the next 
year, NBC and ABC would both produce made-for-television films that exploited escalating 
nuclear anxieties. The next two chapters continue to explore how these narratives are emblematic 
of the misinformation and conflicting ideas about nuclear war delivered by network television. 
Additionally, the second chapter discusses the beginning of the success of the Reagan 
Revolution, the cable invasion, and the transformation of the traditional television news cycle. 
Given the changing pace of network television, audiences were forced to consider different 
                                                 
119
 Jules Tygiel, Ronald Reagan and the Triumph of American Conservatism (New York: Pearson, 2005), 136. 
84 
 
 
perspectives on nuclear war and challenged to confront their own complicated fears about living 
in the nuclear world. 
Chapter Two: Blurring the lines between Fact and Fiction; Special Bulletin, Technology 
and Reagan 
“THE FOLLOWING PROGRAM IS A REALISTIC DEPICTION OF FICTIONAL EVENTS. 
NONE OF WHAT YOU ARE ABOUT TO SEE IS ACTUALLY HAPPENGING.‖120 
In March 1983, NBC telecasted its nuclear-themed, made-for-television film, Special 
Bulletin, a fictional version of the threat of domestic nuclear terrorists in America. Only three 
after the broadcast, President Reagan addressed the nation during prime-time hours to discuss the 
urgency of the nuclear crisis with the Soviet Union. In only a few short sentences, Reagan called 
on the American viewer to support U.S. civil defense by aiding scientists and the military with 
their tax dollars for the construction of strategic defense technologies. Ultimately, Reagan 
believed, the summons for taxpayer money for space-based missile systems would make the 
escalating arms race with the Soviet Union ―impotent and unnecessary.‖ Through network 
television, Reagan‘s speech, more popularly known as the ―Star Wars speech,‖ would recalibrate 
Cold War culture, calling on scientists and television viewers alike to aid in his vision of the 
defensive space shield, thus ending the need for nuclear disarmament and nuclear peace activists. 
For NBC, the arrival of the president‘s announcement of space-based missile systems provided 
an interesting way of promoting its newest made-for-television nuclear-themed movie, Special 
Bulletin.  
In concert with Reagan‘s concerns about nuclear war, the teleplay offered a platform to 
discuss nuclear issues in terms of technology and radical activism. In Special Bulletin, a group of 
radical peace activists take hostages, including a live television crew, and threaten to detonate 
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over 900 nuclear warheads off the coast of Charleston if the U.S. government does not comply 
with their demands. To cover the thirty-six-hour standoff, a fictitious network (RBC) is 
constructed to show the events live, and through the use of satellite technology, the nuclear 
standoff is broadcasted throughout the country. As opposed to other nuclear-themed dramas of 
its time, NBC presented a controversial narrative that exploited social fears about nuclear war 
and offered a self-reflective critique of network broadcasting.  The film borrowed heavily from 
topical events such as the Reagan administration‘s growing military arsenal and the nuclear 
freeze movement, as well as the role network television played in creating topical spectacles. The 
teleplay offers an interesting commentary on Reagan‘s ability to deflect the nation‘s attention 
from the actual immediate threats of international nuclear weapons and direct it toward radical 
Cold War scapegoats. Although the film is typically overshadowed by the colossal success of 
ABC‘s The Day After (1983), which aired in November of the same year, Special Bulletin is 
arguably one of the most important contributions to the canon of nuclear dramas due to its 
examination of the media and technology during Reagan‘s eighties. 
This chapter examines the ways television technology complicated the existing interplay 
between the three major networks, the White House, and the viewer. Embedded in this analysis 
is the assertion that ―technology‖ was depicted as an individual act of cultural and political 
agency. Individual technology from the remote control to the arrival of cable provided a rupture 
in the traditional relationship between the networks and viewers. Furthermore, nuclear 
technology offered a dramatic shift in Cold War politics by projecting nuclear anxiety into the 
atmosphere. However, the availability of television technology also obscured the line between 
fact and fiction as demonstrated on television, as present in political rhetoric, and as shown on 
network television through the growth of ―infotainment.‖ This cultural and political dependence 
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on technology bolstered the national belief in nuclear deterrence, which helped to transform 
Reagan‘s public image from that of a militaristic hawk to that of ―the Great Communicator.‖ 
  More specifically, this chapter examines the relationship between network television, the 
Reagan administration, and technology. This examination highlights how technology created the 
idea of new public spaces in the early eighties through the advent of network cable television. 
This section offers a brief analysis of the Reagan Boom, which is more cultural than economic in 
scope. This cultural prosperity was reflected in the changing television landscape, specifically 
with the advent of cable and the growing dependence on technology. This work examines the 
emergence of ―infotainment,‖ the curious mélange of political commentary, social issues, and 
celebrity culture, which accompanied the twenty-four-hour broadcasting format. The term 
―infotainment‖ does not have a consensus definition among media and television scholars, 
although it usually describes the blending of reality, fiction, entertainment, and some form of 
―news‖ however defined. What media scholars universally accept is that infotainment is a 
product of cable television, identity politics, and tabloid journalism.
121
 One of the examples is 
ABC‘s Nightline, ―The Crisis Game,‖ which featured actual political figures in a fictional 
nuclear situation. The four-hour production of ―The Crisis Game‖ simulated a futuristic nuclear 
standoff with the Soviet Union, featuring former politicians as the current White House staff. 
This intriguing combination of scripted news and current affairs epitomizes the growth of 
infotainment and lends itself to cultural analysis.  This blend of fact and fiction is most notably 
demonstrated in the 1983 made-for-television film, Special Bulletin. In order to analyze NBC‘s 
made-for-television nuclear narrative, one must also understand how American television served 
to heighten nuclear culture and technology in 1983. This made-for-television film was one of 
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many nuclear-themed television events made in that year alone. However, the narrative also 
employed a critical lens on the role of television in creating social fear. The role of technology 
was also significant to Special Bulletin in that the fictitious scenario relies on satellite and remote 
technology toward which Reagan will gesture in his political rhetoric.  The political 
ramifications of technology and infotainment are discussed with an exploration of the President 
Reagan‘s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as the ―Star Wars‖ speech. Based in part 
on science fiction and in part on actual technological innovation, the presentation of SDI offers 
an interesting platform to discuss how the idea of the space-missile system was more important 
than the logistics of building such a weapon. SDI also demonstrates the ways in which the 
Reagan administration employed ideas of ―peaceful deterrence‖ in order to sell militarism to the 
American public. This blending of technological realities and scientific theory was very much in 
line with the advent of infotainment and Reagan‘s Strategic Defensive Initiative. Finally, the 
analytical lynchpin of this chapter suggests that television technology became an integral 
political and cultural device during the late atomic period. 
Catering to the Individual: The ’80s Emphasis on Technology  
In 1982, Time magazine dedicated its annual ―Man of the Year‖ issue to ―the computer.‖ 
Gesturing to the new world of computers, the article described how millions of Americans were 
acquiring and using these machines, from corporations and companies to schools and personal 
users. Additionally, because cable technologies became more successful in court due to 
deregulation, traditional notions of the television experience began to change. From VCRs, to 
cable, to the remote control, traditional network television came under assault by a number of 
significant technological innovations that would collectively break the network oligarchy and 
transform television identification. The VCR (video cassette recorder), coupled with cable, was 
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unapologetically revolutionary in its ability to redefine the quintessential American television 
experience.  
By the late seventies, the technological invention of home video recording was available to the 
public in the machine known as ―Betamax.‖ This device could plug into a home television set 
and duplicate the concurrent program. Sony marketed the device as follows: 
Betamax connects to your TV and will record and play back on your own set. It‘s as 
simple to use as a cassette recorder or a clock radio. All you do is insert a Sony Home 
Videocassette, set the digital time and Betamax will record on cue. The Videocassette can 
be saved for viewing again or you use it to re-record another program. You can also 
watch one show and record another at the same time or Betamax will record while you 
are enjoying other pastimes. Suggested retail price including digital clock timer $1745 (or 
less).
122
  
Along with home video recording, pay-for-television satellite television was also challenging 
traditional viewership. Cable television was alluring, as it catered to individual taste and offered 
a twenty-four-hour news cycle. On October 1, 1975, HBO (Home Box Office, Inc.) presented, 
―Thrilla in Manila,‖ a heavyweight boxing match between the controversial Muhammad Ali and 
the elder Joe Frazier. This unfiltered, brutal fourteen-round display of athleticism, won by Ali, 
was an enormous hit for the cable network. The struggling ―pay-for-television‖ channel, as it was 
referred to at the time, utilized a series of satellites to broadcast the boxing match live from the 
Philippines. HBO became a trailblazer in the fight against the networks and its use of satellite 
communication. The concept came from thirty-three-year-old Charles Dolan, who argued that 
pay-for-television channels funded by private viewers would offset advertising costs and would 
avoid many of the problems of the commercial network television system. The success of the 
cable endeavor would depend on the specific niche market of viewers who wanted a theatergoing 
experience of home and extensive coverage of sports. By 1977, the network‘s reliance on paying 
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customers paid off as the cable network turned its first profit.
123
 In short, ―HBO quickly became 
an incredible cash cow … eventually outstripping in profitability the all-important magazine.‖124   
Cable stations made their individual marks on the televised public by appealing to niche 
markets. In 1979, the all-sports station ESPN emerged as a network exclusively for the sports 
fan. In addition, MTV (Music Television Videos), the idea of twenty-seven-year old 
Mississippian Robert Pittman, targeted the specific suburban, Generation-X audience. This 
capturing of the viewership of a new generation gestured toward cable television remaking itself 
as a vehicle for identity and self-reflection. Similarly to Ted Turner, Pittman wanted to dominate 
the capitalist market; to that end, he not only launched the cable network, but also revived Six 
Flags Amusement Park and, more importantly, helped to build the corporate juggernaut AOL–
Time Warner.
125
 
Arguably one of the most significant changes of the decade was the emergence of cable 
news stations, which shifted the traditional network television news cycle. In the early eighties, 
the entire television medium was changing because of the popularity of cable television and the 
introduction of Ted Turner. Turner, a self-created media giant from Atlanta, sued the three 
networks as well as the Reagan administration in 1981 over equal access to the White House 
press corps for his Cable News Network (CNN). Accordingly, Turner‘s lawsuit, coupled with 
Walter Cronkite‘s retirement as lead anchor on CBS‘s Evening News, advanced cable‘s 
legitimacy as a credible television alternative to network news. The cable news sleeping giant 
during this time, CNN offered twenty-four-hour, around-the-clock coverage beginning in June 
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1980.
126
 Turner openly mocked the networks and boasted that his network functioned like the 
Associated Press, presenting constant updates, raw news footage, and promoting Turner‘s other 
capitalistic pursuits such as TBS (Turner Broadcasting Station) and his professional sports team, 
the Atlanta Braves. Although Turner criticized the news magazine programs such as 20/20 and 
60 Minutes, his creation of CNN and Headline News, with their punctuated sound-bites and 
access to a multiplicity of satellite reports stationed around the country, contributed to the 
conflation of news and entertainment. This not only destroyed the traditional news cycle, but also 
cut into the profits of the three major networks and further fragmented the traditional viewing 
audience. 
Television technology followed a cultural trajectory similar to the Reagan era. In its 
infancy, the cable station encountered resistance by the three major networks because of profits 
and the availability of technology. However, along with the Reagan administration‘s record of 
deregulation, cable advocates like Ted Turner championed the newly reconfigured public sphere 
as democratized spaces. With this new technology, satellites transformed American television 
audiences and their dependence on the Big Three networks for broadcasting and information. 
For a small percentage of Americans, the new world of cable television reflected a 
renewed prosperity analogous with the Reagan boom. Despite the pessimism brought by nuclear 
freeze activists and the media in the first two years of Reagan‘s presidency, by the end of his first 
term, patriotism and the joys of consumer capitalism enticed Americans more. Commenting on 
the importance of the year, historian Gil Troy explains, ―1983 the great economic boom—the 
baby boom boom, the Reagan boom—began. It was a boom of service jobs, not manufacturing, 
of the Sun Belt and silicon chips, not the Rust Belt and smokestacks. It was also a boom with its 
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own cultural institutions and accents.‖127 The American viewer, and eventually the voter, would 
experience the growing wave of ―optimism‖ espoused by President Reagan and internalized by 
the public evident by the landslide 1984 Presidential election. 
The Development of News as “Infotainment” 
As Walter Cronkite gracefully resigned as America‘s leading voice in network news in 
1982, it signaled the beginning of a new era in network television news. CBS selected Dan 
Rather as lead evening news anchor. Rather gained national recognition during the Nixon years 
and his investigation of Watergate, which brought a greater sense of skepticism as opposed to 
Cronkite‘s patriarchal, slant to the nightly news. Although CBS‘s news division would continue 
to gain viewers with Rather at the helm, the ABC news division was reinventing itself. Under the 
leadership of Roone Arledge, the ABC news division moved forward by creating several new 
shows with innovative formats, such as Nightline. Additionally, in 1981, Arledge courted David 
Brinkley away from NBC, after a thirty-eight-year career with the network, and created This 
Week, which became the number-one Sunday morning news show.
128
 By the end of the decade, 
ABC News was accruing profits of over $70 million.
129
 The increased profitability of network 
news, coupled with the advertising dollars generated from the made-for-television movie, created 
a unique genre of social realism television specials throughout the 1980s. The conflation of 
broadcast news and broadcast network programming transformed the lens through which 
audiences interpreted and received political issues. As Reagan‘s first term continued, it became 
increasingly hard to delineate narrative representations of political issues from network 
television‘s presentation of the news. 
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In 1983, ABC presented a special event that intermixed the lines between fact and fiction 
in a number of significant ways.  The November 23 episode of Nightline, entitled ―The Crisis 
Game,‖ showed a four-hour simulation of actual government officials reacting to a fictitious 
Soviet invasion of Iran, and promoted it as a public service event. In an extraordinary display of 
fact and fiction, ABC assembled a cast of former Washington insiders to show to the public how 
the White House might respond such a nuclear situation. The cast included former U.S. senator 
Edmund S. Muskie as the president, while former secretary of defense James R. Schlesinger 
appeared in the simulation as the secretary of defense. Additionally, Clark M. Clifford, another 
former secretary of defense, portrayed the secretary of state. General Edward C. Meyer, who had 
recently retired as U.S. Army chief of staff, played the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
They sat around a table, under a presidential seal, along with other officials, and pondered the 
response to a Soviet invasion of Iran.
130
 After providing a brief explanation, host Ted Koppel 
assured the audience that this is not a real crisis, but a fabricated rendering of events of what 
might happen.     
The ―Crisis Game‖ was set in the future, 1985, following the fictional death of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini, and Iran is in a state of unrest. Soviet forces are helping to develop a leftist 
faction. Iran is bankrupt because of the eight year Iran-Iraq war and the U.S. is aiding anti-leftist 
groups. Although there is Soviet unrest in Eastern Europe, the real site of contention remains the 
Middle East and the Persian Gulf.  The crisis continues for twenty-five days in May, with the 
Soviet Union deploying more than 250,000 soldiers to the Persian Gulf region.
131
 As the Soviet 
troops flood the region, hawkish cabinet members discuss the nuclear option, only to be 
dismissed by the president. After the National Security Council orders an air strike over the 
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USSR, negotiations begin between the two superpowers, and the Soviets retreat from the area. 
By the end of the four-hour production, peace is restored and the crisis is successfully quelled. 
The Nightline special intended to share with the public the private conservations and 
options which different officials might discuss in the White House. The program claimed to 
―demystify‖ the decision-making process by showing officials debating different diplomatic and 
military scenarios while the audience also hears Ted Koppel and New York Times reporter Leslie 
Gelb adding running commentary to the officials‘ actions. This public invitation into the 
―Situation Room‖ democratized and also complicated ideas about government officials. In an 
article in Time magazine, one columnist pondered the issue of politicians acting as politicians 
and, conversely, actors becoming politicians.
132
 Reviews of the Nightline production in the New 
York Times and in Time pointed to the realism presented in the special and even commented that 
it provided a nice civics lesson and public service to the American people.
133
 However, for all of 
its insider offerings, the program was notable for its blending of fact and fantasy in a 
monumental way. Not only did the network manipulate current events, but its use of politicians 
simulating current Reagan White House officials was unprecedented in network broadcast 
history. Furthermore, this ―crisis‖ did not cover the issue of domestic nuclear terrorism, but 
rather carefully situated the conflict in conventional Cold War terms. This foray into the realm of 
fictional news mirrors the growth of infotainment as well as the televised presidency of Ronald 
Reagan.  
The idea of news as infotainment is not unique to this examination; however, 
technological innovations coupled with sensational stories created a new format for holding 
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national dialogue. Throughout the postwar period, networks were conscious of their duty to 
provide public affairs programming but were equally aware of the corporate sponsorship 
necessary to sell the news to the people. Although alternatives to network programming were 
expanding, including the configuring of cable networks and home video recorders, the majority 
of Americans still used television as the primary medium of understanding current issues and 
affairs. The creation of 60 Minutes (1968), CBS‘s long-running news magazine television show, 
changed the format of news broadcasting by offering visual editorials on popular politics and 
events. This blending of popular entertainment and political analysis helped to blur the line 
between fact and fiction.  The two other networks, NBC and ABC, also created news magazine 
shows such as 20/20, which legitimized specific anchors, like as Barbara Walters, as objective 
and investigative reporters who asked ―complicated‖ questions.  However, even with so-called 
objective, respected network anchors and journalists, the format of news magazine shows meant 
the inclusion of a number of segments that created news as entertainment. From segments on the 
White House announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, to a segment on pop music 
sensation Michael Jackson, the idea of blending news and, more culturally, mass-marketing-
driven ―pseudo-documentaries‖ built an innovative space on which the entire American viewing 
audience could receive social and political news as well as information on recent popular-culture 
figures or events. This format allotted little context, education, or time for substantive discussion.  
Special Bulletin: The-Made-for-Television Movie’s Critique of Network News 
Part of the creation of news entertainment was the inclusion of the audience as active 
participants engaged in the national dialogue.  In NBC‘s made-for-television film Special 
Bulletin, the audience was placed in the role as the observer as well as a hostage to the teleplay. 
The narrative openly challenged the audience to decide which side they are on and which 
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characters are most identifiable. In addition, the teleplay challenges the audience to reexamine 
their political identity as well as the viewers‘ relationship with network news. The film asked the 
viewing audience to examine the role the media played in creating the unfortunate destruction of 
one of America‘s oldest cities. Are the viewers, with their unquenchable desire for apocalyptic 
imagery, responsible for the nuclear blast? Did the media create outlets for nuclear ―terrorists‖? 
How does technology contribute to the dire plot? The teleplay engages viewers by posing these 
larger questions in the narrative and in doing so, brings heightened immediacy to the film.  
Promoted as ―a realistic depiction of fictional events,‖ the speculative melodrama Special 
Bulletin was shot on videotape and staged in real-time as a late-breaking news event. The story 
concerned a group of antinuclear activists who take hostages off the coast of Charleston, South 
Carolina. The group demanded the immediate disarming of 968 nuclear warheads located in the 
Charleston area; if the government does not meet the threat, the activists will detonate their own 
nuclear device. Written by Marshall Herskovitz and directed by Edward Zwick (who would later 
famously collaborate on the successful ABC series Thirtysomething), the film received six 
Emmy award nominations. Initially airing on March 20, 1983, the broadcast was accompanied 
by repeated disclaimers by NBC, assuring the audience that what was occurring on television 
was only fiction. Nonetheless, the production was so authentic, from fake commercials, soap-
operas, and other fabricated previews of upcoming RBC television events, that thousands of 
American viewers called the network, demanding information on the siege of Charleston.
134
  
As the narrative opened, approximately one hour after the Coast Guard boarded an 
unknown vessel at Charleston dock, the audience is introduced to the fictitious network, RBC. 
This network, like the Big Three American networks, invited the American audience to 
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participate in the hostage situation as willing participants. The narrative engages the theme of 
news as spectacle as it creates a title for the hostage crisis. By the second day of the nuclear 
standoff, RBC introduces the story as ―Flashpoint: America under Siege.‖135 Just as nervous 
Americans had participated in the nightly updates on the hostages in Iran in 1979 with ABC‘s 
Nightline, viewers had become more accustomed to receiving world news with new immediacy 
thanks to satellite transmissions and international network news anchors.  
Additionally, the movie highlights the personal affection and identification viewers felt 
toward lead network anchors. In Special Bulletin, the network anchorpersons are John Woodley, 
played by Ed Flanders, and Susan Myles, portrayed by Kathryn Walker. Anchor Woodley is 
considered a representation of the real Walter Cronkite on the fake network. Just as Cronkite had 
reached the apogee of his career throughout the traumatic decades of the sixties and seventies 
and became the patriarchal voice and ratings giant for CBS, Woodley‘s age and role as lead 
anchor positioned his character as the ―objective,‖ voice of reason in this nuclear nightmare. 
Additionly, the role of co-anchor, Susan Myles, was also based on the familiar face of ABC‘s 
Barbara Walters. Hired away from NBC for a highly publicized $1 million contract, Walters 
became the first woman to co-anchor the network nightly newscast, ABC Evening News.
136
  Even 
though these lead RBC anchors drew from real-life familiar network anchors, as the events in 
Charleston unfold, we start to see how the network struggles to explain with investigative 
objectivity the larger implications of the nuclear standoff in the Southern city. 
Central to the teleplay is the use of documentary-style photography. The narrative 
interweaves handheld/steady-cam shots in which the audience becomes familiar with the nuclear 
terrorists and uses the traditional photographic style to shoot the network anchors. As the director 
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changes camera and editing styles, he forces the audience to routinely acclimate to the rapacious 
world of network news and its ability to stream live footage from around the country through 
satellite technology. This results in continuously jolting transitions, from the live hostage 
situation in Charleston, back to the anchors at the New York news headquarters, to various other 
reporters strategically located around the country. Technological changes, including the use of 
satellites to position reporting around the world and carry live footage to the audience, are 
integral to the narrative, as it exposes its viewers to a number of different perspectives for the 
audience to identify. Because Special Bulletin is presented in a documentary/live news format, 
the anchors from the network in New York to the local affiliate anchors in the studio try not to 
editorialize on the situation; rather, they provide the viewers with constant updates from the 
reporter and cameraman taken hostage. As stated earlier, the nuclear terrorists are activists for 
peace, although they are a collective of sixties radicals and activists reminiscent of the Weather 
Underground. 
The narrative captures the interesting interplay between the peace movement and the 
notion of nuclear terrorism. In the teleplay, the terrorists consist of two scientists, Bruce Lyman 
(David Lennon) a former strategic-weapons planner for the Pentagon, and Dave McKeeson 
(David Rasche), who built the homemade nuclear device; an African American radical similar to 
Angela Davis; a nervous housewife ostensibly from the peace movement; and an ex-con. This 
eclectic group of nuclear terrorists challenges the viewers to redefine the image of ―nuclear 
terrorists‖ as well as the peace movement. The ―nervous housewife,‖ a white middle-class 
woman representative of a grassroots nuclear freeze activist, has no real knowledge of the 
enormity of the situation until the network points its lens on her. The black radical woman, now 
a nuclear terrorist, reminds the viewers of sixties activism and radicalism. However, the 
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masterminds of this domestic nuclear threat are former Pentagon scientists, who possess the 
technology and the knowledge to use state-sponsored weapons against the citizenry it professes 
to protect. An unnamed president stands for Reagan, and the narrative posits the notion that the 
government drove these men to terrorism and then depicts the executive response as 
overconfident and callous, pushing the situation to a perilous precipice. The nuclear terrorist 
standoff in Charleston becomes more complex as the news coverage unflinchingly continues 
from around the country. While on television addressing a nervous public, government officials 
offer to cooperate with the terrorists; however, a SWAT team ultimately kills the group, but not 
before the group detonates the nuclear warheads, obliterating the historic site that was 
Charleston.  
In the early 1980s, the three television networks were in a bitter ratings war and 
developed large-scale original productions to garner viewers. However, the production of Special 
Bulletin brought internal strife to executives at NBC. Wanting to compete with the highly 
anticipated November ABC nuclear social melodrama, The Day After, some NBC executives 
argued that the teleplay would capture the immediacy of nuclear issues while also capturing high 
ratings. According to NBC‘s news president at the time, Reuven Franks, ―The only concern of 
NBC news was that Special Bulletin might have been confused with a news bulletin. We agreed 
on various steps to ensure that the average viewer will not be misled in that way.‖137 NBC 
network executives had legitimate concerns that the audiences would interpret the film as live 
network coverage, with concerned citizens calling the local Charleston affiliate of the network to 
discern what was happening. The medium‘s ability to manipulate and transpose information is 
critically important, in that unlike any other media, television is instructed to entertain and 
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educate the American public. The network openly challenged the audience‘s objectivity and 
abilities to discern fact from fiction. This approach to the topic of nuclear weapons was perhaps 
too immediate and confusing for the American viewer watching in their home in light of historic 
Cold War fears. 
Cleary, NBC executives as well as other network and Hollywood insiders understood 
escalating nuclear anxieties. In fact, 1983 was remarkable in that more films were made about 
nuclear fears than in any other year in cinematic history. The film Wargames, which depicted the 
horrors of nuclear war and technology run amuck, was a triumphant cinematic success. However, 
the difference between watching nuclear horror on screen in the theater was that the viewer 
literally walked away from the visual site of the destruction. In contrast, Special Bulletin 
broughtto life this nuclear standoff in such a familiar network news fashion that the audience is 
forced to ask if these fictionalized events are true or just ―television.‖ NBC presented some 
thirty-one messages proclaiming the fictitiousness of Special Bulletin. In Charleston, South 
Carolina, the scene of the fictional nuclear disaster, the word ―fiction‖ was permanently 
superimposed on a corner of the screen. This did not spare the local Charleston NBC affiliate 
station from receiving hundreds of mostly negative phone calls. The made-for-television film 
Special Bulletin became a visual reminder of the power of television in its ability to blur fact and 
fiction and interlace personal fears with the political ramifications.
138
 
In the end, however, Special Bulletin focused less on nuclear war and more on the 
awesome power of network television. Television, as a national medium, handles crisis as if the 
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coverage of the event were more important than the story itself. 
139
 The incorporation of the 
network into the story is underlined when a presidential staffer issues a statement that the 
terrorists‘ demands will be met, but does so only as a ploy to distract the terrorists while the 
government plans a military assault on their tugboat, which is shown by the camera cutting off.  
A deeper investigation into this type of analysis offers a unique critique of network television, 
often not explored by television producers. In this film, as the audience becomes more entangled 
in the nuclear showdown occurring in the South, the viewing audience at home is left to ponder 
the ferocious appetite of the American viewer. Thanks to television technology, anchors and 
commentators who help to frame the news and educate the public become secondary to the 
terrorists and hostages who have access to live television audiences around the country. The 
audience sees visual evidence that the local anchors have no idea about the government‘s true 
agenda on capturing the terrorists. Furthermore, the imagery of a fake network broadcasting a 
nuclear hostage situation on a real network pushed the boundaries of fact and reality, an 
interesting byproduct of Reagan, cable, and infotainment. Critics have equated Special Bulletin 
with Orson Welles‘s live 1938 radio cast of The War of the Worlds; however, considering its 
historical context and the beginning of the twenty-four-hour cable news format such as Headline 
News, one can read the teleplay as a portent of the televised infotainment future to come. 
The most chilling aspect of Special Bulletin was that, after a few days, the story no longer 
dominated the headlines; the memory of Charleston and the victims of nuclear terrorism are now 
replaced with ―in other news.‖ This commentary on the power and vapid nature of network 
television was a controversial critique for NBC to posit, especially for a made-for-television. The 
teleplay suggested that the Reagan White House is willing to sacrifice a certain number of 
Americans in an event to adhere to executive policy. Furthermore, the film implies that the 
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Reagan administration is willing to kill nuclear freeze advocates in order to maintain Cold War 
orthodoxy, as well as to obfuscate the newly constructed, televised position on negotiation with 
nuclear terrorists. Once again, we see how television was utilized as the medium in which 
commentary, capitalism, and corporate culture collide and engage the masses to participate in 
popular discourse. Finally, as the movie slowly concludes, it reminded the real network audience 
that the media has moved on to the next big news event. Again, an educational framework for 
understanding why Charleston now resembled Hiroshima is never given, but rather what is 
offered is an exciting, new, titillating story. The line between fact and fiction, and the role the 
networks and the Reagan administration played in constructing network news, were openly 
challenged by network television.  
The theme of scientists engaging in nuclear terrorism was a significant component of the 
teleplay in terms of the peace movement and larger Cold War politics. Nuclear terrorism was a 
facet of the later atomic period, after the Yom Kippur War and as more countries were building 
nuclear weapons and using nuclear energy. A level of distrust, not only in the bureaucrats that 
stack the government but the scientists who engineer nuclear weaponry, pervaded popular 
culture. Looking back to Mary Shelley‘s Frankenstein, to the discovery of uranium, the idea of 
man playing ―god‖ and becoming the ―creator,‖ is an archetypical theme in popular literature and 
culture. Yet with the emergence of nuclear technology, the scientists are placed under a sharper 
microscope. Scientists occupied a curious, dualistic position in the public imagination. 
Furthermore, in Reagan‘s America, scientists who did not either adhere to Cold War orthodoxy 
or engage in the project of space-based missiles systems should be regarded with suspicion by 
the American people. 
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In the early 1960s, research about network television affiliate stations suggested that 
prime-time network viewership was dependent on the popularity of local news programs. Thus, 
if an affiliate wanted a viewer‘s and commercial attention during peak prime-time, network 
hours, the affiliate would have to produce greater, more marketable local news. A research 
analyst for NBC noted that viewers did not ―watch a program‖ as much as they ―watch 
television.‖140This realization brought remarkable changes both for the networks and for the 
audience. Even though the question of television serving as a hegemonic device is certainly an 
important concern, the enormity of that interrogation is larger than the scope of this examination. 
For Americans who ―watch television‖ news, particularly the audience that does not delve into 
other mediums such as print or radio journalism, they rely more on what television scholars call 
the ―cult of personality,‖ in which audiences identify with certain network anchors. s. Before the 
Big Three networks lost their oligarchy on television, a survey comparing the three major 
network anchors of the decade—Peter Jennings of ABC, Tom Brokaw of NBC, and Dan Rather 
of CBS—suggested that differences were based on demographic identification. According to the 
same survey, ―Jennings is at his strongest among women, 25–64 years old, middle-class viewers 
and whites; Brokaw is at his strongest among men, those 65+, lower and upper-class viewers and 
whites‘; Rather enjoys surprisingly strong support among 18–24 years old, many of them 
minorities.‖141 
This rather major aspect of audience identification and reception suggested that viewers 
become loyal to an anchor, the network, and also local affiliates. This loyalty became 
questionable when it is compared to commercial sales. Network television depends on 
advertising dollars from corporations, who are now presenting the news through an identifiable, 
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commercial, appealing network anchor. However, the phenomenal escalation of pace of 
gathering news sources since the 1970s and the ability to capture live shots on handheld camera, 
dramatically and irreversibly transformed television news. With live shots and the supplementing 
with news from ―on-site‖ reporters, the context for understanding the event has also narrowed. In 
1968, the average sound bite on network television was forty-three seconds; by 1988, sound bites 
of politicians dropped to approximately nine seconds. 
142
 This dramatic decline in actual time 
spent understanding complicated jargon replaced the context with commentary. Technological 
advance brought a truncated aspect to network journalism. Furthermore, the use of sound-bites 
and shorter news stories contributed to a larger misunderstanding between fact and fiction on 
television.   
The “Star Wars Speech”: A Cultural Milestone in Infotainment Television History 
In March 1983, President Reagan addressed the nation via television to discuss the 
current status of the Cold War and the issue nuclear proliferation. Outside of the public eye, the 
White House media staff had constructed an oral blueprint to transform Reagan‘s image from a 
militaristic hawk to a president of peace. The ―Star War‖ speech, as it will come to be known, 
marked a transition in Reagan‘s ability to present a solution to the nuclear freeze movement and 
the unimaginable consequences of nuclear war. As described in Fitzgerald‘s work, Way Out 
There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War, Reagan‘s political ideology 
drew from a variety of different conservative threads. His belief in American exceptionalism 
buttressed by Manifest Destiny somewhat resembled Theodore Roosevelt‘s foreign policy in 
terms of Latin America. Just like Taft, Reagan contended that small government coupled with 
lower taxes translated into more money for the ―common man,‖ which appealed to Midwestern 
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conservatives. Finally, Reagan‘s foreign policy was nothing less than a recapitulation of the 
Truman Doctrine. 
143
 As a conservative, Reagan assumed the role of shepherd to America‘s lost 
flock. Reagan‘s Cold War orthodoxy had not changed in thirty years—a staunch anticommunist, 
he would use every tool in America‘s arsenal to fight the ―red menace‖ and he had not flinched 
in this political adherence since the 1950s.  
Reagan‘s 1982 START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) speech at Eureka College, his 
alma mater, marked a transition in the media‘s depiction of the White House. Fearing that the 
national exposure of the nuclear freeze movement served to damage the president‘s hope of a 
two-term presidency, the White House employed a new schematic on how to publicly respond to 
growing antinuclear protestors around the world. The START speech had two central political 
objectives: to act as a public-relations campaign that would repackage the president as a man of 
peace who shared an interest in arms control, and to cripple the Soviets‘ ability to maintain 
nuclear parity with the United States.
144
 Knowing the Soviets feared space-based nuclear 
weaponry, National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, along with Manhattan Project scientist 
Edward Teller and other ―Cold Warriors,‖ began to explore the strategic military value of space-
based missile defense systems. Teller contrived one idea that included an X-ray laser that would 
destroy the Soviet Union‘s missiles as they emerged from silos. The idea of strategic defensive 
delighted President Reagan, who was intrigued by the notion of biblical Armageddon in the form 
of nuclear warfare and felt imbued to save Americans from an apocalypse while continuing to 
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adhere to the proven method of nuclear deterrence.
145
 The START speech did not go unnoticed 
by the Soviets.  
In many ways, the presidential speeches of 1983 often confused the Soviets. They 
interpreted the START speech as rhetorical aggression by the president. Furthermore, his speech 
to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983, warned the 
Soviets that the United States was committed to moral superiority as well as nuclear arms. 
Calling the Soviet Union ―the evil empire‖ because of his perception of the Communist 
adherence to atheism, Reagan emphasized that the need for more nuclear weapons was not just a 
matter of parity, but rather was the ultimate struggle between ―good and evil.‖146 This assertion 
met with rousing applauds by the Christian audience, who agreed the issue of nuclear arms was 
secondary to the God-less aspirations of the Soviet Union. However, liberal U.S. politicians 
feared the ―evil empire‖ speech would preclude further disarmament diplomatic summits with 
the Soviets, or worse, provoke ―Soviet insecurities‖ to the point of strategic nuclear warfare.147  
Following the ―evil empire‖ speech, Reagan‘s next televised speech was more 
conciliatory than many expected. On March 23, 1983, Reagan delivered the televised speech in 
which he addressed a number of nuclear issues concerning the American public. Reagan 
admitted the United States needed to engage in more productive dialogue with the Soviet Union. 
In the same speech, Reagan also restated his commitment to peace by expressing the hope that 
one day nuclear weapons would be ―banished‖ from the earth.148 Singularly dismissing the 
wealth of callous statements made by his advisors over the last two years, President Reagan 
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stated, ―Our only purpose—one which all people share—is to search for ways to reduce the 
dangers of nuclear war.‖149 What Reagan presented to the American people did more than just 
repudiate the nuclear freeze movement; it revealed a new weapon that promised peace for the 
U.S. against Soviet nuclear weapons. This new policy initiative exploited the weakness of the 
Soviet military apparatus and also appealed to the American electorate. It was a treatment for the 
Cold War and, if implemented correctly, could change the course of U.S.-Soviet relations 
forever. This came to be known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI. This speech and 
space-based concept dramatically transformed the Cold War and situated the context of 
militarism literally to the stratosphere.  
Criticisms as well as adulation immediately followed the televised description of 
Reagan‘s space-based missile system. The program, which critics caustically referred to as ―Star 
Wars‖ for both its pecuniary and science-fiction qualities, had immediate political ramifications. 
If successful, the U.S. space-based system would be able to dominate the entire world, and 
would also force the Soviets into financial ruin by trying to maintain parity with the U.S. military 
arsenal. For the Soviets, this was interpreted as evidence of American Cold War aggression. 
Furthermore, the Soviets felt uneasy about the announcement of this extraordinary technology as 
new American land-based missiles were currently arriving in Europe. As for the American 
public, Reagan‘s televised patriarchy and comforting words of a world free from nuclear 
weapons without losing to the Soviet Union restored a belief in the power of American 
presidency and scientific prowess. Furthermore, as some scholars have argued, SDI represented a 
turning point in America‘s relationship with President Reagan. Through SDI, Reagan both 
shared information with the Soviets and embraced the liberal view of a nuclear-free world. One 
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indication of how Reagan was outpeacing the peace movement was that by April 1983, nearly 
one month after the SDI speech, attendance at antinuclear demonstrations had declined, and the 
number of magazine articles written about nuclear weapons had dropped significantly. 
150
 In 
short, SDI became the public relations boost that helped to transform Reagan‘s image as a Cold 
Warrior to a ―Great Communicator.‖151 From a media standpoint, Reagan‗s announcement of 
SDI turned the nation‘s attention away from domestic issues and toward technology and 
scientists. The idea of space-based missile systems, as described by President Reagan, also 
placed the immediacy of nuclear war not in terms of presidential foreign policy, but as the focus 
of American scientists.  According to Reagan, it was the job of the scientists and scholars to 
determine the mechanics and physics of such a protective weapon, while it was his job to speak 
about how this bright atomic future makes antinuclear activism obsolete.
152
  Reagan‘s fantastic 
idea about an invisible shield protecting Americans, rather than engaging in arms negotiation 
with Soviets, certainly shifted the national discourse from heightened geopolitical tensions to the 
bright future of space-based technology. Although this idea presented safety from international 
nuclear weapons, SDI did not address the issue of domestic terrorism.   
Reagan‘s call for the scientific community to utilize their expertise for SDI proved quite 
problematic. For many nuclear physicists, this idea was completely implausible. By the fall of 
1983, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) directed a study to explore space-based 
missile defense systems. Under the leadership of Harvard professor and former systems analyst 
for the Department of Defense (DOD), Dr. Ashton Carter, the experts gathered data, including 
full access to classified information, in order to examine the range of technological possibilities 
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of space-based defense. According to the OTA study, the probability for a near-perfect defense 
system ―was so remote that it should not serve as the basis of public expectations of national 
policy on ballistic missile defense.‖153 The OTA report was immediately countered by former 
Los Alamos physicists led by Gregory Canavan, who claimed that the investigation was ripe 
with ―technical errors, unsubstantiated assumptions, and conclusions that are inconsistent with 
the body of the report.‖154 Moreover, the former Los Alamos scientists went on to personally 
attack Dr. Carter, claiming the report was politically biased and endangered Americans with his 
explanation of national-security, classified information. This scientific divide over the possibility 
of SDI pitted former atomic scientists such as Canavan and Edward Teller against more 
―pacifist‖ nuclear scientists such as Carl Sagan. 
Furthermore, the Reagan White House continued to sell this idea to the American people 
by regularly appearing on network news shows. Appearing on NBC‘s Meet the Press on March 
27, 1983, Caspar Weinberger applauded the efforts of the president and the White House and 
explained to the American viewers that SDI would offer full protection from any Soviet nuclear 
strike. Weinberger asserted, ―what we want to try to get is a system which will develop a defense 
that is thoroughly reliable and total … I don‘t see any reason why that can‘t be done.‖155 As 
more scientists and experts participated in the national debate, the Reagan White House 
continued to dismiss all negative assessments and emphasized the need for specific space-based 
technological defense systems. General Abrahmson, director of the Strategic Defense Initiative 
and former NASA advisor, framed the debate in a larger context of American patriotism and 
nationalism. In response to the notion that it was impossible to build a space-based missile 
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defense, Abrahamson remarked, ―I don‘t think anything in this country is impossible … We have 
a nation which indeed can produce miracles.
156
 For Abrahamson, who had worked with NASA 
since the first manned-flight mission into space, not only was the success of SDI uniquely and 
indelibly American, but its naysayers were dismissing the entire foundation of American 
progress. Interestingly, this type of rhetoric espoused by Reagan staffers echoed the president‘s 
emphasis on the frontier and cowboy wisdom, even in terms of science and nuclear physics.  
Unfortunately, the popular discussion on SDI conflicted with the majority of the 
scientific community. The TTAPS study, conducted by an international group of scientists, 
theorized that even a limited military engagement using nuclear weapons could lead to global, 
environmental devastation. At the height of Reagan-era rhetorical militarism, scientists outlined 
a number of new environmental, atmospheric, and climatic effects that would result from nuclear 
blasts. In an article in Science magazine titled ―Long-Term Biological Consequences of Nuclear 
War,‖ twenty prominent international scientists argued that the controversial theory of nuclear 
winter redefined and examined the aftereffects of nuclear war. Nuclear winter theory 
hypothesized that a persistent lack of sunlight, subfreezing temperatures, and high levels of 
ultraviolent radiation would render the geographical terrain almost uninhabitable. Subsequently, 
the logical conclusions derived from nuclear winter theory pointed to an inescapably bleak 
future. The theory asserted that agriculture would deteriorate by exposure, thus leaving the 
survivors to scavenge for food. This study provided a forecast of the potential effects on human 
and ecological systems for up ten years after nuclear war. According to the study but the end  of 
the first year a loss of agricultural support force humans into a position of scavenging for food. 
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As the theory continues, epidemics, pandemics and a loss of government support would cripple 
society, which would last for indefinite period of time. 
157
 
This description of the post-nuclear scenario did not correspond with FEMA‘s civil 
defense plans that included a manageable postwar design. Moreover, the postwar survivalists‘ 
image conjured up in this article left an indelible imprint in the minds of its readers. After more 
than twenty-five years, the cultural imagination of total human annihilation from nuclear war 
was given more immediacy in the early 1980s when scientists, policy makers, and social activists 
offered contradictory images and information about nuclear issues. Not surprisingly, the 
apocalyptic imagination soared with the arrival of nuclear winter theory.
158
 Nuclear war films, 
particularly made-for-television network dramas, began adopting doomsday scenarios of gradual 
or inevitable genocide caused by miscommunication or human error, such as Special Bulletin 
(1983), The Day After (1983), Threads (1984), Population One (1986), and When the Wind 
Blows (1987).  
Reagan‘s idea of an invisible shield in the atmosphere fit nicely within his ideal of 
America. He espoused optimism, responded to narratives, and believed in the promise of 
American exceptionalism.  The individual was the hallmark of the Reagan era, and pessimism 
was equated with liberalism.  However inconceivable by the scientific community, the satellites 
that were orbiting the air where already received by cable viewers. Just as the individual cable 
viewer came to define him or herself by identifying with niche cable stations, Reagan 
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championed the efforts of individualism and the joys of consumer capitalism. Additionally, as 
impossible as SDI might be, Reagan again sold the viewing public on the idea of peace through 
the most remarkable peace weapon ever conceived.  This connection of technology and new use 
of space helped to persuade American viewers and voters that this idea of SDI might serve as the 
antidote to nuclear war. What the SDI lacked was protection from domestic terrorism. Although 
this defensive weapon offered Americans agency against Soviet nuclear aggression, it would not 
prevent the nightmarish scenario of domestic terrorists using nuclear weapons against their 
fellow Americans as depicted in NBC‘s Special Bulletin. 
As scholars continue to examine the influence of the Star Wars speech, one argument put 
forward by historians such as Garry Wills asserts that the Cold War presented a platform that 
expanded the powers of the executive branch, thus altering the balance of constitutional power 
that existed before the atomic age. If such a proclamation is correct, then Reagan not only 
mobilized this executive power, but also employed populist language to appeal to the uninformed 
voter and television viewer. As for the impact of the Strategic Defensive Initiative on the 
television viewer, scholars continue to debate if Reagan actually believed in the possibility of 
this defense weapon. At the time, journalists and Congress proved they knew what Reagan 
thought of the reality of this complicated weapon by publishing a wellspring of articles on the 
topic and appropriating $3 billion that the White House requested for the program.
159
 In his 
memoirs, Reagan wrote, ―I never viewed SDI as an impenetrable shield … but if it worked and 
we then entered into an era when the nations of the world agreed to eliminate nuclear weapons, it 
could serve as a safety-value against cheating—or attacks by lunatics who managed to get their 
hands on a nuclear missile.‖160 This interesting admission of Reagan‘s acknowledgment of the 
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impossibility of SDI mirrors the conflation of fact and fiction indicative of television. Opposed 
to other forms of mass media, television was charged with both entertaining and informing the 
public. Given this monumental task, the media is given the responsibility of explaining politics 
and global events to the American public. For viewers, this ongoing manipulation on 
conventions invariably blurred and produced politics for public consumption. Even if Reagan 
knew that SDI was impossible, his ideal defensive weapon became emblematic of a nation 
dependent on technology and vulnerable to misinformation.
161
 Moreover, cable television 
audiences and the growing number of interested American households gaining access to cable 
television stations demonstrated the real power of satellite technology. SDI may have been a 
Cold War construct, but it also worked to legitimize existing satellite television capabilities that 
American audiences were eager to consume. If ―Star Wars‖ could protect Americans, it could 
also cater to the individual and the growth of new spaces for public discourse.  
Additionally, Reagan served as the perfect spokesman for the Strategic Defensive Initiative. Just 
as the former actor sold GE to the American public in the early days of television, Reagan 
delivered Americans a unique blend of imagination and technological promise. His ability and 
ease with the medium speaks to his use of narratives and stories to explain complicated events. 
By 1983, Reagan promulgated a strategy to win the Cold War: a space-aged, computer-
controlled defense missile that could shoot Soviet missiles before they reached their target.
162
 
Again in Reagan‘s world, the minutiae or details of the project were less important than what the 
SDI would produce—a world freed from the possibilities of nuclear war. This national 
contrivance worked as a way for many Americans to mitigate their growing nuclear fears, 
synonymous with the first two years of Reagan‘s presidency. 
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Conclusion 
From the creation of home-video-recording equipment to the explosion of popularity in 
pay-for-television cable stations, to presidential speeches promising that technology could rid the 
world of the fear of nuclear war, technology promised a new future for Americans. Additionally, 
technology transformed the traditional network television news cycle. Twenty-four-hour news 
offered sound-bites in seconds rather than standard four-minute news segment. This 
transformation dramatically altered the way American viewers understood, interpreted, and 
received television news. However, television technology also expanded the boundaries of 
traditional news by using remote anchors and satellite affiliates from around the world, helping 
to provide for more informative reports of global and domestic affairs. Collectively, network 
television executives feared that many Americans could be confused by dramatized, nuclear-
themed programming. The examples of Special Bulletin and ―The Crisis Game‖ underscore how 
problematic network television had become in terms of discerning fact from fiction. In the case 
of Special Bulletin, NBC went to great lengths to remind the audience that what was occurring 
on the fake network, with fake commercials and fake news anchors, was not real. Even with over 
thirty reminders given to the audience throughout the broadcast of Special Bulletin, the local 
Charleston, South Carolina, affiliates received hundreds of concerned calls asking if the city 
indeed faced a nuclear hostage crisis. 
As for politics, Reagan‘s three major speeches investigated in this work—Eureka, ―Evil 
Empire,‖ and especially SDI—were constructed to effectively mitigate nuclear freeze activists 
and also to reaffirm the policy of nuclear deterrence. The Strategic Defensive Initiative was 
hyped as a weapon that, if implemented properly, would make nuclear war impossible. 
Unfortunately, the issue of domestic terrorism did not enter into this particular defensive 
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weapon; yet the rhetorical attack against peace activists had the intended consequence of 
equating peace activism with the New Left movement of the sixties.
163
 For Republicans gearing 
up for a national election year, Special Bulletin reinforced the notion that leftist radicalism, even 
if it appeared innocuous, threatened nuclear deterrence and the moral superiority of Ronald 
Reagan.  
The lynchpin between accessibility to these new technological advances and SDI is not 
purely academic in scope. For the privileged white-collar yuppie class cultivated by Reagan‘s 
economic policy, the ideas of satellite or cable television, home video recording, and niche 
channels opened up this new world of television viewing. Similarly, Reagan‘s approach for 
peace through superior technological might, as outlined by SDI, promised a world free from 
nuclear war. Alternatively, the dependence on technology to bring these promises to fruition, 
either in space or in the American home, relied deeply on capital and wealth. This is one of the 
many contradictions of the Reagan Revolution. From SDI to pay-for-television stations, if 
Americans wanted to reap the rewards of technological innovations, they would have to pay for 
them. Cable and satellite may have offered an alternative space separate from network television, 
and they also may have contributed to a redefinition of the public sphere, but they also 
fragmented viewers. Furthermore, the reconfiguration of the traditional news cycle brought on by 
CNN and the continuous format of network news magazine shows continued to blur the lines 
between fact and fiction.  
Special Bulletin is not the only nuclear-themed made-for-television event of 1983, as 
ABC and the White House spent more time prompting and preparing for the November live 
broadcast of The Day After. Yet the visual and textual lines on television between reality and 
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fiction were becoming increasingly blurred. Special Bulletin‘s relentless pursuit of a network‘s 
next big story, similar to ABC‘s creation of Nightline in the wake of the Iranian hostage crisis, 
speaks of the direction in which network television news broadcasting was headed in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, the nuclear terrorists demanded a live plea on television to explain their agenda, 
thus once more underlining the use of the medium as a space of political hostage and negotiation. 
Special Bulletin is the most obvious example of this confusion. The audience is forced to rely on 
network anchors, sponsors, and remote satellite access in order to gain knowledge of the growing 
nuclear situation created by anti-American, nuclear freeze activists who once worked in the 
Pentagon. This intense dramatic situation cannot be covered by the popular press as events are 
unfolding by minute to minute. Additionally, ABC‘s presentation of ―The Crisis Game‖ on 
Nightline, which fabricated a nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union by using real politicians as 
the actual White House staff, further obfuscated the line between reality and fiction. Collectively, 
the ―Crisis Game‖ and Special Bulletin worked to misinform the public because they were so 
visibly close to actual political events.  
Throughout 1983, all three major networks continued to present documentary and fact-
based narratives to the public in the banner of ―social realism.‖ More troubling, however, was the 
continued intermixing of fact and reality, and this did not go without commentary. A TV Guide 
commentary on the docudrama asserted, ―too many people, I fear, think these fictionalized 
movies are true, too many people, I fear, are forming—and then transmitting—their final 
impression of the major social and political events of our time on the basis of fictionalized 
movies, rather than on the basis of historical fact.‖164 
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Although the ―Star Wars‖ speech repositioned Reagan as a president of peace, the next made-
for-television nuclear war would challenge the audiences to reconsider their opinions on Reagan, 
the nuclear freeze movement, and the realities of World War Three. The next chapter examines 
how visual and media fear provoked by the 1983 ABC movie, The Day After and examines the 
ways in which the White House attempted to rebuke the film and ensure a successful 1984 
Presidential election. However, the line between fact and fiction was challenged by The Day 
After as the imagery became a cultural representation of the Cold War for a new generation of 
Americans.  
Chapter three: Preparing for the Fallout; The Day After and the Reagan Reaction 
Perhaps the only adequate treatment of nuclear war would be two hours of a 
totally blank screen in prime time. But who would sponsor it?
165
 
On Sunday, November 20, 1983, the American Broadcasting Company aired the made-
for-television film The Day After, and an estimated 100 million viewers watched the annihilation 
of America due to cataclysmic nuclear war, making it the second-most watched program in 
American television history. Weeks prior to the premiere of the film, ABC began an intensive 
promotional campaign aided in part by extensive coverage in the popular press. The publicity 
surrounding The Day After was nothing less than a national event garnering cover stories in 
Newsweek and TV Guide, along with comparable segments on popular news shows like Good 
Morning America, 60 Minutes, and Today. Furthermore, in the nights leading up to the 
November 20 airdate, news shows such as Nightline featured prominent political figures acting 
as mouthpieces for different opinions on the state of the nuclear freeze movement, nuclear 
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disarmament, and the deployment of nuclear hardware. Given the level of media attention and 
promotional blitz surrounding the film, it appeared as if the entire country was willing and ready 
to watch a fictitious war played out on prime-time television. 
According to Brandon Stoddard, the president of ABC at the time, ―the film provided an 
unrelenting and detailed view of three nuclear explosions and what the effects might be on 
‗average‘ American citizens, far removed from political origins or explanations.‖166 But rather 
than remaining politically innocuous, The Day After proved a hotly contested political issue. In 
addition, after the original broadcast, ABC aired a news special hosted by Ted Koppel to answer 
questions about nuclear war and remind viewers that what they previously viewed on television 
was a narrative film on nuclear war, not real news coverage. ABC issued a ―Viewer‘s Guide‖ 
and distributed it to libraries, schools, and religious groups across the country. For the weeks 
surrounding the original broadcast date, it appeared as if the American public was saturated with 
nuclear discourse. 
Since the 1950s, American audiences have enjoyed a steady stream of Cold War films 
that attempted to illustrate the perils of the atomic age. From the science-fiction creature features 
of the 1950s, such as Attack of the Crab Monsters and Them! which scared audiences with 
mutated beasts, to the doomsday films of the 1960s, like Fail-Safe and Dr. Strangelove, that 
terrified audiences with atomic technology and human hubris, American audiences were 
entertained, titillated, and curiously intrigued by atomic destruction.  Yet by Reagan‘s second 
presidential term, television had remade the Cold War narrative into a social melodramatic 
made-for-television format capable of capturing the immediacy of factual geopolitical events. 
According to Kim Newman, author of Apocalypse Movies: End of the World Cinema, 
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―Television had long since replaced the theatrical film as the principle source of effective 
fictions. As a mass medium, television combines the visual appeal of the movies in their heyday, 
the immediacy of newspapers, and the potential informational content of printed book.‖167 Much 
of the scholarly work on atomic culture has focused almost exclusively on film; however, 
television proved a formidable medium for presenting nuclear war scenarios. 
Most specifically, the format of the made-for-television film provided an effective canvas 
to show both the prewar life of the characters and overlay that with post-nuclear war realities. 
Nuclear war teleplays are an interesting amalgamation of melodrama, character studies, disaster, 
and realistic renderings of serious social topics. The majority of narratives that incorporate 
nuclear themes either demonstrate the political turmoil that embroils America into a nuclear war, 
such as 1982‘s World War III, or radicals attempting to use weapons for overtly political reasons, 
as in Special Bulletin. Rarely did the narrative delve into the problems of how one survives a 
post-nuclear world. This emphasis on demonstrating both the pre-and postwar lives of ordinary 
characters living in a radiation-poisoned world served to rework the atomic narrative.  
This work begins by examining the official Reagan White House response to the 
presentations of The Day After. More than any other social made-for-television drama, the 
Reagan White House prepared a campaign that would counter any support for liberal opposition 
the film was predicated to generate. The onslaught of nuclear-theme issues on network 
television—World War III, Special Bulletin, and more—mobilized the White House to construct 
a media plan that would explain the administration‘s nuclear policy clearly to the public, using 
television as the conduit. This public position on nuclear war demonstrated how significant the 
Reagan White House viewed network television and its relationship with the American voters. 
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Second, this chapter analyzes both the cultural and political significance of the film. Placed 
within a larger context, the film is emblematic of the ideological chasm between the peace 
movement and Reagan-era conservatives. The final scope of this chapter examines how the ABC 
network maneuvered through political pressure, corporate fears, and public concerns about the 
most anticipated made-for-television film about nuclear disaster in television history.  
ABC‘s extensive promotion of the television event as well as its response to the larger 
implications of the narrative‘s content is of great importance to this examination. More than any 
other network, the ABC news division went to great lengths to use its highly rated program, 
Nightline, to reframe the geopolitical events of Reagan‘s militarism. For example, the night 
following the premiere of The Day After, Nightline presented, ABC‘s ―The Crisis Game,‖ to 
demonstrate how the White House would respond to a nuclear crisis with the Soviet Union. This 
chapter discusses the multiple ways in which the ABC network presented an official narrative 
disseminated from the White House in the wake of the potential political fallout of The Day 
After. In this larger context of television history, this chapter examines the interplay between 
network television, the Reagan White House, and the television audience. 
The Day After 
The film, set in Lawrence, Kansas, the geographical center of the United States and home 
to many missile silos, attempted to present a realistic account of the effects of nuclear war on 
ordinary Americans. The opening scene was a montage of shots of day-to- day life in Lawrence 
and its surrounding areas. The audience watched children playing in a park, workers in a mill 
plant, and students attending class at the university, as well as lovers engaged in intimate 
movements. The audience realizes that this opening scene was meant to provide a glimpse into 
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the ordinary lives of people like the viewers. These characters were not aware of the imminent 
danger that awaited them. The director, Nicholas Meyers, developed the plot for the crisis to lead 
to nuclear holocaust, not by showing government leaders discussing the immediacy of the 
military situation, but by showing people passively gathered around television sets. In addition, 
Meyers chose to allow the audience to receive the same information that the characters in the 
film received, at the same time they received it, thus heightening the audiences‘ identification 
with the characters.
168
 
As the political situation becomes direr, the characters grew increasingly concerned by 
the televised news. However, they go on with the minutia of their lives. The audience became 
intimate with the film‘s main characters. The central character was Dr. Oaks, a middle-aged 
heart surgeon (played by Jason Robards) who lives in Kansas City with his wife. Lawrence, 
Kansas, the academic heart of Kansas, lies approximately thirty miles away. The majority of the 
narrative revolved around two families: Dr. Oaks and his wife, as well as the Dahlberg family, 
who lived on a farm forty miles outside of Kansas City. As the film opens, the Dahlberg 
patriarch (portrayed by John Cullum) was preparing for the wedding of his oldest daughter 
Denise, played by Lori Lethin. Other characters include Joe Huxley, the voice of the political left 
and a professor at the University of Lawrence, portrayed by John Lithgow, along with Steve 
Guttenberg, who plays a medical student from the university taken in by the Dahlbergs in the 
fallout of the war.  
The film interweaved all of the scenes of daily life with the various news reports of 
political events that revealed the impending war. In an interesting scene, Dr. Oaks and his wife 
reminisce about how the current political divide between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was 
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similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The couple recalled how in 1962, they were in bed 
together watching the story unfold on television, and took comfort in how they had survived that 
incident and would survive another. Further information on the impending crisis was provided to 
television viewers through dialogue between some of the college students and local patrons, 
outlining theories from the Democratic and Republicans parties.  . The audience begins to slowly 
empathize with the characters, who, mirrored on television, realize that nuclear war was 
becoming a foreseeable reality. 
 Then, the bomb came. The bomb sequence lasted approximately four minutes and was 
edited to shock, terrify, and emotionally ravage the viewers. At first, Meyers presented the 
effects of the initial attacks on the downtown areas of Kansas City, the entire city; then the 
effects on its citizens including Dr. Oaks‘s daughter, who was immediately eviscerated. Not only 
were they incinerated, these characters were literally vaporized, their skins disintegrating off 
their skeletons until finally they disappeared completely. Buildings flew apart, glass shattered 
and fell onto the streets, and bridges collapsed causing massive damage to the city‘s 
infrastructure. Meyers incorporated stock footage of actual bomb tests from the U.S. Army to 
heighten the effect of the initial blast. He intended for the audience to be shocked by the bomb‘s 
ability to completely decimate an entire city and even strip human flesh off the bone. 
But the bomb sequence was only the beginning, the critical moment between the pre-and 
postwar American landscape. The survivors, those in Lawrence, had to struggle with the 
immediate and obvious problems of post-nuclear life. Thousands were injured, and the 
technologies on which America had grown so dependent were no longer available. Patrick 
Mannix, author of the scholarly work on antinuclear fiction, offered this assessment: 
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The implications are obvious: civilization, as dependent as it is on electronic technology, 
will not survive even the most personally harmless effects of nuclear war. We are left to 
imagine how many will die because the medical equipment has failed. We are also 
largely left to imagine the other effects in society of this breakdown of technology. At 
night city streets will be lit, if at all, by the uncertain glow of fires. Police cars, like all 
other equipment relying on electric components, will be rendered useless. Refrigerators 
will cease, and food will spoil. Even water supplies will be limited by the failure of 
electric pumps.
169
 
This loss of everyday consumer culture, to which Americans had grown accustomed and on 
which they depended throughout the postwar era, was something the viewer had to imagine in 
his or her own mind. The film created an atmosphere in which the viewer had to imagine how 
they could survive a nuclear war and what tools might be used to preserve the human body. This 
was an important commentary to make, as this is where the teleplay diverges from most 
antinuclear drama in that it attempted to present a realistic postwar landscape. It challenges the 
viewers to imagine life without the simple essentials provided by the government, such as water 
and even medical care. But more than just this change in the way Americans would have to 
reconsider necessities, the survivors had to confront the social and psychological changes that 
nuclear war brings to the average citizen. Doctors at the Lawrence University Hospital discuss 
radiation levels and pontificated about when it was safe to ―go outside again.‖ This also 
suggested that the first responders, such as medics, doctors, fireman, nurses, and police officers, 
were neither informed nor trained in nuclear survival skills. This point of contention, of civil 
preparedness, was a political issue for Reagan as he stressed that the U.S. was not engaging in 
civil defense measures in parity with the Soviet Union.  
According to Kim Newman‘s analysis of the film, after the bomb was dropped, the film 
struggled to retain optimism with the grim realities of nuclear holocaust overshadowing any 
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sense of hope.
170
 However, a closer reading of the film reveals that the narrative never loses its 
optimism. The film ―struggles‖ to retain its providence. But this optimism was draped in the 
confidence in the American people to rebuild, not the government. The film displayed faith in 
the American people through its characters‘ continued struggle to survive and to move through 
the daily minutiae of activities, despite feeling increasingly hopeless due to a disconnect with 
government officials or any news about the situation. The film highlighted the American 
viewers‘ dependence on network news for basic survival information, a commentary that 
revealed the complicated relationship between technology, government, and preservation in 
postwar America. The film relied on the strength of the characters to retain their faith in 
humanity over any other ideology. This depiction of ordinary Americans struggling to survive in 
a post-nuclear holocaust world marked an important shift in the cultural depiction of the Cold 
War. 
In spite of cataclysmic damage to the physical and social construction of American life, 
the teleplay of The Day After envisioned many of its social intuitions remaining partially intact 
due to the commitment of the American worker. Doctors continued to provide services to their 
patients, even without any technological assistance. Lawrence citizens continued to attend make-
shift church services, even though most congregates suffered from radiation sickness. Bands of 
survivors came together and formed refugee camps. The Dahlberg family displayed an enviable 
amount of compassion by opening their miniscule fallout shelter to the young medical student 
(Steve Guttenberg). All of this underscored a continued effort to rebuild some semblance of 
society, law, and order in the midst of nuclear chaos and a lack of communication from 
government assistance. Unfortunately, some lawlessness did occur: Mr. Dahlberg was killed by 
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squatters who either wanted his land or wanted his food. Yet even in the final scene of the film, 
when Dr. Oaks journeyed back to ground zero, Kansas City, to be with his deceased wife, he was 
embraced by fellow survivors-squatters, who joined him in a sad gaze at the radioactive rubble 
that used to be his home. The survivors, even as they witnessed the widespread destruction and 
death and sickness that ravaged their once bountiful country, never lost their hope and faith. 
Humanity and strength prevailed until the end. This display of humanity‘s ability to self-preserve 
in a time of crisis resonated with American audiences in that the viewer had come to identify 
with one of the many characters. 
This is not to suggest that the Lawrence survivors did not suffer horribly, as most slowly 
died due to radiation sickness. One might even suggest that Meyers attempted to exploit one of 
the most terrifying fears of the nuclear age: the fear of radiation. The mysterious poison had 
never adequately been explained or discussed by government officials. In one scene, Lori, the 
daughter whose wedding was interpreted by World War III, cannot bear the claustrophobic space 
of the Dahlberg‘s fallout shelter for another moment and runs outside in a field peppered with 
white radioactive fallout. Lori cannot understand that even though the sky was blue and the sun 
was shining, the air was poisoned with deadly levels of radiation. Afterward, the audience bears 
witness to Lori‘s struggle with the radiation; her hair thins, she begins to hemorrhage, she grows 
tumors, and the medical infrastructure could do nothing to save her. Other characters, such as 
nine months pregnant hospitalized patient played by Amy Madigan, awaited a similar fate. As 
for Dr. Oaks, his initial position, on the highway miles away from ground zero in Kansas City, 
allowed him more time to help save the remaining population of Lawrence and travel back to his 
beloved family to witness a wasted landscape. He too grows pale and bald, develops sores, and 
eventually collapses. 
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Overall, Meyers refrained from sensationalizing the horrors of radiation sickness in 
comparison to other films of its time period. Perhaps the executives at ABC made this decision 
for him. Many speculated that this reluctance to include more graphic imagery crippled the 
realism of the film. In a review from American Film magazine, world-renowned French 
cinemaphile Marcel Ophuls asserted that the scenes of actual destruction were ―woefully 
inadequate, naive, and almost clumsy … The Day After cannot possibly compete with the 
vicarious thrills of gratuitous violence, precisely because its intentions are honorable.‖171 Ophuls 
continued with the rhetorical question: Could any presentation, even one with gritty realism, 
capture such an important event? Perhaps gritty realism was an unrealistic and unattainable goal 
for any filmmaker depicting World War III and nuclear holocaust. However, as the previous 
chapter argued, from the network‘s perspective, was less important than attaining realism 
perhaps was not as important to the network as retaining viewers and corporate sponsorship. 
Perhaps executives at ABC, including Nicholas Meyers and Brandon Stoddard, and the 
American television audience, were ready to be ―entertained‖ rather than confront the graphic 
realities of post-nuclear apocalyptic life. After all, if the viewer considered all the possible 
fictional scenarios of nuclear war, viewers would recognize that it was possible for the U.S. 
government to provoke, escalate, or even begin a third World War. The dramatic and apolitical 
elements of The Day After suggest that American audiences of the 1980s preferred to be 
entertained by a diluted version of nuclear war rather than to confront the horrors and their own 
responsibility in the denotation of nuclear weapons. 
The audience, as well as the characters they are meant to resemble, never really know 
what side started the war, or which side deployed nuclear weapons first. This was intentional on 
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the part of ABC executives, who wanted to stress the ―apolitical‖ message of the film. ABC 
president Brandon Stoddard stated, ―I don‘t think audiences will be able to find a political 
statement. It does not say there should be less nuclear bombs or more nuclear bombs. We do not 
deal with the cause.‖172 Regardless of the critical issue of causality, one of the survivors, Dr. Joe 
Huxkey (John Lithgow), an academic at the ruined university, found an old radio and heard the 
president make the following announcement: ―There is at the present time a ceasefire in the 
Soviet Union. During this hour of sorrow, I wish to assure you that America has survived this 
terrible tribulation. There has been no surrender, no retreat from the principles of liberty and 
democracy for which the free world look to us for leadership. We remain undaunted.‖173 This 
statement on the stalwart commitment of the government to ideology over humanity is a rather 
larger commentary on the faith in institutions to handle the aftermath of such awesome 
destruction. Yet, the audiences drew ambiguous messages from the film‘s conclusion. The 
makers of the film left essential elements of causality and governmental orthodoxy unexamined. 
The audience was left to ponder if the war is still continuing? What about other survivors? 
Would there be a national recovery program? Would the government come to the rescue? Was 
the inclusion of the president‘s message a prerecorded telecast made at an earlier time that 
automatically aired after a nuclear strike began, just as mentioned in Edward Zuckerman‘s work 
on civil preparedness and defense? Whatever the intention, the film did include some ominous 
clues about its vision of the post-nuclear war world. As the audience sees, Professor Huxley 
continued to try to communicate with other survivors from around the country, even though it 
becomes more evident that no one is responding to this call. There might be no national 
recovery. Thus, all the official civil defense measures of post-nuclear planning, including citizen 
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displacement, taxes, and even immediate needs were rendered into another remand of pre-
holocaust life. The film ends with the following epilogue: ―The catastrophic events you have 
witnessed are, in all likelihood, less severe than the destruction that would actually occur in the 
event of a full nuclear attack against the United States. It is hoped that the images of this film 
will inspire the nations of the Earth, their people and their leaders, to find means to life after the 
fateful day.‖174 Hiding under the banner of apoliticism, the film still rallied behind the slogan of 
the nuclear freeze campaign and the White House: to prevent the world from suffering from a 
nuclear war.  
Although The Day After received mixed reviews in the popular printed press, it achieved 
unqualified success by network television standards. The advertisers, who were apprehensive 
about sponsoring the film since its inception, came away from the film with record television 
exposure.
175
 Not only did the teleplay garner astronomical ratings for the ABC network, crushing 
their competition in the November sweeps, but the film made an indelible imprint on the minds 
of the American television audience and became another avenue for Americans to discuss their 
feelings about America‘s nuclear arsenal and become active participants in the nuclear discourse.  
The film serves as an important cultural touchstone for a myriad of reasons. First, in the 
weeks leading up to the original broadcast date, the news media was saturated with stories 
detailing the coming of ABC‘s depiction of a nuclear war on television. In addition, many 
officials worried that the film would be too terrifying to watch, and under pressure from a 
number of agencies, ABC issued a parental advisory that children under twelve years old should 
                                                 
174
 Quotations from The Day After, 1983.  
175
 Diane Mermigas, ―‘Day‘ Aftermath: Sponsors Pull Coup,‖ Advertising Age 28 (November 1983): 1.  
128 
 
 
not watch the film unsupervised.
176
 Furthermore, the nuclear devastation presented in the film 
was unprecedented for American television viewers. Over twenty years later, many viewers can 
still vividly recall watching the film on television. One viewer wrote, ―I first saw this film at the 
age of ten, and it frightened me more than I can adequately describe. When I saw it again at the 
age of twenty-seven it still frightened me.‖177 
The Day After was not the first made-for-television film to confront the subject of nuclear 
holocaust. However,  The Day After was significant because it ignited a wave of national debate 
on the subject of nuclear war. The Day After allowed all Americans to watch the unimaginable 
and to visually confront their own nuclear nightmares. The film attempted to tap into existing 
nuclear war fears, while also provoking wide-scale debate. The teleplay brought to life the 
abstract political and scientific renderings of nuclear war and personalized them by providing a 
human face for the aftereffects of nuclear war. The film also provided a narrative framework by 
which Americans could engage in the complicated debate. Instead of politicians discussing 
nuclear weapons, disarmament, or the imperative of foreign policy using indecipherable military 
jargon, the film democratized the issue of nuclear war by addressing it in a melodramatic format 
that more Americans could understand and, more importantly, discuss. The average American 
might not be able to describe NATO‘s first-strike policy or the ideological orthodoxy behind 
deterrence, but any American viewer could discuss how The Day After made them feel. What 
impact the film would have on American politics and the Reagan White House would be 
chronicled by the White House media staff, particularly David Gergen and Michael Deaver. 
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The Day After rejuvenated the national debate over the possibility of nuclear war. Once-
abstract political and scientific concepts such as ―survivability‖ and ―limited nuclear exchange,‖ 
usually the jargon of the upper echelon of the American military-industrial apparatus, now 
entered into the American vernacular. In the wake of The Day After, the issue of nuclear war and 
the question of survivability became debated in a myriad of public spheres, from churches to 
schools, and network news outlets. Historians have yet to determine the precise impact of the 
film, so important questions remain unexamined. What counter-narrative did the White House 
present to the American public on the effectiveness of deterrence? How did the White House 
media staff react to the network interest in this subject? Did the film change the way Americans 
perceived the dangers of nuclear war? What is the significance of the film in terms of Cold War 
culture? To answer these questions, one must first examine what politicians and activist groups 
were suggesting about the film before and after its broadcast in November 1983. 
A month before The Day After aired, bootlegged copies of the film began to circulate 
around the nation‘s news media and political groups. These advanced screenings served as one 
of the primary factors that made the film a national event. The mass media created a firestorm of 
political speculation around the film, prompting spokespeople from either side of the political 
arena to take a position on the movie. The New Left understood the film as a crucial wake-up 
call to Americans to reawaken the goals of the antinuclear campaign. Antinuclear activists set up 
teach-ins, distributed informational literature, and launched a project called ―800-NUCLEAR,‖ 
an advertising outlet that urged viewers to join grassroots efforts to freeze the production of 
nuclear weapons.  
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The Right also reconfigured a national rebuttal to the idea that all Republicans, including 
President Reagan, were hawkish ideologues. In September 1983, before an advanced screening 
of the film, the National Review ran a story about how the film defended the U.S. policy of 
deterrence. Later, after receiving a copy of the made-for-television film, the National Review 
condemned the teleplay as a piece of leftist propaganda that ignored the realities of the Cold War 
and Communistaggression. William F. Buckley Jr. sarcastically suggested that the network was 
attempting to frighten American voters by airing a film ―showing what would happen if bubonic 
plague hit an unprepared America.‖178 This quip on the dramatics of network television also 
shifted the focus from nuclear war to national disaster and recovery, two very different social 
issues. Not to be outdone by liberal antinuclear activists, advocates from Young Americans for 
Freedom picketed ABC headquarters in New York. Furthermore, Jerry Falwell instructed Moral 
Majority members to pressure local ministers to denounce the film to congregates and even 
threaten a boycott of companies paying advertising space on the network during the broadcast. 
Ironically, the White House, along with the growing cacophony of right-wing voices, lobbied the 
network to provide ample airtime for the White House to offer a framework to understand the 
narrative imagery and help to delineate between fact and fiction. 
ABC’s Official Presentation and Response of The Day After 
For months in advance, the Reagan White House prepared for post–Day After ripples. On 
November 19, one day before the broadcast, the New York Times reported that the Reagan 
administration had begun to launch a counter-campaign to the network depiction of nuclear war 
by increasing efforts to demonstrate the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. According to freeze 
scholar David Meyer, ―conservative forces argued that allowing the possibility of a nuclear 
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attack on Lawrence distorted the fact that nuclear deterrence worked.‖179 Republicans feared that 
a dramatization of the horrors of a post-nuclear world would galvanize support for the Democrats 
supporting the freeze and even hinder Reagan‘s chances of winning a second presidential term. 
According to an article in U.S. News and World Report, the White House was very much 
concerned that the antinuclear movement would ―capitalize‖ on the dramatics rather than the 
politics of the larger message.
180
 To appease the media consultants at the White House, ABC 
House would present a live political discussion with Secretary of State George Shultz to appear 
on the post-broadcast news special. 
In the months leading up to the broadcast of The Day After, ABC prepared for the fallout 
the film might bring to the network. In the public press, the network was being accused of 
demonstrating the failures of deterrence. An article in the National Review from October 14, 
1983, suggested that the network, ―spent seven million on a film that reinforces the Soviet 
political goal and helps to generate an ignorant public hysteria at a time when calm resolution to 
preserve a credible deterrent is called for.‖181 In addition, Time magazine also commented on the 
stirring debate about the film. In an October 24 article, Time summarized the film and provided a 
preview of the nuclear imagery the viewer could expect as well as breakdown of the positions on 
the film from the political Left and Right. Ultimately, however, Time gestured to the wellspring 
of films capitalizing on and also generating nuclear fears. The article stated that ―Paramount 
already has a movie in the pipeline called Testament, about one family trying to survive a nuclear 
blast. One of the hottest commercial novels due next spring is Warday … Apocalypse has clearly 
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become something more than the fate that looms just over the horizon line. It may be the growth 
industry of the ‘80s.‖182  
To dispute accusations of bias, ABC decided to air a roundtable discussion after the 
immediate broadcast. Although the direct correspondence between White House officials and 
network executives was limited, a memo from Charles Wick, director of the United States 
Information Agency (USIA) to the American Broadcasting Company, dated October 7, 1983, 
provided an interesting guidepost in understanding the actual cooperation between the network 
and the Reagan administration. In his memo, Wick offered the participation of Robert 
McNamara, Cark Sagan, William F. Buckley, Vice President Bush or Caspar Weinberger on a 
panel that would feature ―a balanced, objective discussion.‖183 Wick also suggested that the live 
audience at the roundtable discussion would ―contain people of strong opinions but will be 
restricted by Ted to questions.‖184 Not only did the network court many of the same talking 
heads suggested by Wick, the network also distributed 400,000 ―study guides‖ that were sent to 
schools and churches nationwide. This suggests that the White House was going to great 
lengthens to control the message and reaction of the film for American viewers.  However, the 
study guide was also politically divisive as it included books closely related to the antinuclear 
movement, including those by Dr. Helen Caldicott and Jonathan Schell.
185
 Even in the midst of 
the controversy and accusations of leftist leanings, the network was able to procure the 
advertising revenue needed to produce the film, in the midst of a conservative call for a national 
boycott of the film.  
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The Offering of “Viewpoints” on Nightline 
The ABC network, consistently insisting that the film contained no political agenda, 
immediately followed the original broadcast of the film with a special news panel to discuss and 
perhaps dispel some of the issues raised in the film. Hosted by well-respected ABC news 
correspondent Ted Koppel, the roundtable discussion featured panelists such as Henry Kissinger, 
Robert McNamara, Carl Sagan, Elie Wiesel, William F. Buckley, and Lt. General Brent 
Scowcroft. The panel brought together an interesting combination of past political operatives and 
current military and social pundits. Sagan represented the new school on nuclear science, while 
Kissinger and McNamara continued to applaud the military effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. 
Wiesel was the only panelist to confront the irrationality of nuclear weapons and vocally reject 
such worse-case scenarios as mutually assured destruction as a framework for nuclear safety. 
Conspicuously absent from the panel was a spokesperson for the nuclear freeze movement.
186
 
The program began with Ted Koppel reassuring the American public that what they had 
just seen on the network was not real—it was the work of network fiction. In a move similar to 
Peter Finch‘s character in Sidney Lumet‘s 1976 classic film, Network, Koppel suggested that 
viewers look out their windows and see for themselves that America was still a nation 
unblemished by nuclear war. Koppel then turned the discussion to arms reduction and engaged in 
a dialogue with Secretary of State George Shultz, whose avuncular status as a statesman was 
meant to ameliorate any percolating anxiety provoked by the made-for-television film. Speaking 
via satellite to the secretary of state, Koppel asked a series of questions regarding arms reduction, 
the policy of deterrence, and the types of problems Americans would have to confront in the 
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event of a nuclear war. Shultz‘s response did not deviate from the official White House Day 
After response scripted by White House media strategists.  
As Koppel turned the dialogue over to the panelists, each provided predictably scripted 
answers to Koppel‘s question and never strayed from their partisan beliefs. William F. Buckley 
Jr. denounced the film, as he had previously in print, claiming it debilitated American military 
standing and criticized ABC‘s promotion of the film as apolitical, when clearly according to 
Buckley, the political design of the film was a ―cause militant.‖187 Although Koppel asked each 
panelist how America might best avoid such a nuclear nightmare, the discussion repeatedly came 
back to the historical success of nuclear deterrence. Robert McNamara, exhibiting an academic 
comfort with the subject matter but discomfort in front of the camera, initially asserted that the 
American people did not understand the theoretical underpinnings of deterrence and how it 
protected against a doomsday scenario. As one of the architects of mutually assured destruction, 
McNamara spoke about the complex interplay between government, policy, and nuclear 
armament, and most significantly, he suggested that Americans could not understand the 
geopolitical power of nuclear weapons. Similarly, Kissinger, appearing rather annoyed by the 
entire panel and live studio audience participating in the discussion, claimed that ―simple-minded 
programs (such as The Day After)‖ only caused irrational panic in the populace. He went on to 
add that nuclear disarmament was necessary, but only to an extent, because if ―the Soviet Union 
gets the idea that the U.S. has morally and psychologically disarmed itself then the precise 
consequences we are describing here will happen.‖ 
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The presence of McNamara and Kissinger was important for a number of reasons, many 
of which are contradictory. Kissinger was remembered by the American people as a vital 
diplomat that negotiated détente and peace in the Middle East, yet his relationship to the former 
president Nixon left Americans uneasy with his academic pontifications. As for McNamara, he 
was a fixture throughout the Cold War political landscape and in the aftermath of Vietnam, he 
was routinely asked to speak of the effective policy of nuclear deterrence. This did not situate 
McNamara as a member of the political right or left, but rather as a symbol of the ultimate 
Washington insider, a man who had engaged in diplomatic situations with Nikita Khrushchev 
and John Kennedy in 1962, and who now was available to explain his political insights with the 
American viewing public.  
When Koppel addressed Carl Sagan, the newly crowned poster child of nuclear winter 
theory and known as an anti-Reagan scientist, it was only to discuss nuclear fallout. Sagan was 
never asked questions regarding nuclear proliferation, disarmament, or his position on the 
nuclear winter theory. Rather, Sagan explained the theory of nuclear winter and its immediate 
policy implications and went on to add that even a small-scale battle could cause the earth to 
become crippled by deadly poisoning. In one of the few lighthearted moments, Koppel 
interrupted Sagan as he was describing the cataclysmic effects of nuclear winter and noted that 
the country was already depressed because the film. The American people, Koppel quipped, did 
not need a more dire illustration of the post-nuclear landscape. Buckley openly challenged Sagan 
and nuclear winter theory and claimed that ultimately, the focus should always stay on the policy 
of deterrence. Since Soviet scientists agreed about the effects of nuclear winter on the planet, 
Buckley claimed, the Soviets would never use weapons of mass destruction.  
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Only the words of panelist Elie Wiesel, a World War II Holocaust survivor, brought the 
discussion down from the theoretical and political level and repackaged the dialogue in ordinary 
vernacular and human terms. Wiesel suggested that the Jewish Holocaust had taught humanity an 
important lesson that it must not forget: ―what is imaginable can happen.‖188 He observed that 
people could not understand such abstractions as nuclear megatons, space-based missile defense 
systems, NATO military exercises, nuclear physics, or complicated military jargon; they only 
knew that they were scared of the awesome destructive power of nuclear war. Prophetically, 
Wiesel proclaimed that he did not worry about the superpowers using nuclear weapons, but that 
he did worry about the smaller nations who would not have a national discussion on network 
television, whether or not it was right to use them. Wiesel urged that the real nuclear threat could 
arise from rogue nations who would not hesitate to use nuclear hardware for limited tactical 
strikes. 
Clearly, what Wiesel forecasted was a message that the nuclear freeze movement, both 
home and abroad, had also attempted to emphasize. Wiesel‘s commentary on the media working 
as a watchdog to prevent global malfeasance intimated that the networks were complicit in 
disseminating important government events to the American viewing public. He spoke of a more 
worrisome nuclear scenario that World War III between the superpowers, and he urged the 
network media to inform the public as much as possible on global events to prevent the 
―unimaginable‖ from happening again.  
This panel discussion was significant for a number of reasons. First, it clearly illustrated 
that those involved in past presidential administrations, such as McNamara and Kissinger, 
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articulated the language of nuclear deterrence and legitimized its effectiveness by stating that it 
has prevented nuclear war. Second, the audience witnessed the unbridgeable chasm between the 
political minds and those from the scientific or humanistic side of nuclear issues. Both Sagan and 
Wiesel suggested that the world of the 1980s, the largest nuclear arsenal in history, needed to 
dramatically reprioritize and disarm. The issue of disarmament for future prevention was the 
message that Sagan and Wiesel emphasized. In contrast, McNamara, Kissinger, and Buckley 
were all highly critical of the value of the film and asserted that the film illustrated the need for 
nuclear armament and deterrence. The experts did not change their opinions after watching the 
film, nor did they engage in any consciousness-shifting debate. 
The final aspect of the panel discussion worth noting—something that Marcel Ophuls 
also noted in his review of The Day After—was how completely out of touch the panelists were 
with the American people. Ophuls called Kissinger‘s appearance on the panel ―a view from the 
terrace.‖189 These men were asked to join in a panel discussion in order to quell the fears the 
American public might have after watching the nuclear-horror drama on television. The real 
criticism of the panel was the obvious disconnect between the panelists and the audience. The 
panelists suggested that Americans were too incompetent to understand the intricacies of foreign 
policy or nuclear megatons. All the panelists agreed that no one wanted nuclear war, but the 
panelists, except for Wiesel, could never really explain to the American public how nuclear war 
was prevented. Nor could the panelists interact with the in-studio audience. These political 
insiders, men of tremendous political power, felt assured that America would not suffer such a 
melodramatic and horrific fate. Only Wiesel, after claiming he knew nothing of nuclear strategy 
and exhibiting human vulnerability, was able to make a human connection with the audience. 
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Wiesel became not only the voice of reason in a room full of egos, but the voice of concerned 
Americans. 
In a New York Times article following the broadcast of the film and the panel discussion, 
the newspaper reported that both the movie and the discussion entertained and misinformed the 
average viewer. According to the article, a public school teacher who watched the film with his 
history class said many of his students found the panel discussion more informative than the 
movie. Others disagreed, claiming the post-film roundtable was more disturbing than the actual 
movie. One seventeen-year-old girl interestingly remarked, ―If the panelists couldn‘t agree with 
each other, how they ever agree with the Russians?‖190 In another survey, viewers were asked if 
the panel discussion helped to clarify the issues raised in the film, and approximately 68 percent 
of those polled agreed that the post-film discussion was helpful.
191
 
Over twenty-five years later, it remains difficult to determine how viewers received the 
film. Until The Day After, no other television program in American television history had 
received so much advanced publicity. Furthermore, no made-for-television film had ever 
received such enormous ratings. At the time, the film was noted as the second-most watched  
made-for-television in history, surpassed only by the 1977 ABC mini-series, Roots. Moreover, 
no other made-for-television network film had ever incited such divisive national attention. In 
the days that followed the original broadcast, ABC executives maintained the film contained no 
political agenda and advocated no political party or legislation. Interestingly, the film did not 
inspire American viewers to become more involved in antinuclear lobbying efforts, nor did it 
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ignite a change in American political identification. However, what does remain a cultural 
touchstone is that The Day After attempted to illustrate the horrific worst-case scenario of nuclear 
war for the American viewers..  
A number of subsequent academic studies designed to gauge how viewers interpreted The 
Day After offer unique insight into the relationship between television and audience reception.  
The immediate polls indicated that the film had little effect on foreign policy or the president. 
Conversely, the film did not foment a groundswell of support for the campaign for nuclear 
freeze. In a poll conducted by the Warner-Amex Qube cable television network, of the 5,500 
viewers surveyed following the original broadcast, only 13 percent believed nuclear war was 
inevitable. Of those surveyed, 49 percent said they still supported nuclear arms control, while 12 
percent claimed the film inspired them to ―now support‖ arms control. In terms of supporting an 
increase in U.S. arms, 29 percent reported that they ―now support[ed]‖ strengthening nuclear 
arms, while 6 percent said they ―now supported‖ a nuclear buildup.192 Additionally, the 
Washington Post conducted a 1,500-person national survey both before and after the broadcast 
and the numbers from the survey suggest that film had little to no effect on the image of 
President Reagan, his policies, and, most importantly for the coming presidential campaign year, 
his approval ratings.
193
 
This data does not insinuate that the film did not disturb viewers—it just did not motivate 
the kind of political activism that the media envisioned it would. The polls were designed to 
evaluate whether or not Americans were changing their political ideals after watching the film. 
An exhaustive study conducted by Stanley Feldman and Lee Sigelman of the University of 
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Kentucky, the film did not tarnish the Reagan presidency. According to the study, attitudinal 
changes on politics were predicated on the educational level of the viewers. Among the highest-
educated viewers, the film led to a minimal increase in a belief that the Reagan administration‘s 
policies were leading the country toward nuclear war. Those with a lower level of education 
(defined in the study as viewers who had a high school level diploma or its equivalent) became 
more supportive of higher defense spending, tough positions toward the Soviet Union, and 
Reagan‘s handling of foreign affairs.194 
The Official White House Response to The Day After 
The White House had prepared for the potential political ramifications of ABC‘s made-
for-television movie for months prior to the film. Their strategy was to saturate network 
television with appearances by cabinet members who repeated that peaceful deterrence was the 
empirical reason as to why a third world war had never occurred. The Reagan White House had 
become at odds with the nuclear freeze movement and in a letter to Edwin Meese, John Hvasta 
of the American Public Research Council wrote, ―we can fight the ‗Freezenicks‘—because we 
know that the Soviets cannot be trusted.‖195  This allowed the White House media staff to 
combat any possible political threats that the film may generate through a three-prong strategy of 
(1) reinforcing the efficiency of deterrence, (2) portraying nuclear freeze supporters as New Left 
liberals, and (3) increased visibility of White House staffers on television that would speak of 
nuclear peace through militaristic strength. 
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An early version of the film was given to the White House and other selected venues for 
advanced viewing. ABC initially intended The Day After to be shown in the spring of 1983, but 
pushed it back to November due to its building controversy. On November 4, the senior officials 
in the White House met to discuss the film. Staffers such as David Gergen, George Keyworth, 
Bruce Chapman, and others discussed how best to address the growing media spectacle. 
196
 A 
number of public affairs strategies were utilized by the White House. In a memo to Robert 
McFarlane and David Gergen from senior officials, the following actions or strategies were 
openly discussed including how each different department could approach the film. The adopted 
plan consisted of two parts; a pre-airing and post-airing response.  
The pre-airing strategy, in which the White House media office estimated that twenty 
million Americans would view the film, projected that public opinion ―vis-a-vis [sic] our 
strategic nuclear and arms control policy will be negative.‖197 In addition, the pre-air plan also 
stressed that ―we must be careful, however, not to over-react to the film or seem overly anxious 
before it airs. We should be somewhere in between—on the job, calm, sympathetic, and opposed 
in principle to fear-evoking entertainment.‖198 The media specialists predicted that local network 
affiliates would ―localize‖ the story for their particular audience, and many requests for 
government officials to respond to imminent questions were already being processed by the 
White House. The pre-airing approach urged every member of the Reagan administration, of the 
Republican Party, and all conservatives to survey the national news landscape in order to prepare 
for specific types of questions, especially those related to nuclear foreign policy and militarism. 
The pre-airing memo anticipated how the film would shape national discourse. Issues such as the 
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recent report on the effects of nuclear weapons on the atmosphere, and to the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, and ―how close we were‖ to having a nuclear war in 1962 were expected by the White 
House. In addition, the White House media office offered a brief that provided ―samples of 
public and media reactions to the film thus far,‖ before the broadcast date of November 23. In an 
article from the National Review from October 30, 1983, ABC was praised in its efforts to 
support nuclear deterrence through the showing of the film. The article states, ―the producers at 
ABC obviously want to impress upon us just what might happen if our deterrent becomes 
unconvincing, tempting the Soviets to treat Lawrence, Kansas, as it if were a Korean 
airplane.‖199 In an advanced showing to the Washington Times, Reed Irvine suggested that 
instead of the movie bolstering support for deterrence, the movie ―is bringing joy to the hearts of 
the advocates of nuclear freeze and other anti-nuke types on the eve of the deployment of 
Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe.‖200 
The White House hoped that network television would provide a more sophisticated, 
balanced approach to nuclear issues and cited an October 23 episode of the CBS Sunday 
Morning News as an example of fair coverage of events. . Evidently, the pre-airing public affairs 
plan had as its first objective to: 
Run up to the time of the airing, November 20. Its objective is to get people to question 
the propriety of the film—to question whether fear-provoking entertainment on the 
subject of nuclear war is in our society‘s best interest. In hand with that criticism, we 
could express the hope that the film causes more people to become interested in the 
President‘s arms reduction efforts and support them more vigorously.201 
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 The principal players in the media affront on the implications of The Day After were most 
notably Caspar Weinberger, George Shultz, George Keyworth, and Robert McFarlane. Talking 
points were distributed to all major players in the media blitz surrounding The Day After. The 
talking points included how to prevent nuclear catastrophe, most notably the emphasis on 
deterrence and arms control as the most effective strategies for avoiding nuclear destruction. In 
addition, the White House media office stressed that officials should discuss ―peace through 
strength,‖ which was coded language to begin talking about Reagan‘s Strategic Defense 
Initiative. All of these talking points alluded back to the same idea of the Soviet Union as an 
expansionist, aggressive, atheist state that clung to the feral ideology of Marxism. Additionally, 
the statements constructed by media staffers emphasized the importance of reiterating that the 
U.S. government, under Reagan‘s leadership, was more willing to engage the Soviets in more 
arms negotiations than ever before, using the example of the START talks in Geneva, the INF 
talks in Geneva, and negotiations in Vienna.
202
  
Although these talking points may appear obvious for seasoned Cold Warriors from the 
White House, the administration was asked to speak publicly on The Day After for months and 
even weeks before the broadcasting. This cacophony of voices filling network news was the pre-
airing strategy orchestrated by the White House.  A cursory glance at the administration‘s 
presence on network television prior to The Day After premiere include: Ken Adelman on NBC‘s 
Meet the Press; Richard Perle on ABC‘s This Week, CNN‘s Evans and Novak, and CBS Sunday 
Night Network News; Richard Burt on CNN Crossfire with Braden and Buchanan; Franklin 
Miller (of the Department of Defense) on WRC Radio and National Public Radio; and many 
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others.
203
 Finally, the pre-airing phase also connected with print journalists who agreed with the 
administration, such as Patrick Buchanan and Rowland Evans, as well as with local Republican 
activist groups like the Citizens for America, who sent packets of talking points and position 
papers on the administration‘s arms control efforts and deterrence strategy to Congress. The 
Republican National Committee was also prepared to focus on these same talking points if 
necessary. From the perspective of the White House media office, the key to the pre-airing phase 
on The Day After was to promote a media counteroffensive of their own, one in which the 
administration in no way appeared threatened, defensive, or afraid of ABC, the movie and 
especially the horrific nuclear destruction the film displayed in a live broadcast. 
The post-airing phase somewhat resembled the pre-airing phase. An advance screening of 
the film was shown to the Pentagon, the Department of Defense, and the State Department, along 
with the White House. Key officials from these departments were asked to draft standard letters 
to anticipate the larger volume of public mail that would flood the White House. The media 
office also commissioned a poll to measure the public‘s reaction to the film. Additionally, the 
president was scheduled to conduct a press conference on the day after the broadcast. President 
Reagan would not address the film specifically, but his presence would be ready to reassure and 
provide a rational response to the wave of emotional confusion brought by the film. However, 
the post-airing strategy remained flexible; it would depend ―on the extent of public reaction to 
the film and would come into full play to quell a large outpouring of anti-nuclear sentiment.‖204  
Even if the Reagan White House wanted to avoid the political and cultural ramblings of a 
made-for-television movie, the national buzz was too electric for the White House to avoid. On 
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Monday November 21, KABC Talk Radio 79 in Los Angeles devoted fourteen hours of its 
programming on questions concerning the nuclear controversy of The Day After. The title of said 
fourteen-hour segment was ―The Day After the Day After,‖ and the president of the station 
invited President Reagan to speak to the audience during the broadcast. In a memo to the White 
House, the director of the station even emphasized how Nancy Reagan had appeared on the 
station earlier in the year promoting her book.
205
 Even early on, numerous media outlets 
extensively covered the story, most interviewing the film‘s director Nicholas Meyer, high-profile 
politicians, and White House insiders. In an October 13, 1983, segment of All Things 
Considered, NPR‘s Susan Stamberg interviewed director Meyer about the film and also the 
citizens of Lawrence, Kansas, where the film took place. As the segment began, one man who 
attended a special preview of the film offered by the network to the Lawrence community 
admitted, ―The movie scared me, very badly. It was nothing I hadn‘t known before, but seeing it 
in front of me, seeing other people going through that scared me deeply … I‘m hoping this gets 
past the censors. I‘m hoping ABC has the guts to put it on.‖206As for any underlying political 
propaganda the film contained, Meyer replied thusly: 
Well, I think that the movie—it is a cautionary fable, I suppose. I likened it at one point 
to a giant public service announcement. It does not take a political stand. It does not deal 
with generals or politics or global strategies. It does not suggest that we arm or disarm. 
What it does is it attempts to show nuclear war from a point of view of regular Americas. 
And in that sense, the film is not ultimately about Lawrence; it‘s about everybody. And 
everybody I think also includes the Soviet Union. It‘s supposed to be sobering. And it is 
also supposed to supply vivid imagery to those words we read and throw around so that 
we have become completely inured to their meaning of fallout and shelters and megatons, 
and so on. Our movie tries to update things so we can all get a handle on what all those 
mean.
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In this short exchange, Meyer highlights a number of important points. He acknowledges how 
The Day After addressed the plight of the average person versus the private conservations of 
politicians (such as NBC‘s World War Three) or the issue of disarmament (like NBC‘s Special 
Bulletin).  When asked by NPR‘s Stamberg as to why the film was generating such ―hullabaloo‖ 
in light of previous nuclear holocaust films like Dr. Strangelove or even television‘s Special 
Bulletin,  Meyer elaborated that The Day After is ―a very literal-minded film that just takes a kind 
of plodding look at the before, during and after with a camera that never blinks.‖208  
However apolitical the narrative might be in construction, the White House interpreted 
the film as politically bothersome. In an October 23, 1983, broadcast of the CBS Sunday 
Morning News, television journalist David Culhane reported on the content of The Day After in a 
segment called, ―Cloud over Kansas.‖ Culhane framed the film in the larger context of the White 
House plan to deploy new missile systems into Western Europe and how the Soviets were 
reacting to the nuclear build-up. Culhane says, ―All across America, in Kansas, people try to 
understand. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are now at one of the 
lowest points in history: Afghanistan, Poland, Central America, the Korean civilian airliner shot 
down by the Russians, the arms talks stalled.‖ According to Culhane, the filming of the movie 
had created a fervor of activism among the citizens of Lawrence, Kansas.  Antinuclear groups, 
especially those affiliated with the University of Kansas and the nuclear freeze, were gaining 
new members since the movie was premiered locally. Conversely, conservative pro-defense 
groups who screened the film called the film ―left wing propaganda that will generate hysteria 
and an emotional rather than rational approach to nuclear questions.‖209 
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Culhane attempted to situate the broadcast of the film within the larger geopolitical 
context of the planned U.S. deployment of nuclear missiles into Western Europe in the upcoming 
weeks and wondered how the film would help shape public opinion on the issue of nuclear 
proliferation. President Reagan responded to this unique timing of The Day After with nuclear 
deployment in Western Europe with ―the Soviets are going to negotiate seriously. There is a 
great propaganda effort going on their part now because their target is—they‘ve been encouraged 
by some of the demonstrations that they‘ve helped organize around the world.‖210 To Reagan, the 
nuclear freeze activists and peace proponents were misguided marauders of the liberal sixties. In 
order to combat this type of New Left Liberalism, the Reagan White House consistently paraded 
the thirty-eight years of nuclear peace produced by peaceful deterrence. Additionally, Reagan‘s 
idea of Communism precluded him from seeing any of their motives as anything other than 
malicious in scope. Thus, the United States had to take a zero-option, hard-line position with the 
aggressive, expansive Soviet Union in Western Europe, in Central America, in the arms 
negotiations, in their diplomatic relationship, and most importantly, with a larger nuclear arsenal.  
In the months leading up to the broadcast, the White House kept a close eye on how the 
media was shaping the debate about The Day After. Although the ABC network and the 
producers and director of the film continued to declare the film was not leftist propaganda, the 
White House dismissed these claims, along with the network‘s decision to broadcast the film in 
November rather than May 1983, as evidence that the film was an vehicle to disrupt the 
deployment of the Pershing II missiles in West Germany. An internal memo to Edwin Messe 
stated, ―the fact remains that on December 2nd, The Day After will open in thirty movie theaters 
throughout West Germany, just a few weeks before the scheduled installation of American 
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missiles on West German soil. Why? The West German film distributor told CBS reporter 
Bradley, ‗By releasing THE DAY AFTER now, we hope that we can change the minds of people 
in our government about the missiles while there‘s still time.‖211 The White House felt confident 
that writers, producers, and ABC executives were all giving contradictory statements about the 
film, while the administration and its supporters adhered tightly to the scripted responses 
prepared by key officials. For example Ed Hume, writer of The Day After, was quoted as saying, 
―It‘s sympathetic with disarmament. I‘m alarmed by the state of our defense policy, if you will. I 
think things are out of control, and I‘m scared.‖ 212 Additionally, Alfred Schneider, vice 
president in charge of broadcasting standards for ABC gave this quotation to the New York 
Times: ―graphically you are showing the core of the argument of those who are for a nuclear 
freeze.‖213 Director Nicholas Meyer gave an interview with Newsweek days before the original 
airing in which he cloaked his efforts within the larger context of civil responsibility. He stated, 
―We‘re going after those who haven‘t formed an opinion. The most troublesome aspect of the 
nuclear issue is that people can‘t bear to think about it. So we reach a sinister point where we 
treat the bombs as acts of faith, as if somehow God built and controls them. All I want is for the 
movie to inspire debate. From debate comes consensus—a consensus we will all hopefully have 
been involved in.‖214 
In anticipation, the White House was also offering counter statements to the popular 
press. The White House‘s official position on the film was that despite the statements of all those 
involved in the film, the message leaned toward the political left. Not wanting to give any 
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political credence to the rumor that the White House was dissatisfied or threatened by the film, 
David Gergen, director of communications for the White House, provided this quotation to the 
New York Times: 
I am not saying we welcome the film … It is powerful and very graphic, but it leaves 
unanswered the central question: How do we prevent this catastrophe from happening? 
(Invoking one of the scripted talking points circulated by the White House media office) 
Viewers could feel that government doesn‘t care and that it is cavalier to their needs. It is 
important that they have perspective on what has been done and is being done to reduce 
the risks.
215
 
For the White House media office, ABC-TV was attacking the policy of deterrence. Throughout 
the fall of 1983, print journalism from the New York Times to the National Review offered 
quotations from disarmament groups that the film was a $7 million advertisement for the 
antinuclear movement. John Fisher, president of the American Security Council, attacked ABC-
TV in an article in Time magazine by exclaiming, ―clearly someone associated with the 
production has a significantly different perspective than we do … this movie says deterrence has 
failed, and that‘s a political statement.‖216 Furthermore, the long-time conservative columnist and 
political pundit William F. Buckley also criticized ABC‘s position that the film was apolitical. In 
the National Review, Buckley argued, ―two references are made to Soviet concern over the 
deployment of Pershing missiles. One, a fragment of a radio broadcast, quotes a Soviet official as 
saying that it was ‗the coordinate movement of Pershing II launchers that provoked the original 
Soviet action.‘ That‘s ABC‘s idea of not politicizing a film.‖217 Peace activists as well as some 
local Democratic leaders staged teach-ins, demonstrations, and vigils to support the film. Clearly, 
the claim that the film was apolitical was disputed by both the Right and the Left, the latter co-
opting the imagery of nuclear disaster to bolster its agenda.  
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In the aftermath however, The Day After did not produce the political problems the White 
House anticipated. In a study from the Office of News and Public Affairs out of George 
Washington University, the conclusion was ―ABC‘s The Day After had no immediate effect on 
attitudes toward nuclear war or defense policy.‖ 218 Furthermore, Professor William C. Adams 
wrote that the immediate report indicated that out of the random sample of 928 viewers from 
around the country, some interviewed right before the movie and half polled directly after 
watching it, no major changed occurred in views on the likelihood of nuclear war; that no major 
shift was evident that suggested viewers were more interested in nuclear freeze; and that 
Reagan‘s image did not suffer from the movie. Professor Adams concluded, ―Our evidence is 
that The Day After failed to change existing views on the horror of nuclear war, the need for 
mutual arms control, and the strategy of deterrence.‖219 
As for the White House, the campaign to reelect President Reagan constructed its own 
rubric to gauge national reaction. In a memo from the campaign committee to David Gergen, the 
White House reported that during the live broadcast of The Day After on November 20, 1983, 
between the prime-time hours of 8:30 and 11:30 p.m., operators received 596 calls. The White 
House operators were also given a script to respond to callers and instructed to ask, ―Do you 
think President Reagan is on the right track in trying to reduce nuclear weapons?‖ Over 299 
callers responded with yes. In another telling sign for the campaign committee, callers 
demonstrated a support not only for peace but also for the president, a tactic that would be 
employed in the 1984 election, promoting President Reagan as the ―peacemaker.‖220  
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Subsequent studies and analyses of the film were submitted and given to the White 
House. An Abt Associates survey, conducted before and after the broadcast of the film, found 
that of the 60 percent of those interviewed who watched The Day After, there were no significant 
changes in attitude regarding the likelihood of nuclear war or their chances of surviving one.
221
 
Abt Associates conducted the survey in two waves and selected random respondents in three 
areas, Boston, Kansas City, and rural Nebraska. Respondents were asked if the United States 
should help defend West Germany by threatening the use of nuclear weapons. Over 73 percent 
said no. Interestingly, when asked if the film prompted viewers to take political action, over 64 
percent reported they had no new agenda to build a shelter of even to write the president about 
their concerns. These surveys also helped to gauge public opinion for the upcoming 1984 
presidential campaign. Question fourteen asked viewers after the broadcast, that if the 1984 
presidential election were held today, and the Republican candidate was Ronald Reagan and the 
Democratic candidate was Walter Mondale, over 53 percent of respondents supported Reagan. 
When asked why ABC decided to air the movie, over 25 percent of those surveyed answered that 
the network showed the gory film solely to make a profit.
222
 Some of the results presented in this 
study suggested that viewers were not swayed as easily by the media campaigned that 
accompanied the film. 
National criticism about the film, especially in print media, suggested the real failure of 
the film was its lack of context. A review in Time magazine suggested, ―the chief failing of The 
Day After was that it did not offer much in the way of substantive information.‖223 The review 
went on to state that the film captured America‘s collective nuclear anxiety but offered no way to 
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mitigate these notions, even for those who watched the 75-minute ―Nightline: Viewpoint‖ panel 
discussion after the movie. Time concluded its analysis by suggesting that deterrence and the 
willingness of the White House to maintain parity with the Soviet Union constituted the only 
path to preventing nuclear war. Republican congressman from Illinois Henry Hyde wrote an op-
ed piece printed in the Chicago Tribune on Monday, November 21, 1983. The article, titled 
―What The Day After Missed,‖ surmised that the film treated this graphic topic of nuclear peril 
in a shallow and superficial manner. Hyde states, ―By showing how bad the war would be and 
not addressing the question of how to prevent the war, the film induced and, in fact, consciously 
dramatized a feeling of helplessness and despair.‖224 By all accounts, President Reagan was also 
saddened by the film, but his optimism in the strength of space-based missile systems and the 
deployment of the Pershing II demonstrated his desire to end nuclear proliferation through 
strength not disarmament.  
Conclusion 
Almost thirty years later, the maelstrom of political and social discourse generated by a 
made-for-television movie appears comical. The imagery presented in The Day After did capture 
the nation‘s attention and furthermore, the film became a visual text for both sides of the political 
spectrum to claim that it legitimized deterrence and disarmament. Political pundits charged that 
never before had a made-for-television movie openly questioned presidential policy. The White 
House‘s pre-airing and post-airing plans for gauging public opinion called for complete 
saturation of the administration position on nuclear war. In preparation for negative press, the 
White House media staff requested high-level officials to make appearances on numerous 
network news shows and place op-ed pieces in major print news outlets. Rather than smarmily 
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dismissing the film as left-wing propaganda, the White House presented the official political 
narrative to counter potential political problems for President Reagan.   
By examining the copious amount of White House documents on the film, it is evident 
that the Reagan administration interpreted the film as politically damaging for the president. 
Going further with this analysis, one can argue that the White House helped to create and 
generate nuclear anxiety as much as the film itself. Yet considering the serious nature of the film, 
coupled with the film‘s graphic imagery of Americans disintegrating into tiny piles during a 
nuclear blast, the administration had to present a strong, united message to the television public. 
Clearly for the 100 million Americans who watched the film, it remains a cultural touchstone of 
the nuclear anxieties that were rejuvenated during the first years of Reagan‘s administration. For 
American network viewing audiences, The Day After stands out as the most graphically realistic 
post-nuclear portrayal ever broadcast on American television. Unlike its made-for-television 
counterparts, such as World War III (1982), Special Bulletin (1983) and Testament (1983), the 
narrative of The Day After focused on ordinary people struggling to survive in this new post-
apocalyptic world. The focus on the individual, rather than the government or social institutions, 
demonstrated the network‘s commitment to social realism and loss of faith in institutions, a 
prominent characteristic of the made-for-television formula.  
Moving into the 1984 presidential campaign, The Day After would linger as a visual 
reminder of the contradictory nature of nuclear deterrence. However, , the film did little to 
change public opinion. The post–Day After panel discussion was arguably a larger spectacle than 
the film itself, offering scripted answers that echoed the White House‘s pre-airing talking points. 
Panelists such as Eli Wiesel and Carl Sagan gained minimal access to the audience, being 
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overshadowed by the conservative chorus of Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, and William F. 
Buckley. Atomic scientist Edward Teller would also offer in print and television news that the 
only way to prevent nuclear war was by ―building a defensive system,‖ alluding to the Strategic 
Defense Initiative presented by Reagan in March 1983. The film had the unique ability to 
transcend pundits‘ expectations of how the public would react to the nuclear apocalypse shown 
on television. Although the film, along with other nuclear narratives exhibited throughout the 
year, certainly whetted the national appetite for nuclear holocaust, it did not, however, alter the 
public‘s perception of Reagan or his policies. 
In many ways, the media blitz surrounding The Day After distracted the public‘s attention 
away from real-life Cold War nuclear situations. From the Soviets‘ involvement in the 
obliteration of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, in which all 269 passengers were killed including 60 
U.S. citizens and one U.S. congressman, to the October U.S. invasion of Grenada, where a failed 
left-wing regime that Reagan had long feared would spread Communism throughout Central 
America left the country in disarray, to the NATO Able Archer exercise 83, in which the Soviets 
interpreted the NATO test command-and-control procedures as a potential first-strike, the White 
House relied on television  to persuade public opinion. These aforementioned nonfiction, Cold 
War close calls, although covered by the popular print press, did not achieve as much attention 
on network television news as The Day After. Nonetheless, the White House would continue to 
recycle nuclear deterrence as the mechanism that maintained peace. Even in the year that gave us 
the Strategic Defense Initiative, the invasion of Grenada, and discord in Eastern Europe, many 
people remembered the year through the imagery presented in The Day After. Although the 
White House devoted a great deal of effort to constructing an antidote to The Day After 
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nightmares, the film ironically helped to bolster Reagan‘s image as a peacemaker, rather than a 
hawkish militarist who would eventually spend $60 billion on missile research.
225
    
In the final analysis, the film and the White House‘s and ABC‘s reactions vis-à-vis public 
opinion transcended traditional notions of television reception and political identification. 
Seemingly at odds, the White House and ABC benefited from the success of the nuclear-themed 
televised event. For ABC, the film garnered enormous ratings and outstanding advertising 
revenue, solidifying ABC‘s position as a made-for-television powerhouse.  But the White House 
also benefited from the film, not only from the perspective of Reagan‘s reelection in 1984, but 
also in terms of how the media staff gained control of the nuclear fear by making officials more 
accessible through network television news. Even though the film was and still is the most 
graphic in terms of network television nuclear history in the United States, it resulted in a media 
maelstrom constructed by networks, the White House, and the media writ large.  In conclusion, 
the legacy of The Day After was more important than its story.  
The next chapter will focus on the Western European reaction to the nuclear imagery 
pouring out of American popular culture. This reaction resulted in the BBC‘s presentation of 
Threads, a postapocalyptic made-for-television film that, for many viewers around the globe, 
made The Day After appear optimistic and cartoonish compared to the brutal realism shown to 
British audiences. Additionally, unlike any American-made network nuclear movie, Threads 
included an exploration of the theory of nuclear winter, a dire forecast that predicted an 
inhabitable planet in the event of global nuclear war. 
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 Chapter Four:  The Great Arms Debate, Threads, and Nuclear Winter Theory 
In an urban society everything connects, each person‘s needs are fed by the skills for 
many others, our lives are woven together in a fabric, but the connections that make 
society strong also make it vulnerable.
226
 
In 1984, BBC World Enterprises aired the made-for-television film, Threads, a fictional 
―documentary‖ that unrelentingly tackled the subject of nuclear war. Similar to its American 
counterpart The Day After, Threads focused on the effects of nuclear war on ordinary citizens. 
Yet the teleplay was dissimilar in that it relies heavily on the environmental breakdown for two 
generations after World War III. Due to its graphic realism and shocking intensity, Threads came 
closer than any other film to representing the full horrors of nuclear war and its aftermath on 
television. Moreover, politically, the film captured the mood of the Western European peace 
movement and the reaction of Reaganism by the political left. The title referred to the 
interdependency of the various and assorted elements that construct society and the vulnerable 
links that can easily be severed and ultimately destroyed. Although the scope of the global 
response to Reaganism is beyond the parameters of this study, the BBC‘s production of Threads 
suggests a shared nuclear anxiety that mirrored American fears.  
Compared to American television atomic dramas of the eighties, the BBC offered a 
distinctively different approach to the made-for-television nuclear theme. Even though the 
narrative of Threads resembled The Day After, this teleplay demonstrated that American network 
television relegated atomic dramas to a specific format that either adhered to total nuclear 
destruction or offered some space for optimism about a world after nuclear war. In comparison, 
the BBC presented a nuclear drama that fearlessly forecasted ordinary citizens navigating an 
atomic world without any government resources, information, civil aid, or even help from 
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family. For all the civil defense planning of the post-atomic world, the story examines how the 
ordinary lives of people are helpless to the effects of nuclear war. This comparison with 
American network television is important, in that Reagan tried to present nuclear weapons as 
analogous with American expectionalism, while the BBC‘s made-for-television movie 
challenges the U.S. ideal of survival and critiques American nuclear policy. 
This chapter does not profess to examine the entirety of postwar and atomic British 
broadcasting. It does, however, provide an examination of how British television framed a 
renewed interest in nuclear weapons in the context of growing NATO militarism. Such an 
examination offers important insight into the national discourse generated by the Reagan 
administration. One of the reasons to examine the BBC production of Threads is to establish a 
framework for understanding the complicated interplay between broadcasting and government. 
As other television scholars have argued, the first ―generation‖ of twentieth-century mass media 
was inextricably linked to national identities, histories, and political orthodoxy. For the BBC‘s 
viewers, as well as members of the antinuclear movement that grew in numbers throughout 
Reagan‘s first term, the film demonstrated British vulnerability of being an NATO ally. The 
specter of World War II lingers large in this teleplay, because it visually reminds its viewers of 
the destruction rendered by the Nazis and the so-carefully-crafted forty years of uneasy postwar 
peace. This chapter argues that Threads, in comparison with The Day After, presented a more 
graphically disturbing and pessimistic narrative that placed American foreign policy as the 
reason for the nuclear war. Unlike the ABC-TV network‘s repeated claims of presenting an 
apolitical story of nuclear war survivors, the BBC‘s commitment to graphic realism, from the 
physical landscape to the effect on humanity, suggests the network did use the film as visual 
critique and commentary on American Cold War policy. Additionally, just as American 
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audiences never knew ―what side‖ started the nuclear exchange, in Threads, British audiences 
were told that escalating nuclear tensions were mounting in the Middle East due to an American 
showdown with the Soviet Union over oil. 
 This chapter begins with an examination of how American network television news 
presented the precarious position of Western European countries in the midst of scheduled 
nuclear weapon deployments. In order to understand how American audiences understood this 
geopolitical problem, I start with an analysis of an April 1983 CBS news special entitled ―The 
Great Nuclear Arms Debate,‖ which presented an international panel of leaders discussing the 
U.S. deployment of nuclear hardware into Western Europe. This special, hosted by retired CBS 
anchor Walter Cronkite, attempted to situate American nuclear policy in global terms. 
Throughout the news special, the audience sees a similar generational divide amongst 
international leaders that reflects domestic politics. 
  More than any other made-for-television program of its time, Threads provides the most 
visually terrifying imagery depicting life in a postapocalyptic world. This dedication to graphic 
realism is demonstrated through the documentary-style editing as well as the story, which shows 
the effects of nuclear fallout and radiation up to three generations after the nuclear war. This 
chapter also argues that Threads became such an important film because it captured the 
immediacy and vulnerability that many citizens of Western Europe felt as the Reagan era began 
and the commitment to rebuild the NATO nuclear arsenal intensified. Moreover, by examining 
the content of the film, I compare Threads with its American counterpart The Day After, 
broadcast almost one year earlier and shown on the BBC. This comparison is needed for a 
variety of reasons, but most importantly because it underscores how The Day After did not 
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capture the types of social and political decay demonstrated in Threads. In addition, the BBC 
version included many of the environmental effects proffered by the theory of nuclear winter.   
Before the appearance of nuclear winter theory, most postapocalyptic narratives focused 
on the immediate aftermath of nuclear war, such as physical and emotional reactions, as much as 
the search for resources. Threads stood out as a made-for-television docudrama that integrates 
this doomsday scenario of nuclear winter into the narrative. Moreover, the narrative offers an 
unique insight into the postapocalyptic world by demonstrating how World War III would affect 
the people living this radiation-laden existence for three generations into the future. Not only 
does the film provide a ―realistic‖ counter-narrative for post-survivalist films such as Mad Max, 
the Terminator series, or the voluminous number of B-movie science-fiction films that depict 
futuristic urban combats, but it also situates the ―post-survivalists‖ as victims, not heroes. In 
addition, in comparison with The Day After, the BBC‘s production of the documentary-nuclear 
melodrama is also intricately tied with England‘s position as a country potentially caught in the 
crosshairs of a third world war.  
Finally, one needs to place the film within the larger context of Reaganism and 
Thatcherism to understand how, even when faced with social and political opposition, the 
reigning ideology was conservative in scope. Accordingly, a number of nations encountered 
conservative social and economic movements, most notably occurring in Great Britain, the 
United States and Canada. With antinuclear activism more pronounced in Western Europe as a 
result of the proposed U.S. deployment of new nuclear hardware into the region, citizens across 
the continent began to re-imagine the legacies of the Second World War, as well as to forecast 
their countries as potential casualties of a superpower showdown. In this capacity, the narrative 
of Threads was much more incendiary than American network made-for-television dramas. 
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Additionally, television continued to invoke nuclear anxieties by presenting these fictional, yet 
realistic, accounts, which did not have the political effects anticipated by pundits but did possess 
the visual imagery to terrify a new generation with the horrors of living in a nuclear world. 
The Great Nuclear Arms Debate 
The idea that Western Europe was caught in the middle of a larger ideological war 
between the superpowers was a topic discussed in both the public and private spheres. On 
American network television, in April 1983, CBS presented The Great Nuclear Arms Debate, 
where long-beloved anchorman Walter Cronkite hosted a ninety-minute discussion with neither a 
live-in-studio audience nor celebrities, just former and current politicians, to discuss the building 
and deployment of new NATO military installations in Western Europe, such as the Cruise and 
Pershing II missiles. The scope of the CBS news special was an attempt to clarify the positions 
for and against the scheduled U.S. deployment of new nuclear hardware into Western Europe 
and to help the American audience understand the immediacy of this controversial event. In his 
opening remarks on the program, Cronkite explained Reagan‘s zero-zero option, meaning the 
Americans would remove all nuclear hardware only if the Russians did. The Soviet Union 
rejected this negotiation tactic, and as Cronkite stated, ―Europe is once again, as it has been since 
1946, stuck in the middle.‖227  The program began with a brief history of the Cold War shown 
through visual images from the Second World War, to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, up to 
the issue of the great American nuclear triad. The four experts discussing the issue of American 
military deployment were Henry Kissinger, Michael Heseltine, Egon Bahr, and Paul Warnke, 
former member of the U.S. Department of Defense. All four panelists were experienced 
members of U.S.-USSR relations and negotiations.  
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According to the news special, the creation of the Pershing II missile meant it would take 
eight minutes for U.S. nuclear warheads to reach the Soviet Union, and since the Cruise aircraft 
flew under radar, it was conceivable that a nuclear war would begin and end in a matter of 
minutes.
228
 Heseltine, secretary of state under British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who 
was more popularly known as a self-made-millionaire status and a leading politician in the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, stated that the United States should proceed with new 
weapons in Europe. Borrowing from the horrors of World War II, he insisted that the Soviet 
Union posed an aggressive, expansive threat to the West, and that the best policy in defending 
against the Soviet Union was NATO military strength, which had kept Western Europe safe 
since the Second World War.  
Panelist and Social Democrat Egon Bahr, live via satellite from West Germany, offered 
the dissenting opinion on U.S. plans for more effective nuclear weaponry at the literal front of 
the Iron Curtain. In his public declarations, he described the precarious position of Germans in 
terms of both NATO and the Soviet Union. According to his data, 86 percent of West Germans 
favored NATO, and 65 percent of people opposed the new NATO arms in West Germany. Bahr 
went on to explain that the West German people would be the first to be damaged in any 
skirmish between NATO and the Soviet Union in Europe, not the United States.
229
 The extent of 
Soviet nuclear capabilities was also discussed and debated amongst the panelists, concluding 
with a consensus that more negotiation between NATO and the Soviet Union was needed, but 
not if it made the United States appear weak in the eyes of the USSR.  
By all given accounts, the news special did little to inform the public or explain any real 
insight into NATO‘s position on the ―growing Soviet arsenal.‖ In his closing remarks, Cronkite 
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said he would leave the outcome of the debate up to the audience and perhaps to history.
230
 The 
use of seasoned politicians who spoke in dry, complicated jargon, coupled with the absence of 
audience participation precluded real audience participation among the panelists in the dialogue 
over NATO nuclear deployment. Furthermore, even the appearance of Walter Cronkite was not 
enough to gain widespread viewership, as the special was crushed by ABC‘s successful Saturday 
night prime-time lineup of The Love Boat and Fantasy Island. Interestingly, the special was aired 
on the BBC4 during its Nuclear Week, which aired the last week of May 1983, and it also 
received a great deal of criticism there for its political exclusivity. Professor and CND member 
Michael Pentz wrote of the program, ―This non-debate showed yet again that the exclusion of 
serious critics of NATO policy from ‗the nuclear debate‘ is depriving the public of its right to 
know and judge an issue of vital importance to its security and survival.‖231  
Like the American networks, the BBC also began directing full attention to nuclear-
themed dramas and news shows, and incorporated the theme in broadcast programming. As in 
the United States, British public opinion was very much divided on the issues of nuclear 
weapons, the role of President Reagan, and NATO. In data collected after the BBC‘s 
presentation of The Day After, British audiences overwhelmingly agreed that the United States 
should not deploy new weapons into Western Europe, but also did not trust that the Soviet Union 
was open to negotiations. Furthermore, the BBC did not offer a full investigation into the 
growing public objections against these weapons, but instead presented the movement against 
nuclear weapons, Thatcher, and Reagan as docile, feminine, and idealistic.
232
 The BBC presented 
the antinuclear movement, even when it staged demonstrations on NATO military bases, as 
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peaceful and undisruptive. This perhaps represented the conservative tone of both broadcast 
networks and the policies of the governments for which they serve. Along with Ronald Reagan, 
Margaret Thatcher helped to alter Great Britain‘s political landscape by becoming more 
conservative, market-driven, and capitalistic in scope. Thatcher joined Reagan in his assault on 
big government, unions, and social welfare programs. Many critics in both the U.S. and Great 
Britain feared the conservatism that both countries exhibited on a political level, as well as the 
lack of space on television for counter-narrative or oppositional objections to policy makers.
233
 
However, in a larger context, network television continuously covered the Cold War 
through the most immediate of mediums and also transformed the ways in which audiences 
imaged the postapocalyptic landscape. The BBC production of Threads was not the first time the 
network depicted the immediate aftermath of nuclear war. At the height of the Cold War, Peter 
Watkins produced, directed, and wrote the teleplay The War Game in 1965. Employing a 
documentary style, including newsreels and interviews, the film depicts the chaotic devastation 
of a nuclear strike. The War Game reminds the audience that it is a preconceived narrative of 
possible events; however, the film stresses that an initial nuclear blast has already happened, 
without warning or without explanation. The film was famously banned by sponsors who 
described the teleplay as ―too horrifying for the medium of broadcasting.‖234 
The format of The War Game offered a documentary-style account of events 
approximately four months after a Soviet nuclear strike. The film placed Great Britain as a 
casualty in the Cold War as the Soviet Union has joined forces with Communists in China, 
Vietnam, and Eastern Europe in a demonstration of Communist solidarity around the globe. 
Similar to the real events of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union demanded the immediate 
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withdrawal of NATO forces in Western Europe, and after a superpower showdown, the Soviet 
Union, believing the United States has already launched a preemptive strike, decided to use its 
nuclear arsenal against Britain. The controversy surrounding the realism depicted in both The 
War Game and Threads demonstrates the complicated interplay between government, corporate 
sponsorship, and the medium of television. These two BBC made-for-television films 
contributed to the larger representation of the Cold War during the 1980s. Reagan‘s commitment 
to combating Communism, coupled with the struggling Soviet Union, created a renewed interest 
in atomic culture and nuclear destruction, which produced atomic narratives on British television 
as well as in America.  
Threads: Nuclear Horror for a New Generation 
The film was set in the industrial town of Sheffield, England, a predominantly working-
class town where people worried more about the economic downturn of postwar Britain than the 
antinuclear movement. Furthermore, the characters in the film were completely unaware of the 
daunting military stalemates that threatened their existence. The plot revolved around two 
working-class families, the Becketts and the Kemps, struggling to survive in the aftermath of a 
third world war. The audience is first introduced to Ruth Beckett and James Kemp and their 
respective families. Like The Day After, the teleplay examines the minutiae of their lives while 
also demonstrating that the British families are just as dependent on television to receive and 
interpret the international news. As the audience meets the young couple, Ruth and James, they 
are parked on a scenic cliff overlooking Sheffield. While they discuss the kinds of intimate issues 
that are the domain of young, restless youths, the audience hears an announcement on the radio 
discussing a military standoff in the Middle East. As the camera fades away, the audience knows 
that the starling news report did not alter the romantic plans of the young couple. Soon after, as 
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the military standoff in the Middle East escalates, viewers learn that Ruth is pregnant, and the 
young couple discusses this new personal crisis. 
Unknown to the majority of the population of Sheffield, the town, situated approximately 
seventeen miles from the Royal Air Force base, doubles as a government communication center 
and in all likelihood could be a military target. The audience has learned, through a voice-over 
narrator similar to Walter Cronkite, that Soviet tanks had entered Iran, its motives unknown, but 
most likely to prevent Western oil supplies from the leaving the region. These military scenes 
provided an interesting and revealing juxtaposition between television news and ordinary, daily 
life. Even the reporter‘s warning of impending war, and news reports issuing an alarming amount 
of unrest, made little difference to the residences of Sheffield, particularly to the newly pregnant 
Ruth. This commentary on both the dependence of postwar British viewers on television for 
framing complicated military issues as well as the intimation that people are too self-involved 
also mirrored the apathy of Americans. 
Compared to The Day After, in which the viewer is never made aware why the nuclear 
war begins, the British audience is kept abreast of the unfolding military standoff. Because of 
this slew of news disseminating from the television, much of the dialogue in the first part of the 
film demonstrates ordinary citizens attempting to discern and discuss the imminent war. The 
Kemp family discusses whether they need to get supplies from the store, or whether it is possible 
to build makeshift shelters as instructed in the nationally distributed manual ―Protect and 
Survive,‖ covering British civil defense measures. Simultaneously, panic erupts in the streets, 
creating an atmosphere of lawlessness. During this part of the film, the audience watches British 
bureaucrats, responsible for the managing emergency measures. The chief executives of 
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Sheffield make arrangements with other local officials to invoke emergency accident plans, but it 
becomes clear that the officials had begun to panic.  
The director of the film, Mick Jackson, deliberately juxtaposes the personal with the 
political issues of nuclear war. The ―primary‖ plot of the film depicts characters coping with the 
aftermath of nuclear war; however, the ―background‖ of the film consists of the international 
events, which provide the dramatic tension for the film. The documentary-style filming and 
editing added not only to the interconnection between the personal and the political, but to the 
line between fact and fiction. As in The Day After, the audience awaits the bombing to begin, 
even though the characters seem unaware and ill prepared for the impending global war. Several 
scenes contain elements that anticipate the shock of the bomb; whistles scream, alarms rumble, 
the sound of aircraft overhead, the ferocious jolt of a tea kettle. But all of this non-diagetic 
sound, dramatic techniques were employed to arouse the tension and anticipation for the 
audience. Jackson‘s decision to delay the initial attack and instead interweave a personal and 
political narrative also provided an opportunity for subtle political and social commentary. First, 
it underscored how easily political events might spiral out of control. Threads does not skirt 
around superpower tensions that were prevalent in the Middle East during the early 1980s. 
Secondly, the film revealed that even though international events were reported by networks and 
every possible media outlet, the characters were still more involved with their own lives than in 
world events. However, after the bomb, the political aftermath rapidly overwhelms the personal 
narrative of the characters. 
The bomb sequence in Threads is quite extraordinary. The scene begins with the 
electronic brightening of the screen followed by a series of quick shots, all filmed in complete 
silence, another dramatic style, intended to terrify and captivate the audience, until the last blast 
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wave hits in a deafening explosion. According to Jackson, he relied on stock footage of nuclear 
weapon tests to heighten the realism of the film. Although the bomb sequence was horrific, it 
paled in comparison to the postwar scenes, which become increasingly harder to watch due to its 
visually wretched atomic landscape. After the nuclear bombs are employed, Ruth leaves her 
parents in a futile attempt to find James, the father of her unborn child, who perished instantly in 
the explosion. As she walks around the radioactive rubble, the audience observes the devastation 
through Ruth‘s eyes. She sees, as the audience vicariously experiences, burning buildings, 
scorched survivors, rubble covered in gray smoke, saturated in permeating radioactive haze. 
Ruth remains the audiences‘ guide through this postapocalyptic world. The audience experiences 
the devastation of her hometown and breakdown of moral order when neighbors are 
unrecognizable and officials are no longer present. It is through the character of Ruth that 
Jackson demonstrates how immediate and irreversible life would become in a post-nuclear 
world. 
The film continues ten years after the nuclear war. In a sense, Threads illustrates the 
nuclear trajectory of three generations and explores how each generation confronted different 
nuclear obstacles. The first generation, the Kemp parents, represented the first Cold War 
generation: those who had survived World War II and the onslaught of German air raids, 
suffering the immediate effects on sustained conventional bombings. Ironically, the older 
generation, who had survived the physical assault of the Second World War, would quickly die 
after the initial attack of World War III. The second generation, who were indeed the principal 
protagonists, were born into an established nuclear world; the main character Ruth personifies 
the nuclear anxieties of the Reagan era and has to survive in this new environment characterized 
by the fatal aftereffects of nuclear poisoning, such as cancers, freezing climatic temperatures, and 
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starvation. The story of the third generation, which included Ruth‘s daughter, was arguably the 
most frightening. Over ten years after World War III, the surroundings of Sheffield are 
redesigned and resemble a primitive Europe, peppered with illustrate savages who exhibit little 
linguistic ability, with no semblance of culture, society, or family, and who lacked the 
communication skills necessary to bond with one another. Nuclear fallout and the inescapable 
climatic harshness cursed this third generation. Jackson leaves the audiences wondering if a 
fourth or final generation, in which the audience only sees a glimpse, was already doomed, 
grotesquely disfigured, will have little chance of survival. 
One of the more remarkable features of the teleplay is its interest in the physical 
environment and the fate of the natural world after a nuclear war. Central to the narrative was the 
dramatization of the severe climactic changes wrought by nuclear fallout. According to the 
research of contemporary scientists, such as those involved in the TTAPS study, the earth would 
be ravaged by firestorms, irreversible climatic changes, and contamination of its food and water 
supply would be contaminated. Accordingly, this teleplay was not a disaster or apocalyptic 
movie nor was it the work of science-fiction fantasy. As the credits revealed, many scientists as 
well as academics were consulted in order to make the film as scientifically accurate as possible. 
This included integrating the theories postulated by nuclear winter theorists such as Carl Sagan. 
Jackson was careful to include ―nuclear winter‖ theory into his depiction of 
postapocalyptic life. Unlike The Day After, this film explored both the environmental and 
humanistic aspects of nuclear war up to ten years after the war. Screenwriter Barry Hines 
incorporated many of the environmental torrents forecasted by nuclear scientists. In the 
landscape illustrated by Hines and Jackson, the postapocalyptic world was characterized by a 
decline in temperature to merely twenty-five degrees Fahrenheit. Sunlight could not penetrate the 
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armor of dust and smoke that covered the atmosphere. Not only did the survivors of the nuclear 
holocaust have to traverse the freezing, dark, radiation-laden physical terrain, but they also had 
to process the psychological imbalance that would follow such a horrific scenario. As a result, 
life became a quest for sustenance, for basic necessities, a far cry from the modern conveniences 
of postwar England.  
The filmmakers wanted to offer a realistic portrayal not only of the destruction and death 
caused by nuclear war, but also the effects on social structures, particularly the family. Hines 
contended: 
There would be survivors of course. But many would have hideous, untreated injuries, 
and then there would be sort of Third-World-cum-medieval peasant agriculture. There 
could be barter, learning of manual skills, a new language among kids because there 
wouldn‘t be the standardizing influence of schools, newspapers, and television. And I 
can‘t imagine loving parents. As soon as kids were big enough, they would work and 
fend for themselves. The generation that would follow would be brutal, stunted both 
physically, emotionally, and mentally. There has been a rather optimistic belief 
maintained by officials in Europe and America that after the first few weeks‘ survivors 
are going to come out of their shelter, gung-ho, like the Seven Dwarfs with picks over 
their shoulders and set off to work to rebuild Britain. But even after the bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when the Allies poured money to rebuild the cities, there was 
no psychological improvement for survivors. 
235
 
 
This commentary, explicitly stated by the writer of the teleplay, indicates his interest in the 
growing threat of nuclear war as well as an understanding of the nuclear freeze movement and 
the power of narrative television. His focus was on exposing the postwar atomic mythology that 
surviving a nuclear war was possible with the aid of a civil defense pamphlet issued by the 
government.  Furthermore, this exploration of the third generation of a postapocalyptic society 
was  a new display of atomic culture. As the third generation grew older in the harsh and 
unimaginable environment, in which Ruth‘s daughter became a scavenger with little 
communication skills, the audience witnessed what it must be like for these forgotten children. 
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Unlike Ruth, who, after surviving a nuclear war, bonded with her newborn baby even in the 
midst of cataclysmic destruction, , Ruth‘s daughter, in one of the most horrific scenes in the 
entire film, could not bear to face her badly disfigured, stillborn child. The rejection of her 
daughter, one critic argued, ―[s]uggests a deterioration of the line of human continuity. Radiation 
from the bombs has attacked the most delicate thread that ties civilization together: the line 
between one generation and the next.‖236 She did not possess maternal instincts of any kind, and 
it was the utter lack of humanity, and lack of natural communication instincts, that the 
filmmakers underscored in this scene. Humanity and civilization was lost forever.  
Unlike The Day After, the BBC production of Threads confronted the topic of nuclear 
war and its aftermath with an unrelenting commitment to scientific realism. Both films were 
―docudramas‖ that purported to illustrate the ―stark realism‖ of nuclear war. Yet the 
documentary-style production employed by the creators of Threads, including the use of grainy 
film stock of U.S. atomic explosions, the incorporation of print news as a narration device with 
the inclusion of statistical information and typewriter sound effects, and also the news reporter 
voice-over narration, proved more effective in presenting a realistic portrayal of life after nuclear 
war.  
Yet it was not only the documentary style of Threads, or simply the film‘s commitment 
to scientific realism, that provided the film with its credibility. The differences between these 
two films were also linked by the varying emphasis on melodramatic elements in the respective 
parts of the story set before and after the nuclear exchange. In each film, before the onslaught of 
nuclear explosions, the audience was asked to identify with the daily minutiae of everyday life, 
such as marriage, pregnancy, family skirmishes, and even the daily expenses of living. Once this 
identification is secure with the viewers, the central characters were shown to suffer and die, left 
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the audience to feel even more emotion about this nuclear scenario. Jackson developed a 
compelling fictional story by depicting the effects of nuclear war on two middle-class suburban 
families in England, most central being the character of Ruth, whom the audience meets on the 
precipice of discovering her pregnancy. She becomes the only character in Threads to survive 
the nuclear war. Nicholas Meyer, the director of The Day After, also wanted to depict the effects 
of nuclear war on ordinary people, but he chose to do so via the emotional route of lack of 
official communication. Meyer allowed the audience to receive the same information about the 
impending war just as the major characters learned of the news in the narrative. He wanted to 
condition the audience to feel the same sense of imminent danger that the characters felt. By 
contrast, in Threads, the audience knowingly anticipated the nuclear war as they are told through 
the device of news facsimile of the escalating problems occurring in the Persian Gulf. After the 
nuclear attack, Jackson maintained only one character that would survive and focused on Ruth‘s 
postapocalyptic, lonely existence. Essentially, the post-attack portion of Threads became a story 
about humanity‘s struggle to survive, as opposed to The Day After‘s struggle to find other 
survivors and symbols of civilization. 
The director‘s emotional assault on the audience continues well after the initial nuclear 
blast. He used graphic imagery to depict the physical devastation on the landscape while also 
playing close attention to the devastating impact on the human body. Jackson showed the effects 
of radiation poisoning on the bodies of the characters. In comparison, The Day After director 
Nicholas Meyer also represented the harmful effects of radiation poisoning on the human body 
but in a much less overt manner. Similarly, although both made-for-television movies show a 
nuclear blast, The Day After offered the following glimmer of hope to the film: ―The catastrophic 
events you have witnessed are, in all likelihood, less severe than the destruction that would 
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actually occur in the event of a full nuclear strike against the United States.‖237 Alternatively, in 
Threads, while there was never any doubt that the imagery presented was diluted or dramatized, 
the representations serve as the visual and narrative counterpart to contemporary ideas on nuclear 
winter theory.  
Another interesting point of comparison between The Day After and Threads lay in their 
depictions of the continuation of life after war. The Day After focuses on the immediate 
aftermath of nuclear war—chaos, lawlessness, a lack of communication with the government, 
and health issues.  The television audience sees the impact of nuclear war on the characters‘ 
lives, and because the scope of the narrative extends only a few weeks into the future after the 
war, the audience is forced to consider the question of the destruction of human civilization and 
humanity. But in Threads, given its generational structure, the audience has no choice but to 
watch how civilization and humans would forage, scramble, and fight to survive in a 
postapocalyptic world. The audience watches not only how the characters navigate through this 
new nuclear-infected world, but also the interworking of human relationships. The Day After 
offered a glimpse of the aftermath on a few individual archetypical characters—the doctor, the 
farmer, the professor, and a nine-month-pregnant woman, but they are all removed from the 
chaos to some degree. In a sense, The Day After invites the viewer to identify with the multiple 
ways in which one of these characters reacts to nuclear war. In contrast, Threads offers the 
audience unflinching views of the long-term effects of nuclear war and forced the viewers to 
consider the lengths one might go in terms of survival.  
Both films investigate the question of human struggle and self-preservation in a 
postapocalyptic world. But unlike The Day After, Threads offered little hope for the future. This 
was a counter-narrative to the Reagan mediations on nuclear deterrence through proliferation. 
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Threads presented the wellspring of antinuclear activists of Western European citizens caught 
uncomfortably in the crosshairs of a nuclear showdown between the superpowers, which was 
ongoing since 1945 but had roots even further back through the entire twentieth century. This 
representation of nuclear winter theory was much more aligned with scientists, ecologists, and 
even activist academics such as Carl Sagan. He quipped, ―Threads is everything The Day After 
promised but didn‘t deliver.‖238 In the conclusion of Threads, humans would have to adapt to the 
new environmental realities, and that devolution of civilization and society would create 
significant changes in human behavior. The loss of culture, loss of language, a return to a 
gathering, nomadic culture, and the inability to connect with a maternal instinct all symbolized 
the transition from a pre-nuclear world to the post-nuclear world. If The Day After offered the 
optimistic, American, sanitized version of life after nuclear war, then Threads was the 
pessimistic, BBC, Western European response to The Day After. 
 Because Threads was a BBC production, it received little American network news 
coverage. The New York Times simply issued a warning to viewers about the graphic content of 
the film after the cable station TBS, owned by CNN/Headline News juggernaut Ted Turner, 
announced it would air the film in early 1985.
239
 Yet contemporary commentary also made it 
clear that the film had a tremendous impact on audiences, both British and American alike. 
According to one measure of reception, examining rating figures, Threads garnered nearly seven 
million viewers in England, approximately 14 percent of the population, when the film was 
originally broadcast on the BBC. Many British viewers, prior to watching Threads, watched The 
Day After, which aired in Britain soon after it was broadcast in the United States. It premiered 
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December 10, 1983, on the Independent Television channel, a growing cable outlet that 
consistently received high ratings. Additionally, nearly 63 percent of Thread‘s viewers claimed 
they had also watched The Day After. Perhaps as a result on this audience overlap, numerous 
studies inquired into how audiences‘ reacted to nuclear blasts on television and tried to explain 
how it affected the average viewer. 
According to one study, of the 63 percent of viewers who tuned in for both nuclear 
apocalypse made-for-television movies, eight out of ten reported that Threads was the better 
film. Among those who preferred Threads, seven out of ten claimed that the American version 
was too ―glossy‖ and that Threads was more believable. Barry Hines, the writer of Threads, 
suggested that British audiences found The Day After too ―American‖ because it ―portrayed an 
American experience.‖240 Instead, British audiences responded more favorably to both the 
realism and the narrative‘s attention to scientific accuracy and detail. Furthermore, British 
audiences applauded the director‘s decision to use unknown actors rather than the parade of stars 
that made up the cast of The Day After.  
Kim Newman, in his analysis of the film in terms of nuclear dramas, argued that Threads 
was far more overtly political than The Day After. The narrative engages a number of different 
political themes, such as Ruth‘s interaction with nuclear freeze activists, workers on strike due to 
the decline of oil production in the Middle East, and the civil defense measures offered by the 
government. The film also criticizes the inability of the local government of Sheffield to handle 
the gravity of a situation should a nuclear bomb detonate. Newman wrote, ―we see county 
councilors in their bunker beneath the townhall, failing to keep the city running and finally dying 
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of radiation poisoning.‖241 Furthermore, a torrent of lawlessness and anarchy pervades the town 
and countryside, which includes looters executed for stealing food, military personnel 
abandoning their duties to form rogue militia groups to scavenge for food, and armed guards 
ready to shoot any citizen who attempts to steal supplies. The emphasis on the utter anarchy and 
incivility of ordinary people is not seen to this graphic extent in The Day After. Such scenes of 
chaos and desperation illustrated that the national government‘s plans and the infrastructure 
could not protect, much less provide for its citizenry in the case of a nuclear attack. This open 
criticism that the elected officials and other bureaucrats would also perish is aligned with the 
nuclear freeze movement. 
Any made-for-television social melodrama that purported to confront ―realistic‖ and 
―controversial‖ topics was likely to be attacked and heralded by all sides of the political 
spectrum. Also, because these topics were framed on television, the language of the issue also 
became democratized in the public sphere. Thus, films are inherently political as they work as 
conduits for disseminating national political issues. Despite the obvious political message of 
Threads, the executives in charge of production, as did the creators of The Day After, claimed the 
movie was apolitical. Barry Hines, the film‘s writer, attempted to clarify the film‘s murky 
message by saying, ―[the film] wasn‘t propaganda. It was even handed.‖242  Viewers were also 
asked if their political opinions changed after they watched Threads, and eight out of ten viewers 
reported the film did not alter their political ideals. Only one in twenty said that the film made 
them believe that nuclear disarmament was the answer, and interestingly, only a small number of 
                                                 
241
 Newman, Apocalypse Movies, 237.  
242
 Quotation from Barry Hines, interview by Paul Binnon, http://www.the-snu.co.uk/threads2.htm. 
176 
 
 
the viewers surveyed claimed they were frightened by the film or that they felt compelled to 
become more politically active. 
243
 
Even though it is difficult to gauge reception and the impact Threads made on its 
viewers, we can attempt to access the result by examining what viewers recall or have written 
about the film. Retrospectively, Internet viewers have mused on how this British television event 
changed their lives. Many recalled that the original broadcast of the film made an indelible 
imprint on their lives, which suggests that the film maintains its political and cultural relevancy 
today. Comments on Internet Movie Database typify the effects the film had and, in some cases, 
still have on its viewers. Many of these comments originated from viewers in Sheffield, England, 
where the film takes place, as well as viewers from the United States, where the film had 
acquired somewhat of a cult following:  
I remember, like most of my friends, seeing this film on TV when I was younger. We all 
got back to school the next day and the whole place was awash with talk of Threads. 
Seeing places destroyed where you actually go, like the scene on the Moor where the 
shoppers go into panic at the sound of the siren, and saying ―I was there on Saturday,‖ 
Woah! People really were scared that it could happen at any time. The scary thing is I 
suppose it could.
244
 
 
Nothing on television has disturbed me as much as THREADS. There is so much shock 
to the viewer in this docu-drama that it‘s difficult to pick the most disturbing aspect of 
this nuclear holocaust scenario … The reason THREADS wins over its rivals for the 
crown of ―Nuclear Holocaust King‖ is its depiction of The Nuclear Winter, though it‘s 
done rather unsuccessfully by sticking a dark filter over the camera, but at least it‘s 
mentioned in depth unlike the awful THE DAY AFTER, and unlike TDA we‘re shown 
the months and years after the war where the survivors have to cope with an ozone layer 
or coherent language. These survivors are truly the unlucky ones.
245
 
 
Threads is one of the most powerful, important movies ever made … This movie will 
stay with you for the rest of your life. Some of the images are so haunting that you might 
easily get nightmares from them … Anyway, I recommend seeing this movie, and if you 
go to local church, school, or university,  see it as often as possible. It‘s just stupendous, 
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and it‘s more important than anything else that people be aware of the issues raised 
here.
246
 
These ordinary reviewers are significant for a number of reasons. All of those who respond in 
hindsight to the film are doing so almost twenty years after the initial broadcast. This suggested 
that the film has tremendous cultural and political significance. Furthermore, using views by 
ordinary audiences also speaks to the film‘s attempt at authenticity and realism. Threads focus 
on ordinary people‘s reaction to the horrific nightmare of nuclear war, and the ways in which it 
continues to resonate with viewers around the world is significant. As opposed to focusing on 
exclusively high-brow criticism, these ordinary, unsolicited recollections of the film offer a more 
interesting perspective on not only the atomic imagination and memory, but also the power of the 
television medium. The majority of the comments posted on Internet Movie Database are 
positive readings of the film. However, unless specifically stated, we cannot assume all viewers 
watched the original broadcast of Threads in Britain in 1984. Many reviewers admitted watching 
Threads at home on VHS, again demonstrating the changing dynamics of technology, politics, 
and culture.  
Because the film relied on documentary style for framing the precipice of nuclear war, 
the stalemate in the Persian Gulf between the Soviet Union and the United States, many of the 
viewers expressed their political opinions because of the political imagery in Threads. One 
reviewer claimed the film served as a cautionary tale to British policy makers, urging them to 
find alternative sources for fuel, such as hydroelectric power or windmills. Another reviewer 
aligned more closely with conservatives, agreeing that the narrative mirrored a genuinely 
aggressive and expansive Soviet Union that was using its occupation of Afghanistan to get to the 
Persian Gulf. Yet regardless of whether viewers interpreted this film as propaganda for the right 
or the left, it is striking how many viewers warned that even in the post–Cold War era, nuclear 
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war is still imminent. If for no other reason, many ordinary citizens of the United States and 
Britain received this film as politically significant rather than a simple, celluloid relic of Cold 
War drama. 
Nuclear Winter Theory 
For many viewers, Threads represents the most graphic of postapocalyptic films. Its 
attention to scientific detail and graphic realism, as well as the filmmaker‘s decision to depict life 
for more than ten years after World War III, presented the untold yet essential story of the 
survivors of a nuclear holocaust. Threads illustrates that no amount of preparation or ideology or 
government structure can repair society one the threads become loose. There can be no 
redemption in a post-apocalyptic society. The objective of Threads is to show that humanity and 
the world would not survive the nuclear winter. 
Before the appearance of nuclear winter theory, most analysts who seriously studied the 
effects of nuclear weapons understood that there would be many unanticipated impacts. For 
example, in the aftermath of the atomic explosions on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists 
discovered that the atomic radiation unleashed by the detonation had unforeseen effects on 
human reproduction and genetics. After the 1954 testing of the hydrogen bomb in the Pacific 
Ocean left Japanese fishermen, scientists found that these fishermen as well as Micronesian 
islanders, infected with radioactive fallout. These events caused public concern and even led to 
the first significant arms control treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States, known 
as the Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of 1963. Furthermore, a 1975 research report sponsored 
by the U.S. government revealed that a series of nuclear explosions had the potential to deplete 
the ozone layer, thus exposing the earth to an uninhabitable amount of ultraviolent radiation from 
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the sun.
247
 Yet even with burgeoning scientific evidence emerging on these and other 
unpredictable effects of nuclear war, the Reagan administration did not integrate this theory into 
their policies on nuclear war.  
Even before the dire predictions of nuclear winter theory became part of the official 
discourse on the post-nuclear world, U.S. government-sponsored studies produced back in the 
late 1970s had made bleak predictions of the likely scenario following a nuclear attack. 
According to one study, ―of the 70,000 people in this area during the non-working hours, there 
will be virtually no survivors. Fatalities during working hours in this business district would 
undoubtedly be much higher … Individual residences in this region will be totally destroyed, 
with only foundations and basements remaining.‖248 Though this quotation sounds much like a 
scene from Threads, this description of unforeseen nuclear devastation comes from the 1979 
report entitled The Effects of Nuclear War. At the bequest of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, the Office of Technology Assessment published this report to explore the possibilities 
surrounding a nuclear attack on both the United States and the Soviet Union. The purpose of this 
report was to provide the needed information for policy makers, including predictions of what 
levels of devastation nuclear weapons would cause for citizens. According to the OTA‘s acting 
director, Daniel De Simone, this study intended to provide a more comprehensive account of the 
effects of nuclear war than what had been reported to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations a few years earlier. The report also attempted to answer questions raised in a 1975 
report, Long-Term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear-Weapons Detonations, which 
                                                 
247
 Long Term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear-Weapons Detonations (Washington, D.C.: National Academy 
of Sciences, 1975).  
248
 Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War (Congress of the United States: Washington, D.C. 
, 1979), 2.  
180 
 
 
addressed questions of whether a large-scale nuclear war would produce irreversible effects on 
the global environment. 
In subsequent years, a steady stream of official and popular literature continued to be 
produced that similarly explored and drew attention to the effects of nuclear war and the 
government‘s plan for nuclear preparedness. In 1984, for example, L. W. McNaught published 
Nuclear Weapons and Their Effects, which was essentially a textbook for soldiers on the effects 
of nuclear weapons and what protective measures might be taken in a nuclear battlefield. Two 
years later, the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy published a similar work that revealed the 
army‘s preparation for a myriad of futuristic, nuclear hostile environments, including nuclear 
war.
249
 Both of these works assumed a nuclear attack was survivable and provided potential 
techniques to aid in that survival. These publications fell very much in line with the official 
policy coming out of the White House that not only was deterrence effective, but that civil 
defense awareness was paramount for surviving a nuclear holocaust. 
In 1983, however, Science published an article that not only contradicted the Reagan 
administration‘s survivalist beliefs, but also left an indelible impact on Cold War history. In an 
article entitled, ―Long-Term Biological Consequences of Nuclear War,‖ coauthored by over ten 
prominent, international scientists, the aftereffects of nuclear war were examined and redefined 
by the controversial theory of nuclear winter. A nuclear winter would be defined as the number 
of new environmental, atmospheric, and climatic effects that would accompany large-scale 
nuclear blasts. This theory postulates that the earth would suffer from persistent lack of sunlight, 
which would bring subfreezing temperatures and high levels of radiation trapped inside the 
atmosphere. The logical conclusion of nuclear winter theory points to an end of civilization and 
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environmental collapse. The theory contended that agriculture would be crippled by nuclear war, 
thus creating devolution of survivors who scavenge for food, which was depicted in Threads. 
The study even provided a forecast for the potential social effects on humans and the ecosystem 
for up to ten years following a nuclear war. The study states that by the end of the first year, the 
following changes would have occurred: 
Loss of agricultural support would dominate adverse human health impacts. Societal 
systems could not be expected to function and support humans. With the return of 
sunlight and UV-B, widespread eye damage could occur. Psychological stresses, 
radiation exposures, and many synergistic stresses would continue to affect humans 
adversely. Epidemics and pandemics would be likely.  
Additionally, the study goes on to suggest that the next decade in a post-nuclear 
holocaust world would be climatic stresses that would limit factors for rebuilding and 
human recovery. This worst-case scenario, as presented by the coalition of scientists 
involved in the TTAPS study, was the focus of Threads and offered an astonishing 
glimpse into an apocalyptic future.
250
  
 Following the publication of the landmark nuclear winter theory published in Science magazine 
in 1983 (known popularly as the TTAPS study), government officials scrambled to determine 
how this new finding would affect existing foreign policy. A New York Times article published in 
the summer of 1984 reported that the federal government was embarking on its own $50 million 
scientific study regarding the validity of nuclear winter theory. According to the article, if the 
scientists determined that the theory was valid, then, the Pentagon claimed, new questions 
regarding national security would need to be answered. The article also revealed that there was 
some discrepancy within the scientific community regarding the severity of these nuclear winter 
effects. Dr. Edward Teller, developer of the hydrogen bomb and nuclear spokesmen for the 
Reagan White House, claimed the attempts at predicting the effects of nuclear winter were 
premature. Additionally, Dr. George A. Keyworth, the scientific advisor to President Reagan, 
suggested that more evidence was needed before the government could fully embrace nuclear 
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winter as a concrete theory as opposed to scientific speculation.
251
 Yet by February 1985, the 
nuclear winter studies budget had melted from $50 million to a meager $5.5 million. According 
to subsequent articles in Science magazine, the scientific study had a hard time finding economic 
support from the government agencies and was no longer a priority for the White House. Not 
only did the project lack crucial funding, but some academic scientists feared that since the 
research budget was dwindling, the funds would be allocated only to government laboratories, 
and the full effects of nuclear winter in independent laboratories and studies that projected 
counter-conclusions would not be considered.
252
 
Beginning in March 1985, a number of congressional subcommittees were formed, and a 
series of congressional hearings were held, to determine both the plausibility of nuclear winter 
theory and how it would affect strategic defense agendas, such as the Reagan administration‘s 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), otherwise known as ―Star Wars.‖ These reports underscored 
how the official discourse on nuclear winter was becoming highly politicized. With the loss of a 
national support for the nuclear freeze movement, many Americans embraced Reagan‘s 
optimistic design for future defense and rejected the negative assumptions of nuclear winter 
theory. The implications of nuclear winter theory also inherently frightened Republicans in 
Congress, because their recommendations might challenge the Reagan White House and refute 
―Star Wars‖as the program that promoted nuclear peace.   
In March 1985, one of the earliest committees to discuss nuclear winter theory gathered 
together. A collection of delegates from numerous committees—such as the House 
Representative Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Natural Resources, 
Agricultural Research and Environment; and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
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Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment—convened to discuss the hot topic of ―nuclear 
winter.‖ In his opening remarks, Morris K. Udall, chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and 
the Environment, set the course for a highly politicized debate by asserting: 
Before we begin, I want to say that it troubles me that we were nearly into the fifth 
decade of the nuclear era before our military planners explicitly accepted the potential 
destructiveness of the climatic effects of nuclear war. Such effects, it is now believed, 
could rival the damage resulting from the familiar effects of blast, fire and fallout. It is 
worth reflecting upon the consequences of the attack by our Strategic Arm Command 
upon the Soviet Union in the late fifties and sixties. At that time, by all appearances, we 
possessed an overwhelming superiority; our military leaders had reason to assure the 
President that the United States could attack the Soviet Union and expect little to no 
retaliation. If on the basis of such advice, the President had decided in time of crisis to 
launch an attack, our targeting doctrine, I have been told, would have led to the 
detonations of thousands of megatons over Russian cities. The result would have 
extended far beyond destruction of Soviet society. Some scientists now believe that such 
an attack would very likely have created climatic changed in the Earth‘s northern 
hemisphere. Had this happened, our own society might have been destroyed even if the 
Russians had not been able to launch one weapon … We should, for example, be 
skeptical of promises that a Star Wars defense will allow a move away from a strategy of 
mutual deterrence based on fear of annihilation. Star Wars, we are told, could make 
possible a strategy based on defensive systems. As desirable as this might be in principle, 
it is unlikely to work out in practice. In fact, by its nature, Star Wars would probably do 
more to create tensions than to reduce them.
253
 
 
What is most striking about Udall‘s statement is not only his wholesale rejection of Star Wars, 
but also his attempt to provide a historical perspective for looking at the possibility of nuclear 
holocaust. He expressed how in the nascent years of the Cold War, we had the potential to 
destroy civilization, and this responsibility irrevocably has changed the global power. In 
Threads, the audience watches annihilation and suffers in the aftermath of a nuclear world. 
Throughout this discussion on nuclear winter, delegates such as James H. Scheuer kept returning 
to the subject of nuclear deterrence and how nuclear winter theory imposed new realities on arms 
control. Scientists such as Carl Sagan joined Scheurer in presenting prepared statements to the 
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panel regarding the White House‘s staunch position and unwillingness to accept nuclear winter 
theory as scientific fact. 
The majority of the hearing was devoted to the March 1 release of a report released by 
the Department of Defense (DOD), which, in the words of Representative Timothy E. Wirth 
from Colorado, continued to, ―downplay substantial scientific research, historical evidence, and 
knowledge … on the potential severity of nuclear winter.‖254 Although the report issued by the 
Pentagon accepted nuclear winter theory as valid, according to an article in the New York Times, 
the DOD had nevertheless concluded that the theory had no ―great policy implications for the 
Reagan Administration and that its weapon modernization programs and its quest for an 
antimissile shield in space were still ‗fundamentally sound‘ ways of deterring nuclear war.‖255 
Because the DOD contended that the development of nuclear winter theory had no direct policy 
implications, Representative Wirth and others, such as Carl Sagan, accused the Pentagon of 
partisan politics. Sagan and Wirth both argued that the Pentagon‘s refusal to accept the realities 
of nuclear winter theory was due to its commitment to support Reagan‘s SDI and also the 
president‘s decision to increase U.S. nuclear capabilities.  
Wirth also noted that ―deterrence‖ was, in effect, an ―old policy‖—the only nuclear 
defense policy the Pentagon and the United States had ever known. Throughout the history of the 
Cold War, postwar presidents relied on the theory of deterrence and mutually assured destruction 
both to prevent nuclear attacks as well as to assure the citizenry that an increased nuclear arsenal 
was the only way to prevent a third world war. The Republicans appearing before the House 
subcommittee merely concurred with Wirth‘s assessment of the Reagan administration‘s 
determination to continue to rely on deterrence and proliferation. Moreover, according to the 
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political Right, nuclear winter theory only heightened the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence 
policy by making its possibility more abhorrent. Richard Perle, assistant secretary of defense, 
told the committee: ―We believe what we are doing with respect to strategic doctrine and arms 
control is basically sound and our acceptance of the nuclear winter theory does not make it less 
sound … There is no shred of evidence that our current doctrine is not the best policy to prevent 
nuclear war.‖256 
Richard Perle‘s position revealed that the Republicans continued to defend deterrence 
because it was based on the premise that it was possible to survive a tactical nuclear war. Thus 
nuclear weapons were simply conceived as bigger bombs. Even Reagan defended the arms 
buildup on the assumption that nuclear bombs differed little from conventional weapons. 
According to nuclear winter theory, however, even a limited nuclear engagement posed a 
significant risk of climatic catastrophe. Nuclear winter theory repudiated the assumption of 
surviving a tactical nuclear exchange. The suggestion that even tactical nuclear warfare could 
generate a series of climatic effects that would result in nuclear winter invalidated the position 
Reagan had adopted at the beginning of his first term.  In an interview from October 16, 1981, 
Reagan reportedly remarked that a tactical exchange of nuclear weapons could be used in the 
―field‖ without it leading to an all-out nuclear assault.257 The presentation of nuclear winter 
theory concluded that even a small nuclear exchange would have the potential to cause 
irreversible environmental effects. Ultimately, a partisan House committee concluded that the 
only way to ensure that nuclear winter never becomes a reality was to dramatically reduce the 
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number of weapons between the superpowers. This contention was in direct opposition with the 
White House plan to funnel millions of dollars to military defense proposals such as SDI. 
The March 14 congressional report stands alone as one of the only reports that took issue 
with the Pentagon‘s reluctance to engage the nuclear winter debate with any sense of urgency, 
while also advocating for a dramatic reduction in arms. Subsequent reports, including the 1986 
report issued by the U.S. General Accounting Office entitled ―Nuclear Winter: Uncertainties 
Surround the Long-Term Effect of Nuclear War,‖ took a very different position. This report 
examined scientific and policy implications of nuclear winter by investigating relevant literature 
on the subject coupled with research from prominent members of the scientific and policy-
making committee. Unlike other reports, this report neglected to provide scientific information 
about loss of plant, animal, or human life due to nuclear winter, and ignored the evidence 
concerning survivors suffering from radiation and fallout. In contrast, the General Accounting 
Office‘s report concentrated on the question of whether the existing policy of deterrence was 
sufficient to include this new nuclear imperative. The answer was simple. According to the 
report, too many ―uncertainties‖ surrounded nuclear winter to necessitate a change in strategic 
policy.
258
 Not only did this report support the SDI, but it also asserted that nuclear winter theory 
would only strengthen the nation‘s dependence on deterrence. Perhaps more revealing, the report 
stressed that ―there is no indication that the nuclear winter issue has affected Soviet policies, 
strategy or force structure.‖259 In short, the General Accounting Office‘s report negated the 
March 1 congressional report suggesting an arms reduction, and asserted that nuclear winter 
theory warranted more scientific investigations before the Reagan administration changed its 
policy on deterrence. 
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Though conservatives claimed that Soviets were not discussing nuclear winter theory, 
Soviet scientists were already discussing the plausibility of this new component to the atomic 
world. Some international scientists postulated that the development of this most horrific of 
human scenarios would bring together fragmented peoples under the umbrella of peace for the 
first time since the U.S. bombing of n Hiroshima in 1945. Soviet scientists published an English-
language book in 1985 that warned people around the globe about the devastating consequences 
of nuclear winter. In the book, titled The Night After: Scientists’ Warning in an interesting nod to 
the ABC made-for-television movie, Soviet scientists employed charts, diagrams, scientific 
jargon, mathematical equations, and even ethos to convey to readers the horrors of nuclear war 
and its immediate and continuous partner in destruction, nuclear winter. Not only would there be 
changes in the atmosphere due to a nuclear war,  leading to long-term climatic consequences, but 
the ultimate danger of nuclear winter lies in the capacity to threaten the evolution of mankind on 
Earth.
260
   
Compiled from a series of papers, lectures, and other relevant documents produced by 
Soviet scientists and others behind the Iron Curtain, this work utilized scientific voices to argue 
for peace and the prevention of nuclear war. While these reports were highly scientific and 
saturated in technological jargon, they still elicited an emotional response from its readers by 
focusing on the human costs of the war, which were not wedded to any ideology or country or 
political stance. In a statement address to both Yuri Andropov, the chairman of the Soviet Union, 
and Ronald Reagan, president of the United States, at the Third Congress of International 
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (June 1983), the Soviet scientists emphatically 
asserted: 
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The first and greatest of all nuclear illusions is the assumption that nuclear war is simply 
one of many alternatives facing humanity, and that nuclear war is but conventional war 
with magnified consequences. The world stands at the edge of an abyss: humanity now 
has the technical means for its own destruction. An all-out nuclear war would kill 
hundreds of millions of people instantly. World civilization would be devastated, and the 
future of those surviving the immediate blast would be in doubt … The general policy of 
nuclear deterrence has held hostage vast populations of innocent people. It has led to an 
ever-accelerating arms race. It threatens our children‘s hope of the future. It weakens our 
struggle against poverty, famine and illness. It has fostered war-fighting doctrines, which 
increases the risk of nuclear conflict.
261
 
The Soviet scientists employed the same rhetorical style of speaking about the consequences of 
nuclear war for children, an antinuclear image invoked by activists since the early 1950s. The 
Soviet scientists echoed much of the language of the nuclear freeze movement, yet their 
scientific theories forecasted new, innumerable effects of nuclear radiation as yet unknown by 
the international scientific community. Although this was the same sentiment presented by 
nuclear freeze activists around the globe, the acceptance of nuclear winter theory by Soviet 
scientists offered a potential scientific space to begin easing tensions between Andropov and 
Reagan. Evident in a statement by Soviet scientists, as well as some congressional democrats, 
was the shared assumption that nuclear winter theory might serve as a bargaining chip to bring 
both superpowers to the table to seriously begin nuclear arms reduction.  
Throughout the 1980s, scientists published an endless number of reports, essays, books, 
and articles on the effects of nuclear war and used all available data to construct the hypothetical 
physical topography and environmental landscape of the postapocalyptic nuclear world. With the 
development of nuclear winter theory, the postapocalyptic environment appeared more 
uninhabitable than before and the environmental effects were more irreversibly catastrophic than 
once postulated. But that was just the beginning. By the mid-1980s, the theory of nuclear winter 
was examined by psychologists, sociologists, and others who investigated how survivors would 
conceive of humanity‘s role in the radiation-laden world. According to scientists Owen Greene, 
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Ian Percival, and Irene Ridge in their 1985 work Nuclear Winter: The Evidence and the Risks, 
nuclear winter would cause a collapse even in the ―idea‖ of humanity. According to this work, 
human survival would depend on biological or evolutionary instincts and our willingness to 
adapt to the nuclear winter environment. People inside the targeted areas, they predicted, ―would 
become psychologically numbed, completely withdrawn and apathetic, and they would be in the 
worst possible state to face the additional rigors of nuclear war.‖262 As for the people outside of 
the prime target zones (ground zeroes) or target nations, once they regained their senses and 
overcame the immediate anarchy that was sure to ensue, people would have to contend with a 
shortage of food, contaminated drinking water, and an assortment of medical problems with little 
or no help from government institutions or any social organizations. In short, it would be a return 
to the most primitive of civilizations, as imagined in Threads.  
Again, the scientists offered some suggestions that might stop the earth from arriving at 
its nuclear conclusion, and once more questioned the policy of deterrence. According to these 
authors, part of the problem with nuclear deterrence policy and mutually assured destruction was 
the assumption made by NATO and Warsaw Pact members that a nuclear war can be ―won‖ like 
conventional wars. Nuclear winter theory revealed that everyone was at risk irrespective of 
geographic or ideological position. Furthermore, the second problem with deterrence was the 
certainty of human fallibility, in the form of accidents, misinformation, or hostile coups, all 
human scenarios  imagined from Dr. Strangelove, Fail-Safe, The China Syndrome, World War 
III, Special Bulletin, and Threads. Every type of human error in the contentious late atomic age 
could generate a chain of events that would cause worldwide destruction.
263
 Clearly the answer 
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would be the global commitment to disarm, and like other scientists, these authors hoped that the 
threat of nuclear winter would become an important platform to spark a national dialogue and 
perhaps even frighten Cold Warriors into erasing the threat of nuclear weapons from the human 
consciousness. 
In many of the scientific representations on nuclear winter, the use of the empirical data 
was employed to illustrate the need for additional social responsibility in the wake of global 
devastation. This approach is evident in the 1986 work, The Long Darkness: Psychological and 
Moral Perspectives on Nuclear Winter. This work includes essays contributed by prominent 
scientists such as Stephen J. Gould, Carl Sagan, and Robert J. Lifton—many of the same 
scientists who developed the theory of nuclear winter. This work stated that its purpose was not 
to scare readers, but to awaken readers out of their slumber of complacency and force them to 
confront the real threats and anxieties that surround nuclear war. So what were the psychological 
threats of nuclear war? According to Robert J. Lifton, the threat of nuclear war was too much for 
the human imagination to even comprehend. 
In his article, ―Imagining the Real: Beyond the Nuclear ‗End,‘‖ Lifton delved into the 
depths of the human psyche in an attempt to determine why mankind had the potential for self-
destruction, while also inquiring as to why humans were numb to the same potential of this most 
awesome of all human constructions. He began with the bombing of Hiroshima as the most 
striking example of the psychological response to an impending encounter with the death and 
destruction brought by the atomic age. Lifton then provided narrative accounts of Hiroshima 
survivors and the kinds of imagery and thoughts that survivors recalled during the attack. Lifton 
went on to argue for individuals, no ―particular symptoms, action, or pattern of behavior‖ were 
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symptomatic of the threat of nuclear war.
264
 Rather, nuclear fear might be defined as the absence 
of hope, the fear of death, the fear of losing loved ones and family members, the fear of radiation 
and contamination; in short, an intensified fear of the unknown was the symptom of nuclear 
anxiety.  
In a related article, John E. Mack considered how nuclear fears actually worked to protect 
existing policy on deterrence. In his article, ―National Security Reconsidered,‖ Mack offered a 
variety of theories that might explain why the Reagan administration refused to fully 
acknowledge the long-term, global implications of nuclear war. Mack determined that the 
methods devised to measure the effectiveness of national security were constructed by the same 
military and political personnel who still exhibited behavior of what he called a ―pre-nuclear 
mentality.‖ By this, he meant that the Reagan administration spoke of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear warfare as if it were analogous to conventional wars.
265
 Similarly it was this dependence 
on ―pre-nuclear mentality,‖ he argued, that was truly frightening to the American public, 
particularly its children and young people who were not able to make heads or tails of the 
survivability of nuclear war. Children were confused as to whether or not to be concerned that 
their youth might be cut short by a nuclear holocaust, or whether they should believe the official 
proclamations that nuclear deterrence did actually prevent nuclear war.
266
 
Mack provided a variety of explanations for why the Reagan administration did not 
appear fearful of nuclear war. Whereas those who opposed U.S. policies on nuclear weapons 
stressed the worst-case scenarios, the Reagan administration and its supporters stressed ―life 
would continue as usual‖ theory and emphasized the ―uncertainties‖ surrounding nuclear winter 
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theory. In addition, the Department of Defense justified the development of more sophisticated 
weapons, such as smaller missiles (Pershing II) and more accurate warheads, which, they 
postulated, would eliminate the amount of smoke, dust, and fires that would create a nuclear 
winter. Another possible reason that the government clung so tightly to deterrence, Mack 
proposed, was that deterrence provided the psychological illusion that the government was still 
in control of these dangerous weapons after failing to prevent other nations from gaining access 
to the atomic formula. According to Mack, there could be no security in a nuclear world, and the 
reality of this notion was too unbearable to comprehend. This, Mack argued, leads people to 
believe that it was not the deterrence policy that was important, or conversely, the plausibility of 
nuclear winter theory. Rather, what was important was the collective American belief in the 
power of the nation-state and executive decision makers. If the American public believed the 
United States was powerful and dominant and wielded tremendous influence over others, then it 
was the power of that convincing that provided comfort, not government institutional programs 
or platitudes.  
In an interesting report entitled The American Policy after Crisis: Cohesion or Collapse? 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies examined the probable responses to an array of 
societal traumas, including immediate basic survival, long-term recovery and the possibility of 
national restoration after a nuclear war. Rather than exploring the atmospheric or climatic effects 
of nuclear war or relying on the same data about radiation zones, this study attempted to explain 
how government institutions would continue to stand in the aftermath. Instead of scientific data, 
this study imagined a post-nuclear America with no capital, no pandemics, and no nuclear 
winter. In this study, the post-nuclear world‘s most devastating effect was the loss of 
nationalism. This study recommended that further action was needed to preserve national culture 
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in the case of cataclysmic nuclear war.
267
 Although culture is an important component of human 
civilization and the loss of culture in any way is tragic, it is worth noting that while other studies 
discussed the plausibility of nuclear winter theory and actively urged Congress to integrate 
nuclear winter theory into foreign and military policy to save humanity from this brand of 
environmental hell, this particular report submitted that the United States must preserve its 
nationalism first, an example of the Beltway‘s rejection of nuclear winter. 
By 1986, it was blatantly clear that nuclear winter theory would neither change or alter 
the Reagan administration‘s decision to increase the U.S. military arsenal nor curb any plans for 
building strategic defensive initiatives. Although many scientists urged Congress to reduce 
nuclear weapons, wrote articles on the dangers of nuclear winter, and repeatedly explained the 
global environmental consequences wrought by nuclear weapons, the U.S. government under 
Reagan declared the Soviets had no interest in reducing its nuclear arsenal because of the 
possibility of nuclear winter. When one examines the official representations on nuclear winter, 
the U.S. government appeared characteristically optimistic in its belief that it could both prevent 
nuclear war, and that in the event the nuclear war became inevitable, nuclear winter was simply a 
theory designed to weaken the United States.  
The unintended outcome of nuclear winter theory was that it became another justification 
for nuclear proliferation, not a reduction in arms. Many scientists, especially those affiliated with 
the political Left, advocated for nuclear disarmament; while scientists associated with the 
Reagan administration, such as Edward Teller, although not completely repudiating nuclear 
winter theory, claimed nuclear disarmament was not the key to preventing a nuclear war. 
Scientific advocates for the Reagan administration argued that only more sophisticated weapons 
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systems, like SDI, would end Soviet nuclear aggression. More importantly, however, the 
literature examined reveals an unbridgeable chasm between the scientific writings on nuclear 
winter, which presented a very bleak picture for the future of humanity, and the official 
proclamations made by the White House, which continued to submit that nuclear winter would 
not happen because nuclear deterrence policy prevented a third world war. 
Perhaps, as John E. Mack asserts, the possibilities of nuclear war were too horrific for 
Americans to believe, so we chose to embrace the notion that government would protect us from 
possible annihilation. Or perhaps, as Robert J. Lifton concluded, imagining the end of humanity 
because of nuclear war is too much for humans to even process rationally. Either way—whether 
one believes the U.S. government prevents nuclear war via its national security policies or 
through the development of futuristic defensive measures—it is apparent that the U.S. 
government‘s official line on nuclear war was that even though a nuclear war might not be 
winnable, the United States would not lose. The impending nuclear holocaust might be too 
horrific for Americans to imagine, yet for people potentially caught in the crosshairs, nuclear 
winter theory offered an outlet to express a collective voice of anxiety and frustration over the 
unwavering commitments of the United States and the Soviet Union to perpetuate the Cold War.  
Conclusion 
As many television productions attempted to present graphic realism of nuclear war, no 
other made-for-television movie presented life after a third world war in more striking detail than 
Threads. The BBC has an interesting history addressing this topic, including the 1965 production 
of the made-for-television film The War Game, which also presented how in the immediate 
weeks after a nuclear strike, British society and political structures would begin to completely 
dismantle, while chaos, anarchy, and bureaucratic hoarding would overcome all proposed civil 
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defense measures. So inflammatory was the film‘s representation of the failings of the British 
government that the BBC decided not to air the film due to high levels of corporate and political 
pressure. The War Game was finally aired in 1985, in the midst of yet another wave of British 
anxiety regarding its geographically vulnerable position between the superpowers.  
.  Although Threads offers one of the most controversial and horrific visual representations 
among all the other made-for-television nuclear dramas of the time period, the teleplay used a 
unique blend of documentary-style editing techniques, real nuclear blast footage, and news 
updates as well as family melodrama to frame its message.. In addition, the film goes to greater 
lengths to inform the public on the problems of survivability. Like its BBC predecessor, The War 
Game, Threads wanted to show how the nuclear fallout would have immediate effects, such as 
looting and governmental betrayal, as well as long-term, generational effects, such as the end of 
human communication and compassion.   
Moreover, the narrative captured the precarious position of the citizens of Western 
Europe, a topic extensively discussed by antinuclear activists as well as concerned citizens of 
many countries. As Walter Cronkite pronounced in The Great Nuclear Arms Debate on CBS, the 
early 1980s positioned Western Europe in the epicenter of a growing international debate over 
nuclear weapons, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, and the expanding U.S. nuclear arsenal 
occurring under President Reagan. CBS did not provide the only example of network prime-time 
news specials to explain international nuclear issues. On December 28, 1983, NBC News offered 
an hour long prime-time broadcast to also clarify the anti-Reagan sentiment emanating out of 
West Germany. Hosted by Marvin Kalb, the news special examined the growing German nuclear 
anxiety.  
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The film Threads portrayed a number of horrific scenarios from the initial chaos and 
lawlessness that would accompany a nuclear blast, to the collapse of government, the destruction 
of the natural world, and finally a collapse of social communication and civilization. This type of 
postapocalyptic rendering left an indelible imprint in the minds of those who watched the 
broadcast and also presented British citizens as powerless victims in a superpower showdown 
over oil in the Middle East. These all-too-real scenarios were omitted in ABC‘s most watched 
and successful nuclear made-for-television drama, The Day After.  The BBC, and the film‘s 
writer Barry Hines, could assert a more pointed critique of the Reagan military buildup because 
the proposal called for an arms increase in Western Europe, which in turn created more 
heightened nuclear anxieties for citizens of these countries. Although the complicated interplay 
between the Thatcher administration, the BBC, and audiences is not explicitly discussed in this 
chapter and is large enough to encompass its own separate work, the production of Threads does 
demonstrate the network‘s commitment to bringing nuclear-based dramas to British audiences in  
both The War Game (1965) and Threads (1984). Interestingly, in both the United States and 
Great Britain, political pundits warned that both television products would dramatically alter the 
political landscape of both countries, with experts warning that these films could cause 
irreversible damage to the executive leaders, conservative party members, and galvanize the 
public into one large antinuclear mob. This did not happen in Great Britain or the United States. 
These films did not spark a worldwide movement against nuclear war, nor did either of these 
television narratives take down conservative leaders like Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher.  
This fear that television productions could trigger mass movements across the globe 
offers an interesting commentary on how important the medium of television is for the public. 
However, it is also notable because data collected in the post-airing analysis on both films 
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revealed that although most citizens reported a desire to end nuclear proliferation, citizens were 
still too fearful of the Soviet Union to truly engage and persuade its leaders to emphasize nuclear 
disarmament over nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, these studies complicate theories on 
audience reception in that the television viewers do not interpret their position as passive or 
easily swayed by propaganda. Although the large topic of audience reception was not explicitly 
addressed in this chapter except for editorials, it is clear that television is not simply an 
instrument for state-sponsored propaganda as argued by many media critics Nor is television the 
great transmitter for spreading democracy. What is evident is that television can bring to life 
many of these complicated political situations that allow for viewers to actively participate in the 
larger debate on issues like nuclear weapons in some capacity. Even with the problematic design 
of television, in terms of political interference and corporate sponsorship, television experiences 
are often accompanied by an increase in social interactions, which in turn shapes a sense of 
belonging and identity in society. 
268
   
The development of nuclear winter theory had a number of important implications, most 
specifically its challenge to official U.S. civil defense measures, which argued that citizens could 
survive a nuclear war with enough pre-war preparation. Although President Reagan called on the 
scientific community to help develop space-based missile systems that would eliminate any fears 
of nuclear attacks on the United States, some scientists were already forecasting a much more 
dire post-nuclear landscape that also challenged the Reagan administration. Even though the 
theory was debated in a number of congressional hearings, by 1986, the Congress had adopted 
the position that nuclear winter theory necessitated U.S. dependence as a strategy to ensure 
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nuclear exchange never occurred. Furthermore, after the publication of the TTAPS study, other 
works on the psychological and social effects of nuclear war filtered into the public sphere.  
Although Threads is usually discussed as one of the major nuclear-themed docudramas of 
the eighties, scholars rarely discuss the film‘s legacy as a visual counter-narrative to The Day 
After and the teleplay‘s inclusion of nuclear winter theory. The BBC production of Threads 
serves as an important visual touchstone in a number of ways, but its representation of nuclear 
winter theory is also significant. For many viewers, even if they were unfamiliar with the theory 
or unaware of the larger debate surrounding the theory of nuclear winter, the teleplay visually 
displayed many of the effects discussed in the TTAPS study. From the lack of sunlight, to people 
scavenging for food in a barren world, to the psychological damage shown in the inhumanity of 
the survivors, viewers now had a visual framework for understanding the long-term effects of 
nuclear winter. Furthermore, this unflinchingly realistic depiction of the lifeless postapocalyptic 
world offered an alternative to both Hollywood and American network television nuclear-themed 
dramas, which often omitted science in favor of melodrama.  
In the next chapter, I examine the 1987 ABC miniseries Amerika, which attempted to 
offer a realistic television rendering of life in the United States after ten years of Soviet 
occupation. Although the miniseries does not engage the topics of an actual nuclear war, nuclear 
winter theory, or the issue of survivability, the telefeature does suggest that the fear of 
Communism was still very real and less understood by the American public.. In contrast, the 
American public understood even less about our postwar enemy than ever before by Reagan‘s 
second term, even as diplomatic relations between the United States and Soviet Union were 
reprioritized by 1985. As Western European audiences began to see the internal collapse of the 
Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, American viewers were offered a melodramatic, narrative 
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account of Soviet occupation. This miniseries would not only generate another firestorm of 
debate about the political effects of a network television miniseries, but it would also challenge 
the network‘s objectivity as some critics charged that Amerika was an fourteen-hour propaganda 
film that celebrated Cold War ideology rather than informing the public with any real 
information on the Soviet Union. 
 
Chapter Five: Cold War Representations in Reagan’s Second Term 
 
For the February sweeps of 1987, the ABC television network presented a weeklong 
miniseries on the effects of Soviet occupation on ordinary American life. The resulting program, 
titled Amerika, was the latest production by ABC that used the miniseries format to explore 
social and political problems. In their newest and longest Cold War–themed narrative, which 
took place in the future (1997), the Soviet Union came to occupy the United States through a 
bloodless coup, enlisting the United Nations, corrupt politicians, and sixties leftist activists as 
internal allies for taking over the country. This miniseries would generate more publicity and 
pre-broadcast hysteria than any other Cold War narrative in television history. Objections to the 
content of the miniseries came from every conceivable political affiliation, from the American 
left and right, to even international objections offered by the Soviet Union. Although the 
miniseries did not achieve the enormous success that The Day After became for the network, it 
reveals many of the political contradictions emblematic of Reagan‘s second term as president.  
This chapter begins with the landslide reelection of Ronald Reagan to the White House. 
In Reagan‘s second term, his language toward the Soviets became more conciliatory. Even as the 
Reagan Doctrine, a recapitulation of the Truman Doctrine, became the centerpiece of America‘s 
foreign policy, and the U.S. military became embroiled in civil wars from Angola to El Salvador, 
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Reagan‘s political language reflected a need to cooperate with the Soviet Union while fighting 
Communism around the globe and reclaiming patriotism at home. With the eclipse of the late 
atomic period, the American public was challenged to conceive of the Soviet Union in different 
ways. Although the Reagan administration grew increasingly scrutinized by the media, 
specifically with the televised proceedings of the Iran-Contra Affair, network television 
continued to use the miniseries format as an avenue to explore political issues. This case study 
investigates ABC‘s 1987 miniseries Amerika. This heavy-handed, seven-part, fourteen-and-a-
half-hour miniseries offers a portrait of American life after occupation by the Soviet Union. The 
argument proffered in the chapter suggests that ABC produced Amerika as a jingoistic political 
offering to the White House after the network was accused of promoting anti-Reagan sentiment 
in its enormously successful 1983 miniseries The Day After.
269
 The network received more mail 
and phone calls about Amerika before it aired suggesting that the film would garner enormous 
ratings for the network. In addition, Amerika received more post-viewer reaction than any other 
ABC miniseries, including The Day After.
 270
 The miniseries also offers a visual and contextual 
commentary on what Americans ―think‖ Communism is and imagines how this scenario would 
affect all Americans, from the small farmer to the U.S. president. Amidst the controversy 
surrounding the miniseries, however, the narrative employs the Reagan and Republican 
definitions of liberalism and social activism as the avenue for the Communist takeover of 
America. Situated within a larger political context, the 1987 miniseries is emblematic of not only 
the ―liberal‖ backlash that denounced New Left activism and politics, but also the triumph of the 
Reagan conservative revolution.  
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Using Reagan and Mondale network television commercials as primary evidence, I argue 
that Reagan‘s image of America reflected the wants/desires of American consumer capitalism 
rather than offer any real context or depth for understanding the larger geopolitical functions of 
the White House. In contrast to the bleak, however realistic, vision of the American condition 
captured in the Mondale ads, Reagan‘s cowboy conservatism appealed to the average voter, and 
in so doing altered the course of the decade. Scholarly investigation of these presidential 
commercials is needed because of the success of Reagan‘s ―Morning in America‖ campaign as 
well as the decline of New Left liberalism. In addition, Reagan‘s televised rhetorical style 
highlighted the past and continuing achievements of Americans. His national speeches were 
more ideological than specific, yet the message was clear. Throughout the campaign, Reagan not 
only openly conflated liberalism, the New Left, the Old Left, Democrats, and social activists into 
one larger umbrella term for the ―liberal‖ political position, but used these terms 
interchangeably. In Reagan‘s idealized America, hope was restored and the imagery of a superior 
America percolated amongst an optimistic citizenry brought back to life from the Republican 
conservatism. Dissenters were ignored by the popular television narratives and news, who found 
higher ratings in sensational stories of murders and celebrity scandal. Even though the sixties 
were romanticized in terms of popular music, films, and iconography, politically, the 
conservative assault on New Left liberalism continued throughout the decade. Although the 
culture wars and debates over identity politics remained televised news staples, the prevailing 
public image of Americans on network television consisted of conservative, suburban, middle-
class, white Americans. 
What is most fascinating about Amerika was not only its overt patriotism but also how 
the film represented the politics of network television. Not only was the film emblematic of the 
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early triumph of the Reagan Revolution, it also demonstrated how that revolution was 
intrinsically linked with network news. The miniseries commented on a number of important 
political situations—from the ideological, such as the threat of Communism blossoming in 
Central America; to the academic, in terms of revisionist history; to the joys of consumer culture, 
such as McDonalds. The film presents the message that Reagan‘s optimism, however flawed, 
offered a better alternative than the fear and pessimism proffered by the liberal Left. This is 
ultimately the ―imagined‖ landscape of the narrative. This message that the United States is 
superior to communism, or even that the tenets of left-wing supporters could lead to the downfall 
of popular American values, was heavily impressed onto the viewer.  
 With the decline of the network oligopoly, not only did the network news style change, 
but it also transformed network programming writ large. Now the three major networks were not 
only competing with HBO, Showtime, and the Fox by 1986, in terms of the conventions of 
network scripted programming, but they also increasingly followed the 24/7 news formats of 
CNN and Headline News. Part of the Reagan legacy is the expansion of infotainment, and the 
deregulation of television and the cable revolution remain the hallmarks of the era. By 1985, a 
new generation of viewers was offered a buffet of visual images through cable niche stations, 
choices from individuals could demonstrate their lifestyle, politics, and even religious beliefs. 
This chapter surveys a number of television programs that both reinforced the Reagan view of 
hope in America as well as social melodramas and infotainment shows that offered a dark 
portrayal of the Reagan years. This fragmentation of the audience mirrors the disconnectedness 
Americans were exhibiting by 1987. With network news focusing on the Iran-Contra Affair, 
American audiences were challenged to digest the problems of the Reagan administration and 
the commitment to fighting Communism, while also seeing the decline of the Soviet Union. In 
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the larger context, television not only framed the late atomic period but also democratized cable 
space  by engaging the viewer directly which became one of the benchmarks of the Reagan 
Revolution. In the larger context of television history, the medium was experiencing its own 
revolution by 1987 with the expansion of cable and the emergence of new television channels 
that catered to niche-audience demographics. The cable revolution, as discussed in this chapter, 
would transform audience identification, while also destroying the three major network‘s 
television monopoly on viewers, opening up a new world of pay-for-service television that 
catered to individual tastes and ideas.   
In Reagan‘s second term, the White House, network and cable television, and popular 
culture writ large glorified the American consumer and the splendor of capitalism. The 1984 
presidential convention commercials, the 1987 made-for-television epic Amerika, and the 
emergence of cable, demonstrate how images superseded factual information by the end of the 
Reagan years. The ways in which American audiences interpreted, ingested, understand, and 
receive the news and information transformed rapidly in the Reagan era, and a new generation of 
Americans depended exclusively on television for all information. This monumental 
transformation in television as the primary medium for information was also commercial in 
scope and thus dependent on the individual viewer for financial solvency. Moreover, these three 
examples are also symbolic of the glorification of consumption analogous with the Reagan 
Revolution. From the 1984 presidential campaign, to popular images of the innocuous yuppie on 
network television such as Alex P. Keaton of Family Ties, to the slick melodramas of prime-time 
shows such as Miami Vice, L.A. Law, and Thirtysomething, televised images of America 
celebrated the wealth of the economy and the spoils of individual success, particularly amongst 
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the professional class. This scripted narrative of the American eighties reflected the political and 
cultural aspirations of President Reagan and the White House.  
During the 1984 presidential election, Reagan characterized domestic problems as a 
byproduct of America losing its superpower standing due to the nature of the Vietnam syndrome. 
When Reagan addressed these issues on television, whether in presidential addresses, 
commercials, debates, or speeches, he combated negativity with religious and patriotic rhetoric 
that assured Americans that God and faith were the tools that would rebuild America. Thanks to 
the brilliant media strategy under White House Chief of Staff Michael Deaver, who helped to 
repackage the president‘s image with the Eureka and Star Wars speeches, the president was now 
a symbol of peace and able to decode any subliminal Communist messages from left-wing 
movements to the crack-baby epidemic, the source of the evil was the same: Left-wing radicals 
in Central America following orders from the Kremlin. This re-envisioned and packaged concept 
of the Cold War allowed Reagan to wrangle a tighter grip on public support for U.S. involvement 
in Central America. In true Theodore Roosevelt fashion, the triumphant reelection of Reagan 
recapitulated the notion of frontier conservatism and American exceptionalism in Central 
America. Like his Cold War presidential predecessors, Reagan shifted the locus of his doctrine to 
fighting Communism in Latin America, and in turn created a more global democratic crisis. 
According to Reagan, faith was under attack. America was threatened domestically by the 
devious left-wing radicals, either Soviet, Marxist, Islamic, or terroristic in nature. The solution 
was adherence to conservative politics and ―traditional‖ family values. The underlying domestic 
problems that came to define the mid-1980s, such as the drug epidemic, poverty, and AIDS, did 
not exist in Reagan‘s portrayal of suburban America, nor was they discussed in the 1984 
presidential campaign. 
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It’s Morning in America: The 1984 Presidential Campaign 
Reagan‘s campaign to recapture the presidency in 1984 was nothing more than a media 
assault on New Left Liberalism and anti-nuclear activism. In Reagan‘s first term, he and his staff 
had applauded the arrival of the cavalry to restore America‘s glory, yet the literal hardware to 
install this dream was paid for by the federal taxes of the working class. Furthermore the 
persistence of antinuclear activists around the world threatened the immediate placement of 
nuclear weapons that would ―defend‖ rather than ―agitate‖ relations with the Soviet Union, 
according to the Reagan White House. The White House strategy to reelect the president in 1984 
focused on denouncing the objectives of liberals, both Old and New, as well as presenting a 
serene, middle-class America freed from all agitators both foreign and domestic alike. By 
examining these presidential television commercials, one has a better idea of how the 1984 
presidential election became a political and public relations victory for the White House.  
Historians from all different perspectives have long noted the significance of network 
television to the success of presidential campaigns. Since the televised debates between Kennedy 
and Nixon in 1960, network television has played an active role in framing presidential images 
and creating democratized political rhetoric. The impact of how much network television 
executives can orchestrate, sway, or even brainwash viewers is still debated among scholars. 
However, current scholarship suggests that television does repackage presidential candidates and 
does create a different relationship with candidates that did not exist prior to television‘s 
existence. There are a number of different methodological traditions in which to gauge television 
representations, but as media scholar Peter Dalhgren reminds us, ―from the standpoint of the 
public sphere, there is a need for continual monitoring of what goes on in the media, analyzing 
specific cases and routine representations, while at the same time it is important not to lose sight 
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of the larger, more theoretical issues.‖271 Network television framed some social movements as 
more important, while most alternative or oppositional civic media had difficulties in the 
contacts with the media of network television. As for examining viewer reception, pioneering 
media theorists suggest that the command of the television medium contributes to the success of 
presidential campaigns and agendas. Thus it is fair to claim that network television helped to 
frame the upcoming 1984 election for the voting citizenry. And as Reagan won the election by a 
landslide, one can safely declare that the victory is owed in part to the successful television 
commercials. 
NARA Commercials 1984 
An extended version of the ―Morning in America‖ campaign was shown to delegates at 
the Republican National Convention and also broadcasted to viewers through network coverage 
of the convention. In this longer version, the message of the commercial emphasized the abilities 
of the entire Reagan Cabinet and applauded the efforts of staunch conservatives during the first 
four years. Reflecting back over the last three years, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and George 
Shultz all physically represent an ease in their positions within the West Wing and an ease as to 
where the country was at that time, as opposed to the tumultuous Watergate and Vietnam eras of 
decades past.   
The screen reads January 20, 1981, and the clip shows Reagan‘s inauguration to the 
presidency interlaced with momentary images of a suburban paperboy, suburban white-collar 
men going to work, of blue-collar workers walking to the factory and of the Boy Scouts. The 
audience sees the glorious, unparalleled architecture of Washington, D.C., and the splendor of 
the waving American flag. Reagan‘s voice-over narration declares, ―Yes it was quite a day. A 
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new beginning.‖ Commenting on the enormity of the oath that he took as president to uphold the 
Constitution and protect the citizens of the United States, Reagan says, ―You know, you don‘t 
really become president, the presidency is an institution and you have temporary custody of 
it.‖272 The audience then sees Reagan alone in the Oval Office working, and again his voice 
describes the appearance of the president verses the reality of the White House. Reagan‘s 
narration states, ―I know the image is it is a very lonely job and you are out there all on your own 
for everything that has to be decided or done. But that is not quite true.‖ The camera then shows 
Reagan surrounded by elite Cabinet members, Cold Warriors, staunch Republican allies who 
were a visible presence on television during his first term. Reagan remarks, ―I have always 
believed that the people around you here are meant to be here, to contribute. And you know the 
best counsel the opinions, sometimes varied opinions, in opposition or approval to whatever is 
being discussed, you are hearing these honest views from very capable men and women, who 
have given up so much, so many of them in their private lives to come here and serve. You don‘t 
feel alone.‖273 Going even further with this theme of exalting the virtues of his advisors, Reagan 
asserts, ―I believe the vice president George Bush is more involved in policy matters and 
government in general here in the executive branch than any other vice president, probably, that 
we have ever had.‖ The voter watches Reagan walking with Bush, hearing the vice president 
explain how over the last four years a renewed America has emerged, one that has hope and is 
less divisive than in the previous two decades. This image of Bush as a peacemaker is marked by 
Fredric Remington‘s famous statue Bronco Buster, which sits in the Oval Office, a visual 
reminder of the past glory of the United States. Bush comments that ordinary citizens repeatedly 
tell him how they feel a sense of peace for the first time in years. This commercial democratized 
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the Oval Office and offered accessibility to government players that harkens back to Jacksonian 
democracy of the nineteenth century. A clip of an American worker in a factory who speaks 
directly to the camera supports this theory that Reagan has restored dignity and ―respect to the 
White House for the common man.‖ A collection of testimony from African American men, 
ethnic women, and white workers confirm this newly empowered Reagan patriotism. Using Lee 
Greenwood‘s patriotic anthem, ―Proud to be an American,‖ as an editing device, the commercial 
presents viewers with montages of the great vistas of America, from the skyscrapers of New 
York City to the heartland of the Midwest. In Reagan‘s America, everyone is united and at 
peace. 
Reagan is seen embracing the troops in South Korea, praying with them, eating with 
them, talking to them. He remarks that every American should be proud of the men and women 
on the ―front lines of the frontier for peace,‖ suggesting that the Democratic and nuclear-freeze 
objections to the military are now over. In Reagan‘s America, service men and women are 
respected and thanked by ordinary citizens on the streets, again an insightful contrast to images 
of the sixties. Furthermore, in an additional testimonial, a woman remarks on Reagan‘s ability to 
engage the people. She says, ―I think he is just dog-gone honest. It‘s remarkable. He‘s been on 
television, what have I heard twenty-six times, talking to us about what he is doing. Now that‘s 
… he‘s not doing that for any other reason than to make it real clear.‖ And as she addresses the 
camera, her eyes start to tear up, and she states, ―If anyone has a question about where he‘s 
headed, it‘s their fault … Maybe they don‘t have a television.‖274 This insightful statement 
reveals the unique connection Reagan cultivated with Americans through the medium of 
television.  Additionally, Reagan‘s accessibility is put on display for the voters, demonstrating 
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that his commitment to the military is personal and his relationships with this staff, advisors, and 
the people is uncompromised by liberal objections. 
Invoking the specter of World War II, which Reagan did quite frequently, his narration 
addressed the commitment for Social Security and to the generation that defended America with 
unabashed honor during the Second World War. However, instead of explaining just exactly the 
ways in which the Reagan administration would actually lower inflation and pay for both the 
growing military and the growing senior citizen population, Reagan presented his biography as 
an example of good government. His Irish ancestry connects him with the blue-collar working 
class, not Old Left union supporters; his deep Christian commitment resonated with the 
skyrocketing number of voters that identified with the Christian Moral Majority all over the 
country; and finally, his unflinching admiration for his wife and marriage appealed to the pathos 
of voters who identified closely with the importance of family values above all else. As the 
camera shows Reagan walking on a ranch, hand in hand with Nancy Reagan, he tells the story of 
how they met in California, and how her patriotism and support helped to provide the strong 
Republican motherhood-inspired virtue for his civil service. He quips, ―She‘s been my first lady 
before she stepped into the White House.‖275 Nancy Reagan‘s achievements are highlighted, 
such as her commitment to children with disabilities, the elderly, and the anti-drug ―Just Say No‖ 
crusade. Viewers are shown the live televised assassination attempt of Ronald Reagan and he 
explains how his entire staff was with him in the hospital. Gesturing to the audience that his age 
and his health were not real issues that would preclude his reelection, Reagan‘s recollection of 
his assassination attempt is of a cowboy rising from the horizon, one who will survive and brings 
peace through strength and stands strong yet free. Ending with clips of Reagan‘s nomination as 
the Republican Party candidate, Ray Charles plays ―America‖ as both the Reagan‘s and the 
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delegates rejoice with thunderous applauds and cheers as balloons and confetti pepper the 
convention hall.  
Reagan‘s narration was populist in tone and dialect; he speaks directly to the common 
citizen in a calming, patriarchal tone. His confidence is overwhelming, and his presence and 
charisma infectious to his growing conservative, suburban voter base. His command of the 
television voice-over was cultivated in the late 1950s when he used to occupy the role of 
spokesman for General Electric. His command and ease at being America‘s spokesman helped to 
solidify his position as president. In addition, the way in which Reagan connected to the 
individual viewer is remarkable in that he had the ability to speak directly to one person through 
the camera. Reagan transcended traditional notions of the private sphere by offering Americans 
the idea of public agency. The individual received his words as if he or she engaged in a 
conversation with Reagan, a gift of rhetoric that was unrivaled by any challenger in 1984. 
In contrast to Reagan‘s romantic version of America, Mondale presented a decisively 
different narrative of those previous three years. Mondale‘s 1984 Democratic Convention 
commercial begins with the same appeal to the electorate‘s pathos with a montage of children, 
explaining with optimism and hopes their dreams for their future. Similar to Reagan‘s staff, his 
media staff understood the importance of presenting children as symbols of hope to voters 
throughout America. This emphasis on children and optimism is one of the hallmarks of the 
eighties in terms of political capital. As Mondale walks down any given wooded path in 
America, he also provides a brief biography of himself, although his delivery lacks Reagan‘s 
confidence and enthusiasm. He appeared more uneasy, less comfortable in front of the camera. 
Although he used the same thematic approach as Reagan, invoking the Horatio Alger myth of 
―rags to riches‖ in America, the imagery in the commercial is less produced, less stylized, and 
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more flat. The audience then watches a collection of clips that demonstrate how Mondale is 
gaining popularity in states all over the country, including the South such as Alabama and 
Florida. Yet there is no sound other than the roar of an airplane. The audience hears no anthem, 
no Ray Charles, no Lee Greenwood, no comfortable patriotic music that appealed to the common 
man.  
In the continuous montage, Mondale is shown in photographs with iconic sixties activists 
such as Jesse Jackson, pictures with union workers, campaign rallies, and still photos of 
speeches. He is shown opening a watermelon in blue jeans, again as a device to connect with the 
common man; although compared with Reagan, Mondale‘s image is reminiscent of Jimmy 
Carter and the malaise of the late 1970s. His attempt at populism becomes insignificant 
compared to Reagan‘s impenetrable cowboy-narrative constructions. Mondale speaks of the 
importance of family and asks a young relative if she is more hopeful with Reagan as 
commander in chief, and she immediately answers no. Next, a nondescript narrator states: 
―Whether it is with his family or on the job, Walter Mondale is real.‖276 The commercial goes on 
to retell of Mondale‘s experience in the Senate and how he was chair of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Children and Youth where the famed anthropologist Margaret Mead famously 
asserted, ―As our children go, so goes the nation.‖277 According to the narrator, Mondale became 
the ―children‘s Senator,‖ helping to establish Head Start and other Great Society programs 
constructed under the Johnson administration. In still photographs, Mondale is seen with a beard 
during the 1960s, as well as with ethnic children from around the country. As opposed to 
Reagan, Mondale speaks of the imperative of education and learning as well as research and 
application. In Mondale‘s America, he speaks to victims of nuclear spills and surveys the 
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damage of women and children who died from toxic exposure in 1981. The narrator explains 
Mondale‘s commitment to the environment, to fighting pollution, and to protecting America for 
the children‘s future. The images shown are of a bleak American landscape saturated by a 
fledgling economy, dilapidated homes, and abandoned cars in the Rust Belt of America. The 
Mondale argument becomes that he, much more than Reagan, has a political record that 
demonstrates his commitment to protecting the children of America, but because of Reagan‘s 
policies, ―eight thousand toxic waste communities still stand.‖278  
In contrast to Reagan‘s collection of Cold Warriors gathered around in the Oval Office, 
Mondale‘s advisors are young, casually wearing ties, not suits; one top advisor is African 
American, while another is a white woman, images that can easily be associated with liberal 
Democrats. The narrator stresses that Mondale is an expert on economic policy, debunks the 
theory of ―trickle-down‖ economics, and openly challenges Reagan‘s assertion that the economy 
is solvent and prosperous for all Americans. Mondale is surrounded by books rather than iconic 
American symbols, again suggesting his attempt to provide an educated context for 
understanding his political positions. As Reagan speaks of hopes and dreams, Mondale speaks of 
how corporations and the wealthy are given tax breaks while the average citizen earning $30,000 
a year carries the weight of the taxes. Mondale states that he wants a fair economic policy for the 
worker, not false hope and charges that Reagan will cut more Social Security, Medicare, and 
other social programs that help the common American. Furthermore, Mondale is depicted as the 
consummate American diplomat, working with other foreign nations such as China for fair trade 
and human rights. More importantly when it comes to the issue of nuclear peace, Mondale is 
presented as the candidate for the nuclear freeze and open negotiation with the Soviet Union; the 
narration remarks, ―As president, Walter Mondale will be working to prevent war.‖ The 
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commercial ends with a montage of natural vistas of America from the ocean to the national 
forests and parks of all different ecological life, capturing the glory of the natural world. Again, 
it is important to note the stark comparison to Reagan, not only in the language that Mondale 
employs, but how the commercial attempts to present his political and senatorial record as a man 
commitment to families, the environment, and maintaining peace. The last montage is not a 
popular song that the audience can sing along to but rather a quite symphonic tune that 
accompanies the natural landscape. According to the NARA, television executives decided that 
the 1984 Democratic National Convention campaign commercial was too controversial for 
network television and did not air the Mondale presidential commercial during the Democratic 
convention.
279
 
From “Morning in America” to a Cold Warrior for Peace, 1984–1987 
By 1987, much of the patriotic zeal that reelected Reagan as president had begun to lose 
momentum. Pollsters reported that the public‘s confidence in government had returned to the 
historic low it had been in 1980. 
280
 In terms of the Cold War, Reagan was now at a pivotal 
moment. The president‘s emerging cooperation with Soviet secretary general Mikhail Gorbachev 
was transforming Cold War politics. Gorbachev, who was elected to the position of secretary 
general by the Politburo in 1985, was also receptive to greater cooperation with the United 
States, even though the country was heavily embroiled in the Strategic Defense Initiative as well 
as aiding right-wing movements in Central America. Early in their relationship, Reagan mocked 
the claims that his foreign policy was too simplistic as he quipped to Gorbachev: ―Roses are red, 
violets are blue. Stay out of El Salvador and Poland too.‖281 Despite having called the Soviet 
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Union the ―evil empire‖ in front of a group of evangelical preachers in 1983, by his second term, 
Reagan‘s language and approach toward the Soviet Union became more conciliatory and ushered 
in the final phase of the Cold War. Although the scope of the ―great thaw‖ is much larger than 
this investigation, it is worth noting that this change in Reagan‘s position is debated amongst 
scholars who claim that he was either a true visionary or unbelievably naive.
282
 Additionally, as 
we move further away from the Reagan years, scholarly interpretations of both the American 
president and Gorbachev are increasingly reexamined, particularly since the death of President 
Reagan in June 2004. What scholars universally accept, however, is that the Reagan 
administration constructed and implemented a working negotiation strategy with the Soviet 
Union, which prior to 1985 was unprecedented in Cold War history.  
  This is one of the triumphs of the Reagan Revolution: that President Reagan‘s political 
ideology, policies, and even legacy were inexorably linked with anti-Communism, and by 1985, 
the anti-Communists engaged in actual diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union. This 
dissertation has shown how the White House media staff was able to transform Reagan‘s image 
as a hawk, through the 1984 presidential campaign and his defeat of the nuclear freeze 
movement, and to repackage his reputation as a peaceful president. For example, meeting in 
1985 in Geneva, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed in principle on a 50 percent cut in strategic 
forces and a reopening of cultural exchange programs with one another.
283
 This meeting was 
more symbolic than substantive, however, as it did demonstrate a new era of cooperation in 
terms of nuclear weapons than throughout the post-war years. In turn, the Soviet Union faced its 
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own complex foreign and domestic problems and encountered resistance in Eastern Europe and 
Afghanistan. Gorbachev represented a new Soviet generation that was freed from the shackles of 
Stalinism, and his policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) were met with 
―Gorby fever‖ around the world. He was given the honor of Time magazine‘s Man of the Year in 
1987. Even though the two superpower leaders were actually negotiating and the Reagan 
Revolution underway, the uncertainty of the Cold War and misinformation on the Soviet Union 
was still very evident in the United States. 
American popular culture, however, continued to exploit nuclear anxieties by producing a 
myriad of cultural products emblematic of the country‘s commitment to fighting Communism 
around the globe. Reagan‘s aggressive foreign policy in Central America and the Middle East 
coupled with his infectious patriotism captured Cold War imaginations. One example is the 
repackaging of the Hasbro toy G.I. Joe as a cartoon series, G.I. Joe: A Real American Hero, 
which began a twelve-year syndication run in 1982. Similarly, Hollywood produced a steady 
stream of action movies, including Red Dawn (1984), Invasion USA (1985), Rambo—First Blood 
II (1985) and Commando (1986), that capitalized on Cold War fears while adhering to the 
Reagan Doctrine. As for network television, nightly news broadcasts presented stories on Cold 
War skirmishes occurring in Angola, Nicaragua, Lebanon, El Salvador, and Afghanistan as well 
as the civil unrest occurring behind the iron curtain. Prime-time audiences were also enjoying the 
exploitation of the Cold War in network series such as the A-Team (NBC, 1983–1987), 
Scarecrow and Mrs. King (CBS, 1983–1987), and Miami Vice (NBC, 1984–1989), which 
blended the detective narrative with the geographic proximity to Central America in a platform 
for a variety of stories that commented on the Reagan doctrine.  
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The made-for-television movie and miniseries were still used as means to grapple with 
social and family issues such as incest in Something about Amelia (1984), teen suicide 
(Surviving, 1985) and child abuse (Child’s Cry, 1986). The ABC television network continued to 
find tremendous success by making epic miniseries throughout the decade such as The Winds of 
War (1983), The Thorn Birds (1983), North and South (1986) and War and Remembrance 
(1988). By 1986, the popular press began to report on ABC‘s Cold War–inspired miniseries 
Amerika, which depicted how ordinary Americans would live under Soviet occupation. This 
miniseries, it is argued, did little to educate the American viewer about life behind the iron 
curtain; nonetheless, the show remains a cultural milestone in that it is also the last miniseries of 
the Reagan era to generate old Cold War fears.
284
 
Preparing for Amerika: The pre-airing media campaign 
In the months leading up to the premiere of ABC‘s Amerika, many critics openly 
questioned the network‘s motivation for undertaking such a politically ―ambitious‖ original 
production. Some speculated Amerika was a symbolic gesture for the political disruption brought 
by the 1983 made-for-television movie The Day After. Many critics at the time seriously 
questioned the intent of ABC, pondering the actual message of the film as it remained unclear 
and contradictory for its fourteen-hour run. In addition, this chapter asserted that the miniseries 
did more to misinform and confuse the American viewing audience rather than explain Soviet 
occupation or even the ideology of Communism by focusing more on the melodramatic events of 
various characters. Although the miniseries was promoted as a realistic portrayal of Soviet 
occupation, the narrative echoed the Reagan position that New Left activism was an instrument 
manipulated by the Kremlin. This assertion that the United States was occupied by Soviets 
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because of a lack of patriotism was offensive to politicians, veterans, activists, and viewers who 
collectively objected to this negative presentation of the American people. Moreover, because it 
was criticized for its overt jingoism, the miniseries was deemed by many as a fourteen-hour 
public apology to the White House from ABC executives for provoking public concern with The 
Day After.
285
 Accordingly, scholars assert that how in comparison with The Day After, the anti-
Communist message of Amerika was given priority, freed from real political pressure, and 
permitted to saturate the network.
286
  
In the months prior to the February 15–22, 1987, broadcast of Amerika, the film 
generated a wealth of criticism and media interest. Similar to The Day After, pundits on both 
sides of the political spectrum objected to the content of the teleplay as it related to the Reagan 
administration‘s policies, relations with the Soviet Union, and nuclear weapons. Although the 
miniseries does not include any atomic imagery, it is important to include it in the larger canon 
of nuclear-themed films, as it presents a futuristic United States under Soviet occupation. This 
Cold War narrative also contained an important political message: the Soviets did not need 
nuclear weapons to occupy America, as they were aided by the United Nations, Communist 
allies from Central America, and sixties liberal activists whose collective lack of patriotism 
served as the mechanism that allowed for the Communist occupation. Again, it is significant to 
remember that by 1987, most Americans received the majority of their information on global 
events through television, which was also changing due to the increase of cable channels and the 
transmission of news segments due to the twenty-four-hour format. 
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On January 2, 1987, ABC Evening News aired a four-minute segment on the controversy 
that the miniseries, while still in production, was generating from all sides. A spokesperson for 
the Soviet Union, Georgi Arbatov, considered ―Amerika‖ offensive, especially in terms of the 
graphic scenes of drug use, alcoholism, and the sexual harassment of women by Soviet men of 
power. Additionally, the United Nations also interpreted the miniseries as globally hostile not 
only to the United Nations, but to the thousands of UN peacekeepers deployed around the world. 
A voice from the political left, Jeff Cohen, opined that Amerika was the ―right-wing‘s ultimate 
paranoid fantasy,‖ as it provided another reason for the American voting/viewing public to 
continue to follow the failed policies of President Reagan. Finally, the segment ends with 
Amerika executive producer, writer, and director David Wrye, who expressed amazement at the 
reaction and found it ironic that groups throughout the United States and the Soviet Union are so 
interested in preventing the miniseries, even though most objections came from groups who had 
yet to see the finished product.
287
 
  The idea for the teleplay is credited to ABC executive Brandon Stoddard, as well as 
political insider Bud Stein, who allegedly questioned why ABC was so concerned with nuclear 
destruction during the production of The Day After and suggested it would be more informative 
for Americans if they watched their country under the thumb of the Soviet Union. Echoing their 
public statement on the production of  The Day After, executives at ABC claimed the film did not 
contain any political message, but rather was an investigation into how the Soviet Union would 
affect Americans. Wrye stated that ―the intent of the mini-series and the way the mini-series 
functions is not anti-Soviet, and, indeed, has virtually no foreign-policy implications.‖288 
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However apolitical the miniseries claimed by those involved in the production, the teleplay was 
causing a firestorm amongst political pundits from all sides. Lisa Belkin of the The New York 
Times wrote: 
―Amerika‖ the mini-series—at 14 1/2 hours, it is, if nothing else, a very large piece of 
prime time—is now the source of great controversy. ―Amerika‖ bashes the Soviet Union; 
it doesn‘t bash it enough. It slanders the United Nations and threatens world peace; no, it 
is a fictive work about totalitarianism. At the moment, liberal to left sentiment is running 
most strongly against the ABC mini-series, although moderate to right-wing criticism is 
coming up fast. Battlements are raised. The sound of apocalypse is heard. Somewhere an 
enemy is lurking. Still unclear, however, is the direction of the enemy attack. Will 
―Amerika‖ be a rightward thrust, plunging us into cold-war paranoia? Or will it turn left, 
lose its nerve and excuse an imperialistic Soviet Union? In fact, nobody knows, including 
the most prominent of the critics. Nobody actually has seen ―Amerika.‖ It's the idea they 
don‘t like.”289  
Belkin went on to write how the film had created so much controversy that ABC produced a 
promotional videotape for corporate sponsors and political/social activist groups. This promotional 
film included interviews from the cast, crew, and producers, all of whom confirmed the need for 
making such an ambitious miniseries.  
Objections to the proposed miniseries emerged from every angle. The United Nations 
wanted a better portrayal of UN peacekeepers and hired a media consultant to work with ABC or 
face potential legal issues.
290
 Additionally, activists on the left argued that the depiction of the 
Soviet Union was too harsh and could damage U.S.-Soviet relations. Critics on the right asserted 
that the film did not do enough to represent the terrors of totalitarianism. Even the Soviet Union 
objected to how the network teleplay depicted the interworking of the Soviet state apparatus. 
According to the official network response, ABC was incorporating all of these issues into the 
finished product, and even in late January with a February release date, the network was still 
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editing the miniseries, suggesting that the objections to the teleplay as reported in the media 
influenced the final product in some way.  
The network spent nearly $40 million to bring the epic series to viewers, but the network 
also depended on corporate sponsorship that was waning in the midst of the Amerika 
controversy. In late January 1987, the New York Times reported that Chrysler, the auto giant then 
run by captain of industry Lee Iacocca, decided to pull its money out of the miniseries. 
Americans would see no commercials for Chrysler during the fourteen-and-a-half-hour telecast. 
This ushered in a wave of fear that other corporate sponsors would pull out of the project, 
leaving ABC in a precarious position. A former United Nations worker and Chrysler stockholder 
had began a letter-writing campaign in opposition to the broadcast and called for a nationwide 
boycott of the miniseries.
291
  
Not only was the network saturated with oppositional mail from Americans, but the 
Soviet Union also became a vocal opponent of the miniseries. In the media blitz that preceded 
the broadcast, Soviet ambassador Alexander Palladin appeared on network news shows and 
openly criticized ABC-TV for its harsh presentation of the USSR. In a two-and-a-half minute 
segment that aired on CBS Evening News with Dan Rather, Palladin remarked on the range of 
anti-Soviet imagery emerging out of Hollywood. His position on Amerika was the film continued 
the tradition of Rocky IV and Rambo, which did not educate the American people on the Soviet 
Union but rather fostered more misinformation and miscommunication amongst the 
superpowers.
292
 Similarly, on January 17, ABC‘s World News Tonight with Peter Jennings aired 
a four-minute segment on demonstrations against the film at the United Nations as well as the 
position by the Soviet foreign ministry about how the miniseries could lead to a serious decline 
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in U.S.-Soviet relations and, more importantly, an immediate response in the form of limiting the 
access of ABC News to broadcast out of Moscow. The segment included a response by ABC 
executive Brandon Stoddard, who acknowledged that the network took Soviet objections 
seriously, but stated that the miniseries was a prime-time, fictionalized narrative, not a program 
designed by the ABC news division. Both the ABC network and the White House took a similar 
position that the United States did not ―bow down‖ to Soviet censorship. 293 
In a February 21 article in the New York Times, Isabel Wilkerson reported that along with 
leftist groups that opposed the content of the film, former Washington insiders also expressed 
displeasure with the narrative‘s depiction of politicians and the United Nations. According to the 
article, three former secretaries of state, Alexander Haig, Edmund Muskie, and Dean Rusk, along 
with two former national security advisers, Robert McFarlane and Brent Scowcroft, and the 
former chief delegate to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, collectively signed a letter of 
protest against Amerika and delivered it to ABC headquarters in New York. The collective 
objection made by Washington insiders, former Reagan officials, and prominent Republicans 
who signed the letter were the portrayal of UN peacekeepers as brutal handmaidens of the 
Kremlin. Along with partisan/activist groups on the left and the right, this letter called for an 
informative panel after the completion of the broadcast that would answer questions from the 
viewing audience, in a format similar to the post–Day After broadcast. 294  
Ironically, an internal memorandum from the White House suggests that the 
administration was more concerned with Soviet censorship than domestic pressure. In a time of 
negotiations with the Soviet Union, both in Geneva and in Iceland, the White House media staff 
feared that the miniseries might stall relations between the two countries. In a memo to Pat 
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Buchanan, Don Eberly offers ―talking points‖ to the White House communications director 
regarding how the ABC miniseries should not influence the ―spirit of Geneva.‖ He writes, ―As 
one who was present at the summit, I can assure you that I found no evidence that the renewed 
sense of cooperation and trust that was clearly present there would require the American 
television networks to consult Soviet opinion in their programming, and face threats of outright 
blackmail for failure to comply … in the spirit of Geneva, you may want to propose to your 
Soviet counterparts a policy of mutuality; we won‘t tamper with their propaganda services that 
masquerade as new programming if they don‘t tamper with our free press.‖295 This statement 
suggests that the White House had sufficient evidence to reason that the miniseries might 
jeopardize U.S.-Soviet relations; however, the administration was more concerned with the 
international objections rather than domestic opposition.  
The White House received a great number of personal letters, memos, and commentaries 
about what the media staff should do in response to the growing controversy. A group of 
elementary school children flooded the White House with letters asking the president to 
cooperate with the Soviet Union for the good of future generations of children around the world. 
Some children even asked the president how he planned to prevent Soviet occupation of 
America, as seen in the miniseries. Mirroring a similar commitment to help the US contain 
Communism after the theatrical release of Red Dawn (1984), which also depicted a Communist 
invasion, a group of YAF (Young Americans for Freedom) from the University of South 
Carolina pledged a commitment to use all available tactics to fight Communism if it were to 
happen in the United States.
296
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  On February 4, 1987, the White House Media Office received a memo from the Freedom 
Federation, a conservative think tank and right-wing activist organization, which enumerated the 
strategies ―the left‖ was using to promote the film with the help of representatives from the 
Soviet Union.
297
 The memo states that an ad hoc organization, known as ―Equal Time,‖ was 
forcing ABC to host a panel discussion after each episode of the mini-series in which the ―left-
wing‖ point of view would be presented to the American people. Most notable on the panel 
would be nuclear winter activist and leader Randall Forsberg and activist/politician Andrew 
Young. Additionally, the memo warned that antinuclear activists, such as local chapters of 
SANE and Mobilization for Survival, among others were sponsoring conferences around the 
country to explain the miniseries in an attempt to galvanize support for Democrats. More 
objectionably, the group ―Educators for Social Responsibility‖ wanted to explore the meaning of 
patriotism in a nuclear world along with ―Media Productions of L.A.,‖ which, according to the 
report from the White House, was using the film as a pretext for bringing Soviet filmmakers and 
television officials to meet the Hollywood entertainment industry. The Freedom Federation 
recommended that conservative groups should be encouraged by the White House to mobilize in 
a campaign to refocus the public‘s attention on the essential points made by the series: ―those of 
Soviet expansionism and human rights abuse.‖298 
In terms of how conservative groups would mobilize, the Freedom Federation reiterated 
five major talking points, which echoed many of the talking points discussed during the 1983 
controversy over The Day After. The first point restated that a Soviet occupation was not 
unrealistic, since the USSR was ―the most successful imperialist power in history.‖ The second 
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point addressed the controversial depiction of the United Nations. According to the Freedom 
Federation: 
Over the past fifteen or twenty years, the United Nations has become increasingly hostile 
to the United States and to the values of the free world. During this time, the Soviet bloc, 
along with its allies among Third World and Arab nations, has used U.S. agencies to 
harm U.S. interests. For example: the U.N. welcomed PLO terrorist chief, Yasser Arafat, 
to the General Assembly; it passed the libelous ―Zionism is Racism‖ resolution; 
UNESCO mounted a concerted campaign aimed at undermining press freedom around 
the world … While the series‘ depiction of the U.N. may be imaginary, it reflects the 
organization‘s marked anti-U.S. posture.299 
Clearly, the miniseries portrayal of the United Nations was not the central concern of the 
Freedom Federation. Yet, leading into the third point, the organization warned that Amerika 
might rejuvenate public support for disarmament that could jeopardize the U.S. nuclear arsenal. 
The fourth point harkened back to the premise of the miniseries, a bloodless Soviet coup. 
According to the report, this idea was also a dangerous reality for Americans to understand in 
that the USSR had come to occupy land from Eastern Europe to Nicaragua, not through direct 
military encounters, but through proxy takeovers and the support of internal terrorists‘ 
organizations. Finally, the report concluded that the real answer for preventing this nightmarish 
scenario from actually happening was to ―help those fighting the Soviets and their proxies in 
Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua to regain their freedom.‖300 
The Freedom Federation was organizing its own audience groups in cities across the 
country including Chicago, Boston, Houston, and many others. Just like their leftist counterparts, 
the Freedom Federation also requested equal network time to present the conservative view of 
the miniseries to the American public. The organization launched its own media campaign with 
the help of William F. Buckley of the National Review and the Wall Street Journal as part of the 
conservative strategy to use the film as a ―pretext‖ to persuade the public that the United States 
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needed to continue its support of right-wing governments in Central America by aiding the 
―contras.‖301 Just how the American public would respond to the film was still hypothetical, as 
ABC continued to edit the film until the February 15 broadcast. But thanks to the outstanding 
publicly surrounding the film, it appeared as if the miniseries on Soviet occupation would unite 
the American public as viewers at least for the first week of February.  
An Analysis of the Miniseries “Amerika” 
After much political speculation, Amerika debuted 15 February 1987.Situated ten years 
into the future; the Soviet Union now occupies the United States. In a bloodless coup that began 
with an electromagnetic pulse that disrupted military and civilian communication, the KGB has 
already installed a puppet regime in the White House that is orchestrating an even larger plan 
than U.S. occupation. The opening scene is reminiscent of the beginning of The Day After. The 
audience sees the glorious vistas of the Midwest, the farmlands, the rolling hills, a distant 
rainbow in the background. Although the scenery looks like contemporary America, after a 
woman jogs up to a man on any mainstream in the country she says, ―Dasvadana,‖ or hello in 
Russian. 
The audience is introduced to the Communist equivalent of urban life, which sets the 
visual and narrative tone. The first real scene of American life under Communism is in Chicago, 
where actors are performing a second-world, sedated version of The Fantasticks and the 
audience looks like Eastern Europeans in drab, featureless clothes, representative of the Soviet 
Second World. As the narrative unfolds, the audience slowly learns how the Soviet invasion took 
place. The narrative presented a conspiracy-themed Soviet occupation, who utilized the United 
Nations, corrupt politicians, and the sixties leftist radicals as tools for American occupation. In a 
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slow pace, the viewer learns how the United States has dealt with the loss of its independence to 
Soviet invaders. A full-scale war was never started by the USSR but rather Communists used 
leftist sympathizers and the United Nations to aid a bloodless coup. American private ownership 
was replaced with Stalin-era collectivization as Americans were stripped of their possessions, 
while bloated, greedy Soviet bureaucrats enjoyed the fruits that capitalism harvested. The 
narrative fluctuates from the dangers of cities to the hiding places and secret spaces occupied by 
Americans in relocation camps. Although some America homes still contain important artifacts 
from the past, such as medals from the U.S. government and personal items of note, the Soviets 
expanded their empire in America in the same manner that Stalin seized land in the USSR during 
the 1930s. As for ordinary Americans, they either complied with Soviet dominance or were 
relocated to camps. Once again evoking the evils of the Second World War, Americans under 
Soviet rule were subjected to the same horrors as Holocaust victims and those who protested 
Nazi occupation.  
The miniseries also explored the minutiae of everyday life. Even though the topography 
of the country appears the same, the American people no longer enjoy the benefits of consumer 
capitalism. Instead of grocery stores catering to the individual needs of the consumer, Americans 
now wait in long food lines only to receive tomatoes and soy cakes. To maintain occupation, the 
Soviets established gulags or relocation camps patrolled by the UNSSU (United Nations Special 
Service Unit), who have unlimited power in their ability to victimize Americans. The UNSSU 
soldiers, wearing uniforms that are reminiscent of both the Nazi SS as well as real UN 
peacekeepers, torch and pillage houses, run over innocent Americans with large Soviet tanks, 
and rape local women (although this is not explicitly shown). Overall, the UNSSU are able to 
wreak havoc without much opposition. Those American patriots willing to fight, they are 
227 
 
 
collected, tattooed with a tracking number, and reeducated on the Soviet version of history in 
order to survive. 
The miniseries stars Kris Kristofferson, who plays Devin Milford, a former sixties radical 
who was a liberal presidential candidate running for president before Soviet occupation. The 
audience watched Milford leaving the Communist rehabilitation prison camp. After six years in a 
Soviet camp, Milford is secluded in the middle of Nebraska, now part of a collective of five 
states known simply as ―the Heartland.‖ Milford argues with his father, who openly blames ―the 
sixties‖ generation for the occupation. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has larger plans for occupied 
America. It intends on breaking up the country into twelve sections, leaving the ―Heartland‖ to 
under the command of Milford‘s former college roommate Peter Bradford, played by Robert 
Ulrich. In typical social melodramatic fashion, Bradford‘s wife is torn between her love for her 
husband, love of country, and love of Milford. As part of Milford‘s parole, he is isolated from his 
children, who live in Chicago, and he makes a desperate attempt to kidnap his oldest son to aid in 
the rebellion and ignite a war of American independence. 
As the narrative continues to unfold, the audience learns that the Soviets have even larger 
plans for America, which are not revealed to American politicians in a lame-duck, symbolic 
position like Bradford. Rather than following the KGB orders of ―the final solution‖ for 
Americans, which involved the nuclear destruction of strategic cities around the country, the 
leading Soviet general, Samanov, asks the remaining members of Congress to officially and 
ultimately disband their third of the American government. When members of Congress refuse to 
disassemble, Samanov threatens to blow up Washington, D.C. employing conventional social 
melodrama narrative style, Samanov is conflicted by his own love of pre-occupation American 
values and cultures and orders from the Kremlin that he commit suicide instead of directing a 
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nuclear strike. Meanwhile, demonstrations led by Milford back in the ―Heartland‖ are met with 
violence and brutal force by the Soviets and the UNSSU, who are finally encountering a true 
revolution by the American people, who banded together under Milford‘s leadership and their 
renewed sense of patriotism. In action scenes, American militias, costumed in jeans, flannel 
shirts, and automatic assault rifles, now wage a guerilla war on the Communists. For the viewer, 
the success of Milford‘s revolution is never revealed, although the audience assumes the 
revolutionaries are successful based on the final images of Milford in mid-celebration.  
The audience thus sees a large generation gap, in which the Great Depression/World War 
II generation blames sixties activists, such as Kris Kristofferson, as the real reason for the decline 
of freedoms and liberties in the United States. This criticism of the sixties is very much aligned 
with the Reagan administration, which cast an extremely negative light on New Left Liberalism 
during the 1984 presidential campaign. Furthermore, the miniseries also engages conventional 
melodrama aspects, focusing on sexual identity, gender inequality, and violence. In one scene, a 
desperate American teenager is inspired to lose her virginity in the midst of the growing 
grassroots movement to defeat the Russians. Again, we see the network juggling the political 
content along with the social melodrama emblematic of the time period. The narrative has no 
defined beginning, middle, or end and unapologetically jumps from social commentary to 
political editorials without any explanation. From montages of American heartland images, to 
images of children in Soviet schools, to the exile camps, to a night club where teenagers are 
incited to riot, the majority of the narrative is concerned with interpersonal dynamics and 
familial relations. This disjointed construction of the narrative, interweaving the political and the 
personal, created space for audience identification with the characters; but more importantly, the 
fractured narrative presented an abbreviated and uninformed representation of Soviet occupation.  
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Considering the mini-series is fourteen and a half hours long, it is important to examine 
specific scenes that capture the complicated currents of the narrative. For instance, in one scene, 
students in an elementary school history class are recalling the American narrative they have 
learned under Soviet occupation. In these ―revisionist,‖ ―Soviet-inspired‖ historical narratives, 
one child speaks of the American imperialist past in terms of conquering and killing Native 
Americans and rather than celebrating the achievements of the Founding Fathers, students are 
taught American imperialism and conquest. In a later scene, the same child addresses a political 
gathering, which looks eerily similar to a Nazi Party rally, and states: 
We are the voice of the new generation … the destructive ways of the past are gone. 
We‘ll replace them with our vision for the future. The party will lead us to a new age. 
There are those who have tried to stop this new age. They are the corrupt reminder of the 
past. They have tried to confuse us with the idea that the old America was a good 
country. We know that lie. History teaches us that lie. We are grateful to our Soviet 
brothers who have saved the world from destruction and we can now join them in a world 
of Socialist brotherhood. Everyone will go to school, everyone will have a job, and 
everyone will be equal. No one will exploit or be exploited. And all of those who oppose 
this wonderful vision will be crushed.
302
 
This critique of the American past as expansionist, aggressive, and imperialist falls in stark 
contrast to the consensus historians of the 1950s as well as President Reagan, who believed in 
optimism and the American dream. Additionally, the assertion that worldwide Socialism would 
bring equality is used as a narrative commentary on the problematic social activists of the 1960s, 
whose cause of identity politics and flirtations with Marxism brought about Soviet occupation, 
according to the narrative.  
So bleak was America under Soviet occupation that a shared will to expel foreign 
occupation becomes the impetus for the rebellion against the Soviets, although the audience 
never sees the real fruits of the American Revolution against Communism. The images from 
President Reagan‘s ―Morning in America‖ campaign of happy, healthy consumer Americans 
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united under God is in stark contrast to the landscape under Soviet occupation. In its place is the 
harsh ―reality‖ of Soviet occupation, a place that values the collective over the individual, a 
government wrought with corruption and malfeasance, and a culture that rejects individual 
identity. Reagan routinely expressed the values of individualism and identity and would publicly 
state on television how one of the greatest strengths of the American people is its differences. 
However, the loss of the individual and the subjugation of Soviet indoctrination illustrate the 
dismal nature of Soviet occupation, according to the ABC-TV network. Interestingly, critics of 
the film echoed a similar message that the ―graphic realism‖ the miniseries attempted to portray 
was unfortunately ill-informed and inaccurate in scope, and that the idea of presenting this type 
of scenario to the American people as ―realism‖ was comical.303 The entirety of the television 
event gestured toward the idea discussed in the press that ABC needed to present a more patriotic 
Cold War mini-series to the American people, one that adhered more openly with the Reagan 
administration.   
The Cable Revolution: Representing the “Individual” on Cable  
In opposition to the depiction of Soviet occupation curbing freedom and choice on ABC, 
television was rapidly becoming democratized throughout the 1980s. In many ways, the cable 
revolution was predicated on the deregulation of television under Reagan and also the expansion 
of cable around the country. For those who could afford it, television offered new representations 
that appealed to the individual consumer. Cable represented the joys of consumer capitalism in 
that the cable stations provided an identity to each specific viewer. As conservatives criticized 
the identity politics of the sixties, cable offered a cultural space for individuals to define 
themselves in the Reagan era outside of bipartisan politics. From the colossal success of the 
Music Television Video channel (MTV) to the triumphant success of the Nashville Network, 
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television audiences were gaining more choices and identifying the niche broadcasting for 
specific regions, races, and generations. However, audiences were also becoming more 
fragmented due to technology. This transformed the traditional relationship between network 
television, the Reagan administration, and the use of television as an instrument of news and 
entertainment.  Moreover, the emergence of cable captures this moment of rupture, when the 
networks began to seriously lose their original programming audiences to specific, niche cable 
channels catering to the individual. This moment of potential democratization of television space 
transcends previous scholarly interpretations of audience reception.  
The decade began with three major networks (ABC, NBC, CBS) monopolizing over 90 
percent of the prime-time American audience.
304
 By the end of the eighties, these three networks 
fought to maintain only 60 percent of that audience. The other 40 percent of viewers were now 
equipped, through the expansion of satellite dishes and cable service, to watch a seemingly 
limitless number of networks that catered more to the individual subscriber. New developments 
included the expansion of syndicated programming; for instance, shows such as The Brady 
Bunch and Bewitched found their way back on television, after decades of being off the air. Most 
notably, between 1976 and 1980, most of the major cable channels were established, including 
ESPN, CNN, MTV, USA Network, and CBN (Christian Broadcasting Network), and these 
received sizeable audiences while offering an alternative from the conventional programming 
present on the three major networks.
305
 Moreover, cable stations tapped into niche markets in the 
same ways that the three major networks attempted to program for specific audiences. Examples 
of niche cable channels included CBN, which became the mouthpiece for the Moral Majority; 
Nickelodeon, a channel dedicated exclusively to children‘s programming and more specifically 
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to a white, suburban audience; BET (Black Entertainment Television), which offered a variety of 
programs from news to original series that was tailored to the African American viewer but also 
created by African Americans; FNN (Financial News Network), which targeted the upper-
middle-class, white-collar audience; and the Weather Channel.
306
 By the end of the decade, cable 
would continue its growth through niche channels and self-promotion and evolve into a 
television alternative that catered to urban viewers, suburban viewers, and everyone in between 
and offered more channels than ever before, with better visual clarity. The rise and expansion of 
the cable television industry is one of the hallmarks of the Reagan Revolution. 
With the cable revolution, new ideas about audience reception and audience identification 
began to change. As the three networks‘ monopoly on television declined, Americans who 
possessed the means to utilize new television technologies were offered an amazing new world 
of choice, which echoes the joys of consumer capitalism as applauded by President Reagan. 
Audiences also used these niche channels as vehicles to explain their concerns, agency and 
beliefs. One of the strongest examples of this type of audience identification is the success of the 
―I want my MTV‖ campaign, which featured artists such as Madonna, the Police, and David 
Bowie among others shouting this tagline on the phone to ―the cable provider.‖ Just like ABC 
had found a loyal audience in the emerging baby boom suburban audiences of the immediately 
post war decade, executives at MTV tapped into the suburban, Generation-X audience by using 
sixties grassroots promotions. When the admired artists said, ―Pick up your phone, call your 
local cable operator, and demand your MTV,‖ suburban teenagers responded. MTV became a 
                                                 
306
 Gary R. Edgerton, The Columbia History of American Television (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 
301–2.  
233 
 
 
cultural and financial juggernaut that would influence all aspects of television programming, 
both on and off cable.
307
  
Pioneering scholarship into the issue of audience reception reveals there are a multiple of 
ways that audiences receive and interpret television imagery and content. More examinations of 
the success of MTV are needed for a variety of reasons, from the cultural to the financial to the 
issue of audiences constructing new relationships with cable niche stations that are peddling in 
identities for the suburban voter. According to one account by 1984, ―with advertising revenues 
of one million dollars a week pouring in, with an audience of twenty-two million youngsters 
between twelve and twenty-four, MTV was the highest-rated basic cable network.‖308 As the 
vanguard leader of the cable revolution, MTV expanded its programming from music videos into 
television shows, news, and celebrity entertainment. This type of slick broadcasting and niche 
marketing produced a generation of youth that defined their identities through MTV as well as 
other channels. As the decade went on, the cable giant was criticized and blamed for creating a 
generation obsessed with materialism and possessing short attention spans. Regardless of the 
negative criticism, by the end of the eighties, many critics would recognize MTV as the era‘s 
―most influential cultural product.‖309 Just as the baby boomers became synonymous with 
identity politics of the sixties, Generation X became tantamount to cable and the Reagan 
Revolution that conquered television.  
Conclusion 
The 1984 campaign is remarkable in that it offered two strikingly different positions on 
the status of America at the time. In Reagan‘s America, the country was brimming with 
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optimism and hope and prosperity had been restored by the collection of seasoned Cold Warriors 
who made up the presidential Cabinet. In addition, Americans were shown enjoying the fruits of 
consumer capitalism. In stark contrast, the political and economic realism offered by the 
Mondale campaign appeared too dismal for the voting public.  
It is imperative to remember that throughout the campaign commercial for Ronald 
Reagan‘s reelection, he never directly outlines or explains any upcoming executive policies. It 
was a produced narrative of Reagan‘s America, where content and depth is less important than 
image, faith, and optimism. The governmental issues debated on television and in the press are 
not addressed. What Reagan offered was a glowing homage to Americans rather than an 
educated framework for understanding complicated issues. 
In opposition, Walter Mondale presented a very different account of Reagan‘s 
presidency. He argued that Reagan had weakened America‘s geopolitical standing by not 
engaging in diplomatic discussions with the Soviet Union. Moreover, he claimed, Reagan‘s 
fiscal commitment to the military was bleeding the American taxpayer to the point of decimating 
the middle class. In stark contrast to the Cold Warriors and older politicians that constituted 
Reagan‘s advisors, Mondale surrounded himself with a younger staff while also having a 
woman, Geraldine Ferraro, as his vice presidential candidate. In Mondale‘s America, the real 
problems facing the nation included the lack of union protection for American workers, an 
assault on social programs such as Social Security and Medicaid, and the destruction of the 
environment.  
Although both commercials were extensively shown in parts on television, this chapter 
argued that Reagan‘s command of the television medium helped to sell his optimism to the 
American people, who rewarded him with a second term in the Oval Office. In addition, as 
235 
 
 
Reagan appeared calm, rational, and at ease in the White House, the Reagan campaign painted 
Walter Mondale as a New Left sixties radical, who personified the trappings of liberalism. 
Mondale was shown as an angry demagogue, focusing on everything that was ―wrong‖ with 
America. While the Reagan campaign offered visual images of suburban workers carpooling to 
work and devoted Christians celebrating in church, the Mondale campaign attempted to capture 
the ―realities‖ of ―trickle-down‖ economics by showing unemployed workers, the dilapidated 
physical environment of the Rust Belt, and the poor and elderly underclass, all ignored by the 
Reagan administration. As factual as Mondale‘s campaign might have been, and arguably was, 
the American audience/voter responded more favorably to the positive images proffered by 
Republicans.  
The conservative idea of representing American life under Soviet occupation through the 
network television mini-series offers great insights into the cultural fear of Communism and the 
ways in which America  were misinformed about the Communist system. In many ways, the 
scenes from the miniseries such as the ―revisionist history class,‖ or hometown parades with 
flags of Lenin/Lincoln, remind the viewers of what constitutes ―America‖ in contrast to 
Communism and attempts to explain some of the ideological differences between the 
superpowers. The Reagan image also plays a large part in terms of viewer identification. For the 
Reagan White House, the film represented the infectious threat of Communism and it also 
promoted the wars against leftist groups in Central America. The film suggests that the lack of 
patriotism was the reason for the success of the Communist invasion, yet the will of American 
farmers and true ―Americans‖ would lead to us back to freedom and democracy. Although the 
miniseries clearly places blame on American liberals, the production is representative of how 
television misinforms the viewing public. In addition, using this network production as a case 
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study for Reagan‘s second term allows for further analysis of the interplay between network 
television and the government. The Reagan White House idealized the nuclear family, moral 
fortitude, and patriotism, while the fictional collapse of the United States was caused by the lack 
of moral fiber and unwillingness to disengage from nefarious machinations for the United 
Nations. Even though the Chrysler Corporation pulled its advertising dollars out of the miniseries 
and Moscow threatened to limit the network‘s access to Moscow television affiliates, this 
miniseries serves as an excellent example of how the network took an extreme stance against the 
Soviets and aligned itself with the White House.
310
 
Similarly, ABC captured the nation‘s attention before the broadcast, generating an 
incredible amount of sensational press surrounding the film. In many ways, the waves of 
objections and opposition to the miniseries is more important than the film itself because of the 
fears and anxiety the film provokes, especially in light of the increasing attention on the Iran-
Contra situation. ABC‘s original version of the narrative was never brought to the small screen; 
however, given the level of pressure the network encountered from a variety of political and 
social forces, one can argue that the film served as a fictional sacrifice to the White House for 
making The Day After. In contrast, Amerika was a celebration and glorification of patriotism as 
well as an attack on sixties liberals. 
One of the strongest examples of the celebration of America during the 1980s was the 
cultural obsession with television technology and the ability to transform the traditional viewer 
experience. Not only did cable break the stranglehold on the three major networks‘ command of 
television viewers, it also brought about new ways of conceiving television as a whole. For 
example, in the early 1980s, millions of Americans discovered CNN, which challenged the 
conventions of network news by offering twenty-four-hour news segments and unknown news 
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anchors. The first measure of CNN‘s success as an alternative to network news came in January 
28, 1986, when millions of students in classrooms around the country tuned into the cable news 
network to watch the launch of the space shuttle Challenger, which included schoolteacher 
Christa McAuliffe as one of the crew. Seventy-three seconds into the broadcast, American 
triumph turned into tragedy when the spacecraft exploded in the blue sky over Florida. For CNN, 
this horrific event solidified the cable news outlet as the network that brought continuous 
coverage of immediate events to air, without altering scheduled programming. Furthermore, in 
1987 CNN offered round-the-clock coverage of the eighteen-month-old girl, popularly known as 
―Baby Jessica,‖ who had fallen into a well in Midland, Texas.311 Once again, the cable news 
outlet incorporated more direct, immediate attention to the story with direction to limit the 
editorial comments made by reports and let the images tell the story. This format challenged the 
conventional scope and role of network news divisions, as once constructed. Invariably, the 
emergence and popularity of CNN would forever alter the way Americans interacted, received, 
and understood the idea of television news.  
In addition, the amazing success of niche cable channels such as MTV, CBN, ESPN, and 
TNN, to name a few, brought new changes in audience identification. Tapping into niche 
demographics, cable not only offered an alternative to the three major networks but also 
provided a new generation of Americans a way to find their identity. For example, MTV targeted 
the young, suburban audience because MTV creator Robert Pittman believed music was a tool 
used by kids and teenagers to identify them.
312
 Furthermore, for Americans who identified with 
the conservative right or identified themselves as Christians, cable catered to this demographic as 
well, with the Christian Broadcasting Network. From the growth of BET to TNN, cable 
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television became a medium for identification in terms of generation, politics, interests, news and 
even religion. The bright future of cable television and the incredible pace of its growth is one of 
the greatest successes of the Reagan Revolution.  
Although the Reagan administration was pleased by the presentation of Amerika on 
ABC, by most accounts, the $40 million production of Amerika did not receive the ratings 
anticipated by the network. Perhaps because of the maelstrom of controversy evoked prior to the 
broadcast of the first episode, the ratings for the miniseries waned after the second night. 
Although the first episode of the miniseries was widely viewed by audiences, by the second night 
American audiences were watching CBS‘s presentation of the Miss America pageant and NBC‘s 
special episode of Remington Steele. Many of the reviews of the film commented on the same 
issue: the narrative was dull and uninspired. A review in the New York Times suggested that part 
of the problem with Amerika is that it offered no actual information on the interworking of the 
Soviet regime, nor did the film educate the American public on the history of the Soviet Union. 
Even though the ABC network marketed the film as a realistic portrayal of American life under 
Soviet occupation, the emphasis on social melodramatic conventions, such as sexual assault, 
infidelity, and family intrigue, obscured any solid context for illustrating the stated mission of the 
film. Most critics agreed that the miniseries was made for the White House as a network apology 
for heightening nuclear anxiety with the 1983 made-for-television movie The Day After. 
Similarly, while both ABC broadcasts provoked initial controversy, the post-broadcasting data 
revealed that each respective made-for-television movie did little to change or even sway public 
opinion regarding the Reagan administration, the Soviet Union, or the Cold War writ large. This 
is not to suggest the film did not change cultural or social ideas about Communism. If anything, 
the film underscores what American considered to be the one of the horrors of the Second 
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World: the lack of consumer choices. One reviewer noted, ―It‘s as though the idea of foreign 
occupation was thought up, nothing more was invented, researched, characterized beyond 
wooden stereotypes. There isn‘t even the beginning of the wild fantasy dreamed up by Lt. 
Colonel Oliver North and his White House supporters in the Iran-contra affair. Now that‘s a 
thriller, full of the kinds of fascinating insights into the workings of government behind rhetoric 
and bureaucratic ritual.‖313 Interestingly, the network was criticized for making Communism 
dull, which was not an official White House talking point, but one that reinforced American 
capitalism the administration‘s agenda.  
This type of empty, contrived propaganda, which pinpointed the American people‘s 
complacency as the reason for the success of the Soviet occupation, was dismissed by critics who 
wrote of Amerika as propaganda for the ABC network, not even for the American people who 
tuned in to watch. Since the original version of the miniseries was never aired due to a wellspring 
of pressure from every discernable political position, it is safe to assume that the final product 
was continuously reedited and lost some of its original commentary due to the overwhelming 
political pressure. But, from the perspective of the White House, the public debate surrounding 
the miniseries worked to divert the public‘s attention away from the Iran-Contra scandal that 
presented a genuine threat not only for President Reagan and Republicans but also to the 
American people‘s trust in government institutions.314The fourteen-hour production proved to 
reinforce the public‘s perception of Reagan as a leader of peace, as well as promoting Cold War 
orthodoxy. Even though the United States and the Soviet Union were entering into the Great 
Thaw of the Cold War in the late 1980s, the lingering mistrust of the ―Russian other‖ remained 
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constant and a fear of miscommunication continued. Due to television, however, Reagan‘s image 
presented him as the Great Communicator and the man who ended the Cold War.  
 
Conclusion 
In many ways, the idea for this dissertation is unconventional in both the approach to the 
topic and the supporting research. The impetus for examining the Cold War during the Reagan 
years through the lens of network made-for-television movies and miniseries is the result of 
watching The Day After in 1983 and becoming instantly afraid of nuclear war. Almost thirty 
years later, it is hard to gauge the impact of these nuclear-themed narratives; however, they live 
on as important cultural and political benchmarks that in many ways follow the trajectory of the 
Reagan presidency. Furthermore, network television works as the primary medium for 
understanding Reagan‘s transition from a Cold Warrior to the U.S. president considered ―the 
Great Communicator.‖ 
This work relied heavily on visual sources, including network films, news programs, 
nightly news programs, and more. These materials are problematic in that the visual effect of the 
seeing a nuclear weapon detonate is considerably diluted by the written word. Even though 
describing nuclear war and weapons is inherently problematic, the sources collected from 
various archives help not only to bring these images to life, but also to illuminate a larger 
framework for understanding the final decade of the Cold War. Additionally, I used the primary 
documents retrieved in the Reagan Presidential National Archives to prove a number of 
arguments present in this work. I was limited in my research by two factors: (1) lack of access to 
documents; and (2) limiting the documents to those that directly discussed television. Although 
the Reagan Archive is still tightly protected in terms of access, the wealth of documents on The 
Day After alone speaks to the seriousness with which the White House monitored this potentially 
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inflammatory and political damaging made-for-television event in 1983. These documents also 
present a number of challenges for this researcher, not only because of restrictive access, but also 
because they complicate questions surrounding the nature of presidential intervention in 
television. Although this is a rather recent phenomenon for postwar presidents, television, 
especially by the Reagan years, was not a simple propaganda device. The Reagan Archive also 
contains numerous documents from conservative groups, such as the Freedom Federation, that 
flooded the White House with memos and documents about how to combat negative images on 
television. The Reagan Archive houses a wealth of information on the nuclear freeze movement 
and offers insight into how the White House responded to the group. 
Previous academic investigations have examined the ways in which network television 
grew in tandem with the Cold War. In a look at television during the early fifties, Nancy 
Bernhard provides examples of direct government interference on news programming.
315
 From 
CBS‘s See It Now to NBC‘s Meet the Press, many early television news programs were designed 
to present on current affairs and employed objective reporters to offer viewers more insightful, 
substantive information. In 1951, NBC-TV received over twelve million viewers to a seven-part 
series entitled Survival, which highlighted official U.S. civil defense measures. A review in the 
Saturday Evening Post described the television special this way: ―If you think a falling A-bomb 
means the end of everything, this remarkable report may change your mind.‖316 In the historical 
case of See It Now, which ran on CBS from November 18, 1957, to July 7, 1958, lead anchor 
Edward R. Murrow famously challenged the ringleader of the Second Red Scare, Joseph 
McCarthy, even under reported official and network pressure to move on to another topic. For 
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American viewers, Murrow was perceived as an objective reporter, diligently tackling corporate 
and government Goliaths for the public good. However by the next decade, the Kennedy White 
House had named Murrow to head the United States Information Agency (USIA).
317
 The main 
charge of the USIA was to distribute and produce American Cold War cultural propaganda 
around the world. Murrow, as head of this foreign cultural agency, contended that it was not 
Communism people feared, particularly in developing third-world nations, but rather economic 
and political instability. His agenda was to promote a real dialogue between government officials 
and broadcasters to construct international documentaries that would benefit all people of the 
―Free World.‖ Bernhard, Boyer, and other scholars have all asserted that network executives 
were intimately involved with government officials, and this type of interplay complicates how 
corporate television works, especially in terms of the Cold War. 
Although the three networks transmitted Cold War messages to the American public 
throughout the fifties, network attention dwindled in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
The 1962 nuclear showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Cuban 
Communist government‘s possession of Soviet nuclear warheads serves as the apogee of the 
official cooperation between the government and network executives. On the morning of 
October 22, 1962, White House press secretary Pierre Salinger requested access to network 
prime-time hours for the president to address the nation. As Americans tuned in to watch ABC‘s 
Stump the Stars, viewers heard an announcement that the program would not air. Instead, 
American audiences heard President Kennedy speak of Soviet nuclear weapons found in Cuba 
and that this nuclear repositioning was not acceptable. As described by Gary Edgerton, ―it was 
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the first time television was used as a forum for international diplomacy.‖318 Furthermore, in the 
aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the White House press secretary offered each network one 
reporter and one hour, to engage the president about the event. Taped in the Oval Office, 
Kennedy fielded interviews with three reports as network executives Bill Lawrence of ABC, 
Sander Vanocur of NBC and George Herman of CBS watched from the sidelines. Broadcasted in 
December 1962, Americans watched as the president effectively answered provocative questions 
about the nuclear standoff. But what was less known was how much the White House had 
orchestrated the journalistic inquiry.
319
 The Cuban Missile Crisis marks an interesting point in 
terms of Cold War and network television history. For U.S. policy makers, the 1962 event would 
spark a new commitment to diplomacy, and for network television, the television lens no longer 
pointed as brightly on nuclear-themed programming. 
This is not to suggest that television omitted Cold War–themed broadcasting from the 
airwaves. Yet after the viewing the world on the brink of nuclear war in 1963, the networks 
relegated Cold War programming into action, science-fiction, or farcical programming. In his 
work on Cold War broadcasting on network television in the sixties, James Coon examines how 
network shows such as Rocky and Bullwinkle (1961), F-Troop (1965), and Get Smart (1965), all 
employed Cold War–era themes under the guise of comedy. He argues that opposed to network 
programming of the fifties that presented American audiences with more documentaries and 
news specials on the threat of Soviet expansion, network shows like Get Smart parodied secret 
agents as well as the entire Washington-based counterintelligence apparatus.
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 This inclusion of 
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more brevity and comedy, according to Coon, was a reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis as well 
as the shift in national focus on domestic issues and the Vietnam War. 
Network television would bring back nuclear issues to news formats and to a new 
generation of television watchers by the late seventies. For Generation X, the term that describes 
Americans born between 1968 and 1981, images and ideas about the Cold War were received 
exclusively through the network television medium. In contrast with older Americans, 
Generation X knew less about the Cold War and had not experienced the immediacy in which 
television could evoke nuclear anxiety. This is not to suggest that Generation X had no 
knowledge of nuclear culture, as Hollywood produced a wide range of nuclear-themed films 
throughout the sixties and seventies. However, television is a different medium, especially with 
the conflation of news and entertainment that emerges in the late seventies. In 1979, as a result of 
the March 28 nuclear accident at Pennsylvania‘s Three Mile Island nuclear power plant and 
President Carter‘s growing frustration with the Soviet Union, network television repackaged 
nuclear-themed programming for a new generation of viewers. Most notably, it is the images 
from made-for-television films such as The Day After that will become cultural touchstones for 
an entire generation whose only knowledge of the Cold War came directly from television. 
This pronounced emphasis on nuclear-themed programming was the last phase of the 
Cold War. For American audiences of the eighties, the issue of nuclear weapons saturated 
network programming, from scripted made-for-television films such as World War III, Special 
Bulletin, and The Day After, to nightly news segments about nuclear freeze, to even 
scripted/fictional news such as ―The Crisis Game.‖ This level of media attention did create a 
renewed climate of nuclear fear that lingered until the official collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. Although the late atomic period is arguably the most active era of the Cold War in terms of 
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visual culture, global activism, the expansion of nuclear weapons to other countries, and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, it is also arguably the least explored by scholars. A cursory look at 
the late atomic period under Reagan alone chronicles the largest military budget expansion of the 
postwar era (1981), the largest political demonstration in American history (1982), the adoption 
of the nuclear freeze resolution by the House of Representatives (1983), and the most-viewed 
nuclear apocalypse movie in network television history (1983), as well as the signing of the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the most comprehensive nuclear negotiation 
treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, signed in 1987. Any one of these events 
should be examined independent of one another; yet collectively, they illustrate a larger point 
about the significance of the decade, particularly for Cold War historians. 
Over the last thirty years, television has reinvented itself in significant ways. The collapse 
of the major three networks control of national viewership in the eighties, the availability of 
multichannel cable and global satellite technologies, changes in regulation policies and 
ownership rules along with new types of personal home-recording video systems, all contribute 
to transformations in the ways we ―watch‖ television. As the cable and broadcast networks 
struggle to compete for audiences, new program forms emerge and are emulated by other 
television markets.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, in response to changes in the industry, 
policy, technology and audience viewing habits, network television revitalized its schedules and 
targeted specific groups, especially the suburban youth and elderly, with new program types. The 
emergence of the Fox network in 1986 is emblematic of this transformation. The network‘s first 
venture was The Late Show Starring Joan Rivers, which debuted October 1986, and was created 
specifically to lure viewers away from The Tonight Show Starring Johnny Carson on NBC. 
Although the Joan Rivers‘ version barely lasted a year, Fox continued to plunder the three major 
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networks audience base by engaging in niche programming. Beginning in April 1987, the 
network introduced audiences to a more subversive type of family situation comedy in the form 
of the unapologetically dysfunctional, Married …with Children. This depiction of the 
contemporary American family was far removed from the positive images offered by NBC‘s The 
Cosby Show, and ABC‘s Family Ties and Growing Pains. However, Fox continued to deliver 
alternative programming by introducing American audiences to comedienne Tracy Ullman as 
well as the still-running, cartoon, satirical family, The Simpsons. Originating as a vignette on the 
Tracy Ullman Show, the success of this cartoon family was soon spun off as its own half-hour 
animated series in 1989. Emerging as the new network of the late eighties, Fox branded itself as 
the network for hip programming.  Included in the new Fox pantheon of shows was Keenan 
Ivory Wayans‘s In Living Color, featuring an ensemble of African-American actors and 
comedians, as well as the network for youth-oriented series, such as 21 Jump Street and Beverly 
Hills 90210.
321
   
Fox would continue to find success in the growth of infotainment broadcasting, a similar 
pattern seen on ABC, NBS and CBS. Three network shows specifically demonstrate the Fox 
network‘s commitment to creating inexpensive, reality-based shows that dealt with immediate 
issues and blurred the lines between fact and fiction. The tabloid newsmagazine show, A Current 
Affair (1987), became a hit for the network offering a daily dose of sensational stories on lurid 
crimes, sex and celebrities. America‘s Most Wanted, premiering of Fox in February 1988, 
became one of the most popular series on the network. It presented factual information on 
wanted fugitives as well as fictional reenactments of crimes left unsolved and unprosecuted. By 
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July 1989, the series became the first Fox program to rank first in its time slot.
322
 More than any 
other Fox reality show of the era, America’s Most Wanted invited, encouraged and even 
demanded audience interaction, asking individual viewers to become de facto deputies and 
marshals helping to aid the authorities in the pursuit of dangerous criminals. The network even 
repackaged the scripted, dramatized police show into a new reality format. Fox‘s 
reality/documentary themed, Cops, invited audiences to participate in the actual pursuit of 
criminals by placing the home viewer at the scene of police inquires. This series was shot from 
the point of view of the actual police officers on the ground with camera crews following and 
documenting police in the office, on stakeouts, drug-raids, and to a lesser extent, officers 
beginning and end their shifts. This look at real law enforcement officers on and off the job 
resulted in modest ratings for the network but helped to solidify Fox as America‘s fourth major 
broadcast network by 1990.
323
 
Just as the introduction of the Fox network was representative of the changing television 
landscape of the 1980s, by the end of the decade the big three networks CBS, NBC, and ABC 
had each created individual niche identities with American viewers. Since the beginning of the 
postwar era, CBS had worked to legitimize its news division from Edward R. Murrow, to Walter 
Cronkite, to Dan Rather. The network continued to dominate the airwaves throughout the early 
seventies and eighties not only in terms of news but also serial productions such as M+A+S+H  
and Dallas, both of which achieved iconic status and loyal viewership for the network. In 
addition, NBC struggled in the eighties to produce shows and news segments that rivaled CBS. 
By the 1984 season, NBC premiered an original family situation comedy that would also achieve 
outstanding ratings and generate a huge audience with The Cosby Show.  Furthermore by the end 
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of the eighties, NBC dominated television with sit-coms such as Family Ties, Cheers, and the 
Golden Girls. Interestingly, NBC produced on onslaught of family orientated programming for a 
variety of suburban audiences from Generation X to baby-boomers who found comfort and 
identification with the characters. Throughout the postwar television period, ABC branded its 
network as the channel committed to family programming, sports, and news. The network 
broadcast ABC‘s Wild World of Sports, created Nightline in the midst of the Iranian Hostage 
Crisis, and produced some of the most widely viewed made-for-television movies of the late 
seventies and early eighties with Roots (1977) and The Day After (1983). At the decade‘s end, 
with the introduction of Fox and its commitment to subversive humor and ―realistic‖ 
programming, American audiences had more viewing choices and in turn demonstrated their 
own agency by identifying with individual shows rather than a network brand.  
The decade is filled with iconic imagery captured and recycled on American network 
television. From Reagan‘s assassination attempt (1981), to The Day After (1983), the Geneva 
Summit (1985) to Reagan‘s public declaration to Gorbachev regarding the destruction of the 
Berlin Wall (1987) to the televised proceedings of the Iran-Contra hearing (1987), collectively 
these images present the visual trajectory of not only the Reagan administration but also a 
televised history of the Cold War.   
Reagan‘s final years in office are in stark contrast to the genesis of his presidency. By the 
end of his second term, Reagan expressed a personal and ideological willingness to engage ―the 
evil empire,‖ that produced positive result. His belief in American expectionalism and ―Star 
Wars‖ terrified and helped bankrupt the Soviet Union. This is not to suggest that Reagan‘s 
cooperation and presidency alone brought an end to the Cold War but coupled with the scope and 
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success of the Gorbachev Revolution the era of cooperation among the two existing superpowers 
marked the end of Soviet occupation from East Germany throughout Central Europe.   
As the decade begins, television news and print journalists alike are much more 
interrogative of President Reagan and his case for investing millions of tax-payer dollars to 
rejuvenate the U.S. nuclear arsenal. From the media‘s interest in the nuclear freeze movement to 
the prime-time inquiries into Reagan militarism, mass media writ large was more openly critical 
and hostile to the administration. However, as the decade moves on, particularly after Reagan‘s 
reelection in 1984, the television news industry becomes much passive in its depiction of the 
President and his administration‘s policies. Furthermore, television in the eighties presents these 
moments of rupture in the traditionally established connections between government, the three 
major networks, and American viewers. These points of rupture include the post-Day After 
roundtable discussion that invited audiences to participate in a live-televised discussion with US 
officials on the topic of nuclear war. This invitation to the American public to engage in official 
nuclear discourse can be interpreted as a moment of democratized television space where 
ordinary Americans demonstrated their agency, voice, and collective concerns.   
As for network television news and programming, it followed a similar trajectory of 
Reagan‘s eighties. Upon his arrival, his military budget increase was met with more overt 
criticism. CBS‘s news presentation of ―The Defense of the Nation‖ interrogated the new 
administration‘s key policies and its effect on domestic programs. In addition, celebrities were 
joining the growing nuclear freeze movement, whose image and wholesome activism was 
embraced by the mass media in 1982. By the beginning of 1983, the eighties zeitgeist of 
―personal technology‖ and the ―yuppie‖ captured the attention of Americans were who 
seemingly entranced by the bright future of personal technological items that radiated 
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conspicuous consumption. As for television, social realism had taken on new dimensions with 
the expansion of cable and the transformation of network news. Late-night news shows such as 
Nightline and the twenty-four-hour coverage by Headline News and CNN changed the public 
reception to television segments. By the end of the decade, CNN would dominate television 
news and become the leading news outlet during the 1991 invasion of Kuwait. This melding of 
fact and fiction and even the problematic nature of network news instantly creating sensational 
stories due to technological advances in the medium is best exemplified in the rise of 
infotainment and a cultural fixation on wealth and the lives of the rich. By the end of 1985, after 
Americans watched The Day After, Special Bulletin, ―The Crisis Game,‖ and for some, through 
the expansion of cable, even Threads, there was not only a political, but a cultural need to move 
away from atomic issues. By the end of the decade, the networks were mired with cultural 
representations of Reagan‘s idealized America such as Family Ties, Growing Pains, L.A. Law, 
Thirtysomething, Moonlighting, and Cheers. Additionally, First Lady Nancy Reagan made 
television and presidential history with her appearances as herself promoting her anti-drug 
domestic agenda campaign, ―Just Say No!‖ on a number of family-oriented television shows. 
This movement away from the nuclear social melodrama format implemented in World War III, 
The Day After, Special Bulletin, Threads, and even Amerika was notable, and it gestures toward 
a change in network programming. Although the made-for-television movie and the commitment 
to social melodrama still remains, by the end of the eighties, all three networks would decrease 
the production of the social melodrama in exchange for more news tabloid shows, or even with 
the creation of the Lifetime network (1984), which would gender the social melodrama as its 
niche marketing scheme, promoting itself with the tagline ―programming for women.‖ 
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More scholarly work is needed to investigate the link between television technology and 
democratized space. With the inclusion of cable and home television technology, the individual 
can create a distinctive viewing experience that represents agency and even democracy. 
Additionally, one of the major transformations in the television format is the development of 
tabloid-news broadcasts or ―vox-pox‖ talk shows, defined by a media personality heading the 
program by the creation and engagement of some type of public forum. ―Vox-pox‖ shows such 
as Phil Donahue Show (1970), Jerry Falwell (1971), Jesse Jackson Show (1990), and Oprah 
(1986) directly engaged in-studio guests and the larger American audience to participate in a 
public forum on social issues. The notion that these types of public forums allow for agency and 
democratized spaces challenges conventional theory of television working as a one-sided mass 
medium that dictates public opinion. The popularity of tabloid news shows ushered in a new 
feeling of inclusivity by viewers. Conversely, the feeling of inclusivity by viewers also alters the 
entire design of public opinion polls and how they are used by politicians, mass media journalists 
and pundits to explain public policy. Infotainment programs unapologetically interweave the 
―entertainment‖ segments with varying degrees of seriousness and have steadily become more 
popular since their inception. Some scholars contend that this transformation in television has 
undermined most traditional notions of objective journalism.
324
 Nonetheless, the cultural 
connectivity offered by this ―news‖ format has an emulsifying effect in that the individual feels 
as if they can participate in larger, democratized discussions by simply watching television, 
another aspect of the scholarship that needs more exploration. 
No discussion on the relationship between television, the Cold War, and American 
viewers is complete without reiterating the significance of Ronald Reagan as the first television 
president. Reagan himself became a visual political emissary between entertainment and 
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politicians. He was the embodiment of the melding of Cold War issues within the mainstream 
discourse. Reagan‘s resume, consisting of Hollywood actor, SAG union president, HUAC 
supporter, and then California governor, charmed the press and his years in Hollywood 
cultivated skills of delivering emotional monologues. Early in his political career, he aligned his 
political agenda within the conservative right that conceived the Soviets as untrustworthy allies 
nor could they interpret student-oriented New Left politics as anything less than comical 
delinquents devoid of real substance. Reagan‘s record reflected that he would fight Communism 
both home and abroad and utilize television to disseminate the message that Soviet sympathy 
would not be tolerated. Some scholars have argued that Reagan was an image of the times, the 
ultimate media-constructed fantasy of unlimited wealth and unparallel visual pleasure.
325
 
Reagan‘s idealized image and positive optimism made him a perfect fit for television. His 
oratory conveyed heroism, patriotism, and faith in American optimism. This rhetorical style was 
best suited for television because it mirrors the teleplay‘s narrative conventions of plot and 
resolution. 
When historians look back on the televised decade of the eighties, we find more cultural 
connectivity because of the immediacy of the television medium. Throughout the decade, over 
100 million Americans watched the end of M*A*S*H, The Day After, and even the Super Bowls, 
leaving indelible imprints on the memories of Americans and helping to define American culture 
during the eighties. Television, acting as a mechanism for cultural identification and cultural 
interaction, is an important component of this narrative. Additionally, the deregulation of the 
network oligopoly is emblematic of the decade. Without the Republican agenda of deregulation 
the avenue for this public space and cultural remembrance may not have been as easily had. If 
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we are to understand the Reagan years and Cold War culture, it is imperative that we begin to see 
how all of these changes in political rhetoric, cultural imagery, and television work together to 
form a larger narrative that more effectively captures the eighties. 
Recent scholarship on the Cold War, television, and Reagan are flourishing due in part to 
availability of documents and the exploration of television as an academic discipline. In Epic 
Encounters, Melani McAlister explains the connection between cinema executives, the Middle 
East and the Eisenhower administration.
326
 Bernhard‘s work on the significance of legitimizing 
network television reporting provides amazing insight into early cooperation between network 
executives and Cold Warriors, especially in terms of the importance of network news and 
documentary programming. Additionally, Jane Feuer‘s work on cultural constructions of wealth 
and identify during the eighties, Seeing through the Eighties, directly challenges the Gramiscian 
ideology of television as a mechanism of state-sponsored propaganda. The fragmentation of the 
traditional network audience combined with the awesome success of cable niche stations, remote 
technology, and home video recording transcends the early cooperation between network 
executives and the government. For a moment before the emergence of the Internet and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, television appeared to work as a democratized space, where 
individualism, choice, and debate could be obtained. However, international conglomerates such 
as Viacom, AOL–Time Warner, and others soon emerge and complicate the notion of individual 
agency. These international conglomerates still construct and maintain the public conscience, 
and just as the big three networks denied access to other cable channels, these corporations 
provide limited space for the people to access any real counter-narrative that challenged 
corporate sponsored news media. This would remain unchallenged until the technological 
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development and cultural participation in the opening of the Internet in the early nineties. 
Collectively, these nuclear dramas opened up a televised space for the suburban Generation-X 
viewers to become involved in the public discourse on nuclear issues. These made-for-television 
films, along with Hollywood cinematic productions, defined nuclear war, Communism, and Cold 
War ideology for a new generation. One could argue that the Cold War was defined by these 
made-for-television films as their popular images still resonate and are discussed within the 
public sphere. It is interesting that the Generation-Xers knew more about fictional accounts of 
historical events opposed to actual facts. Yet this reflects the nature of the medium of television 
that grew in tandem with the Cold War. 
It is almost inconceivable to think that made-for-television films of the eighties were so 
politically wrought with controversy. The networks‘ attempt to explain them after they were 
broadcast, due to popular pressure or perhaps to increase ratings, are also worth noting. In the 
instance of The Day After, investigations into audience reception reveal that the news specials 
caused more confusion than explanation of Cold War events. These films did not affect the 
public‘s perception of Reagan. Looking at these network productions collectively, it is hard not 
to conclude that the mass media worked to create a climate of fear in terms of the production, 
investigation, and exhibition of nuclear-themed programming. My examination of official 
documents from the Reagan White House on the topics of nuclear freeze, popular culture, and 
the presentation of his national policies on television suggests that the issue was not so much that 
network television melodramas would remove the president from office. The real issue appears 
to be American assumptions and understanding of deterrence policy. With the growth of 
American network television in the postwar years, Americans were told that deterrence 
prevented nuclear war, even at the expense of nuclear disarmament. Nonetheless, as network 
255 
 
 
television transformed into an interesting mélange of news, entertainment, information, and 
public debate, the lines between fact and fiction became inexorably blurred. 
With the explosions of the first atomic bombs in Japan, the nation has operated with a 
different framework for dealing with foreign and domestic affairs. As most scholars have noted, 
what developed in the postwar years was a triangular dialogue of television, scientists, and policy 
makers and social critics that have often confused and misinformed the American people more 
than it has explained the awesome possibilities and conflicts of the nuclear age.
327
 Additionally, 
this triangular dialogue became more complex with the inclusion of more popular debate with 
the expansion and prevalence of mass media, including network television, film, print 
journalism, and the exposure of political pundits writ large. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, defenders of 
Reagan‘s military buildup insist it was necessary to lure the Soviets into a position of reform that 
would bring a real arms-reduction agreement. Alternatively, since the fall of Communism, 
longtime Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin has proffered that Reagan‘s 
presentation of militarism had the opposite effect. He states, ―It strengthened those in the 
Politburo, the Central Committee, and the security apparatus who had been pressing for a mirror-
image of Reagan‘s own policy.‖328 Even the architect of containment theory, George Kennan, 
agrees with this alternative version of Reagan‘s Cold War policies working to delay, not hasten 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.
329
 As historians and political insiders continue to provide more 
insight into the internal cooperation between the Reagan administration and the Soviet Union 
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under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, an evident ―change‖ in both countries brought new 
cultural and economic transformations. 
The ways in which the Cold War came to an end will continue to be examined by 
scholars, as well as the future of nuclear weapons in the post–Cold War world. Popular 
American notions on the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe are developed and 
constructed by television imagery. In the aftermath of the celebratory ending of Soviet 
occupation, nuclear discourse transformed as the proven methods of nuclear deterrence and 
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) were no longer viable. Today, we recognize how 
vulnerable we continue to be in the face of long-term nuclear issues and how much effort it will 
take to ever rid the world of that extraordinary atomic menace. Nonetheless, while nuclear fears 
may have dissipated in the post–Cold War era, it seems destined that nuclear culture and imagery 
have long-reaching cultural, political, and social effects. The role of the historian is to continue 
to examine this material in terms not only of adding to the historical narrative on the Cold War, 
but also of retelling the potential consequences of nuclear war. As quoted in Paul Boyer‘s 1998 
Fallout, a student from Generation X reminds historians of this imperative with this acute 
observation, ―Those of you who lived through all those scary events have to keep reminding us 
that nuclear weapons really exist.‖330 The further away from the Cold War we move, the more 
the world collectively forgets the existence of nuclear weapons and the awesome power they 
play in terms of politics, culture, economics, and international diplomacy. Although atomic 
history and the Cold War narrative are filled with near-miss accidents, potential showdowns, and 
miscommunication, there remains a wealth of information that is not available to the public. We 
might now know just how close to nuclear war the United States and the Soviet Union actually 
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came, but we should continue to examine television not only as the primary medium to deliver 
the American Cold War objective, but as a device that is emblematic of the entire Cold War era. 
Just as the 1970s was the decade of great nostaligia regarding the 1950s, we are in the 
midst of a 1980s revival in popular and political terms. From clothing, music, television, movies, 
and political rhetoric, America finds itself again grappling with the contradictions of the Reagan 
era. Popular celebrations of the 1980s are evident in film from the recent sequel to Oliver Stone‘s 
1986 film Wall Street, Wall Street 2: Money Never Sleeps (2010), to a retreatment of the popular 
80s cop-drama Miami Vice into a 2007 film. A recent article in USA Today suggests that one of 
the reasons for the current preoccupation with the 1980s is that the ideas of the decade never left 
even as the calendar continues to move forward. The cultural success of the Reagan revolution in 
terms of the pursuit of fortune, individualism, and consumption continues to shape the collective 
consciousness of Americans. David Sirota, a columnist who recently published Back to Our 
Future: How the 1980s Explain the World We Live in Now, asserts that the greed, narcissism and 
the size of cultural products are still very evident in our contemporary lives in terms of the 
Lehman Brothers, Bernie Madoff, the housing market, and marketing cultural products for the 
widest possible audiences. Sirota explains, ―almost every major cultural touchstone is rooted in 
the ‗80s…The Sopranos was an update of an ‗80s Scorsese flick (Raging Bull and later 
Goodfellas). The Wire was Baltimore‘s own Colors. Curb Your Enthusiasm is a Los-Angeles set 
Seinfeld. American Idol is Star Search.‖331 He goes on to argue that unlike the baby boomer 
generation who pursued an interest in social movements and political activism, the next 
generation of Americans, Generation X, ―didn‘t want to save the world…they wanted to get rich. 
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It became the norm, and it‘s the norm today.‖332Interestingly, the decade‘s dark side is also 
remembered most vividly through Cold War television imagery. For Sirota, the ABC made-for-
television movie, The Day After, continues to serve as the primary visual demonstration of the 
looming presence of the power of nuclear weapons. More than any other television production of 
the decade, this cultural representation of the Cold War still evokes fear of nuclear annihilation 
and a visual representation of the Reagan presidency.   
This renewed interest in the 1980s is not restricted to culture, but also politics and the 
legacy of the Cold War. For example, the February 7
th
 issue of Time Magazine features a picture 
of Ronald Reagan superimposed with President Barack Obama with the title stating ―Why 
Obama Hearts Reagan: And what he‘s learned from him.‖333 In the aforementioned article, 
Michael Scheuer and Michael Duffy explore the ways in which President Obama was able to 
command not only the medium of television but also controlled new social, internet media to 
gain political support and voters. Additionally, the authors suggest that Obama also possesses the 
affability and populist tone espoused by Reagan. This interesting commentary on presidential 
politics and technology speaks to the continuing legacy of the Reagan administration and the 
verisimilitudes of the Reagan Revolution.  
Although the Cold War is over, the issue of nuclear weapons and nuclear imagery looms 
large, particularly since the 2011 nuclear disaster in Japan. The tragic incident has brought 
renewed immediacy to the issue of nuclear energy and the possible hazards nuclear energy can 
create. Television has recycled iconic images from the 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear disaster 
as well as the nuclear meltdown in Chernobyl in the Ukraine in 1986. The April 1986 explosion 
at Chernobyl ―was the greatest single release of radioactivity in history,‖ and one of the least 
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explored nuclear accidents by American media outlets. 
334
 A BBC television documentary in 
November 1989 visited the nuclear-laden wasteland and filmed the abandoned city of Pripyat, 
which was once home to over 60,000 people. Radiation levels remained high throughout the 
area, necessitating the demolition of villages and forests. One assertion that can be taken from 
the example of Chernobyl and now Japan is that the public is not equipped to understand the 
generational effects these nuclear incidents wreak on the human body and the environment. 
Television has been the primary medium in which most Americans have come to understand 
nuclear issues, even though throughout atomic and television history, the line between fact and 
fiction has been continuously blurred. Through nuclear themed television dramas, news special, 
and roundtable discussion, network television in the Reagan years attempted to represent the 
unimaginable consequences of nuclear war to the public even though at times these hypothetical 
visual representations were often in conflict with the conservative agenda of the Reagan 
presidency.  
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